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· .. ·EGYPTIAN INTERVENTION IN YEMEN 
by 
.. Richard Little 
ABSTRACT 
-_.;. -.:..:-..:r.- · .. · .. 
1 
. ' y,I . 
.'-_.._·. 
The idea that the world is divided into a devel-
/' 
oped world which is· becoming increasingly stable and ~n 
underdeveloped world where violence remains endemic is 
inaccurate. ·The existence of the developed world acts :as 
a restraining influence on the system as a whole. The UAR 
intervention into Yemen illustrates the restraints in the 
system failing to operate •. The failure was not the result 
, .. ,,• -·-· 
of Nasser's imperial ambitions: this popular interpretation 
is not supported by the facts. Nasser was reluctant to 
pursue a policy of intervention. Yemen was the first rev-
olution against reac:tionary forces following Nass.er' s , 
pledge to support revolutionary governments. The revo--. 
lution would have failed without external assistance; it 
was impossible for Nasser to refuse support and retain the 
respect and leaqership of the Arab world. Nasser also 
feared the danger of Soviet intervention. He intervened 
for the limited purpgse of securing the republican regime. 
The policy proved self defeating; although the republicans 
had substantial support initially, the Egyptians quickly 
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·· .. ·. · .. ·became identified as the enemy.· ·This· bolstered the r.oyal- ·. 
ist cause. Egypt was on the barns of a dilelllllla: if its 
troops were withdrawn the ~epublican reg.ime would probably 
-
· .. lose c~ntro!; if the troops remained the UAR faced problems 
al.. ho@~,,_?nd abroad. Their only hope was that the Saud.i 
Arabians would cut off all as~i~tance to the royalists. 
The -Saudis demanded that the UAR remov~ _their troops first •. 
r 
If the UAR baa been able to solve the Yemeni dilemma sue-
.. 
cessfully they might have been abl~ to cope with the mount-
ing criticism of their handling of the Israeli question by 
Arab extremists. In May 1967 Nasser resorted to a~policy 
· of brinkmanship to restore his position. It failed and 
caused the Six Day War, but it created a new unity among 
the Arabs and in this atmosphere the UAR was able to per-
form a reconciliation with the Saudis. Most commentators 
argued that the failure in Israel would lead to increased 
violence in Yemen; in fact it created a situation in which 
the forces of restraint could operate and the Egyptians 
withdrew. 
The US, UAR and Saudi Arabia all pursued a policy 
of intervention in Yemen but their actions were quite dif-
·ferent. ·A classification of intervention is established. 
Similarly, the motives behind intervention can be classified· 
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FORWARD 
J . 
It has been argued that the sovereign. state is 
no .. ",~~nger a viable e~onomic or military un~t of organiza--
tion. 1 . In spite of this judgement, one of the major 
. ' 
...• ' . .. . 
developments ·in_ the contempo·rary international system has 
b.een the extension of the sovereign s.tate system to all 
inhabited areas of the world. This·trend has not occurred 
· in the abs·ence of violence. The major areas of conflict 
in. the post war world are found where attempts have been 
., .. . . 
made to establish independent- sovereign state.s; Korea, 
Vietnam and Algeria all fall within this -category. 
F. H. Hinsley has argued that this means that the world 
can be divided into two -.systems; the_ developed world which 
is becoming increasingly stable and the underdeveloped 
d 
world where violence remains endemic to the system, as it 
was in Europe before 1750. 2 His conclusion is that the· 
developed world must take positive steps to avoid being 
drawn into. these areas of perpetual conflict •. 
U· 
There is little evidence that the developed world 
~ · has any intention of ~fo:J_lowing this advice. Since World 
~., .• 
War II the U.S. has\built tip _its military forces in ·a way 
I 
,. 
' - . to permit large and small-scale intervention. The airlift 
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.. 
· from Germany in the Lebanon crisis of ·19sa·illustrated how 
formidable and effective these forces could_be. The U.S. 
!,.J}, 
which has in the past .restricted its powers of intervention· 
' 
t:o Eastern Europe is now developing naval forces which pre-
. -~-~ ...... 
sumably give it a _greater flexibility t<\ i;nterv~n,~ in .. 
. · ·other . areas. -~ese forces are not restricted fo the super 
.,-, 
powers. Britain was unwilling to withdraw from the Persian 
Gulf because troops could be stationed there to~fight "bush 
fire" incidents; they have been used for this purpose in 
East Africa. France too is building up an intervention 
force to be.used in its former colonies. 3 
Until now, the inf Iuence of the U·~ S ~. has been 
pervasive in most areas of the world, but now that the 
.... 
• Soviets seem to be developing the capacity to demand recip-
rocal rights, the·U.S. may prefer to adopt new means to 
,-.. 
,_ 
'· 
protect their interests rather than open the door to Soviet 
intervention. There othe·r factors, • addition, which are in 
may force the U.S. to reassess their position. The cost 
of an intervention policy can be very high, as the case of 
I 
Vietnam has shown. Many critics of the policy feel that 
I 
the price is too hi<Jh and that the u. s. would be advised 
to follow a course of military withdrawal and a reduction 
of ;~~itments.~ The U.S. administration has argued against ; 
such a move. It is believed that the U.S. presence has 
':.' 
·'\., . 
I 
' 
·.~ -. 
-~ .... --== 
'· 
' , 
,,:·. ,), 
helped to preserve sta:t:,ility in areas which would other-
wise have been a constant threat to international peace 
·and· security. 
6 
. . ' ·~-- -~- . . ' . . . ' \- • . ' ' . . • ' . c.. ·. ' ' Although some. leaders in the Third Wor~d support 
the U.S. position many are vio·lently opposed to the idea 
that the Great Powers have a general right to pursue a 
....... 
policy of intervention wherever and whenever they please.-. 
The problem for the decision· :makers in the developed world 
\ __ _ 
- . 
is that intervention is sometimes a u~~ful policy and may 
- -{, 
have beneficial effects. The justification for the U.S. 
intervention into the Dominican Republic (1965) may be 
suspect, but the long run effects have been beneficial. 
A highly unstable condition ha~_ been replaced by a stable 
. . . 5 . . situation. On the other hand, the_ 1ntervent1on of Great 
Britain, Q.A.R., and the U.S. into the war between Nigeria 
and Biaf~a has only exacerbated the situation. 6 The UN 
discovered during the Congo crisis that intervention can 
create more problems toan it solves. Although it may be 
argued that the U.S. achieved their objective in the 
; 
Dominican Republic, it would be difficult to argue that 
the Guatemalan intervention of 1954 has had any long run 
beneficial effects. It may be that subsequent regimes 
have-allowed the situation to deteriorate. There is a 
danger that in attempting to maintain global stability, 
' . 
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. the U.S. may be~ponsoring corrupt,. inefficient or tyran-
nical regimes. The price of peace today may be wholescale 
·violence in the future. The situation might b~ compared. 
to the present racial conflict in the U.S. ·where the· prob-
lem has·been suppressed for .over a century; it is debatable 
' . 
now if the problem can still be solved within a peaceful CJ 
framework. 
The conflict between conservative and revolution-
ary forces has been the second major source of conflict in 
the contemporary·system; it is, of course, closely related 
to the attempts to .establish sovereign states in the devel-
oping world. But the surprising fact, however, is the 
frequency with·which conservative and revolutionary regimes 
have been able to exist side by side without engaging in 
violent conflict. The rash of revolutions which broke out 
in Europe in 1830 and 1848 has no real counterpart in the 
modern system. Revolutions, and conflict in general, have 
been localized. This is a point which perhaps Hinsley 
does not take sufficiently into account. The division 
between the developing and developed worlds is by no means 
clear cut; the. two are not hermetically sealed· from each 
other. It is likely that the mere presence of a large 
stable bloc of countries has act~d as a restraining in-
fluence on other areas of the world. The relative 
.,... 
,,· 
r • '' ', • ~ ' ' l 
~. 
' . 
:;: . ... 
,· 
,:,, ........ ,·( ' 
·1, ,', • 
·- ------------------------------~--
--
I 
I 
I 
I 
; I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
! ' 
.1 
j I 
) 
! 
:; 
!, 
!,'. 
·, 1, 
(, 
l : 
l I 1 ,:, 
1 
I 
. 4-, ' 
. . ·. I. 
.· sta}?ility of the p~esent t·.ime has generally been attributed 
to the existence of nuclear.weapons, but it is possible 
that the forces of restraint are less tangible than this 
fact of naked power would suggest. ·' f.·. ·~ 
~ .... ~:-
\ There have been occasions when·this restraint, 
.which it is. suggested is a feature of the present inter~· 
nattonal system, .has not been exercised. The Western world 
has tended to blame the breakdown o:,;the mendacity of the 
_,-
communists and the insatiable ambition of some of the 
leaders of the developing countries. The analysis here 
suggests that the breakdowns relate to certain failures 
within the system rather than to particular regimes or 
individuals within the system. The decision maker only 
. . 
has a limited number of options open to him; it is only in 
theory that there is a spectrum of options which range from 
peaceful coexistence to a policy of unprovoked belligerence. 
This paper will examine the Egyptian·intervention 
into Yemen: an instance whers the restraining influence 
/ 
' 
within the system did not operate. The situation demon-
strates the features of the system which have been examined. 
The Yemen civil war, which began in 1962, was initially a 
struggle between the forces of revolution and reaction. 
The republicans wanted to turn Yemen·into a modern state. 
' . ', ,.·,. . 
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· The·- traditional ruler of Yemen, the Imam, wanted to . pre-
serve the existing order. He had never· had .. complete 
control over the country; order was maintained by a series 
of_;alliances with the major tribes which had more or less 
autonomous control over their own affairs. ·In other words, 
fiiif'' -·· .. 
under'· the .Im~, Yemen had few o~)! . ..:t:he attributes of the r . 
.. -, 
modern sovereign state, and the revolutionary leaders 
wanted to develop in that direction. They were very much 
influenced by the example of the UAR which had a centralized 
--~ _ government capable of molding the future of the country. 
' 
'· \ 
In these cifcumstances, it is not surprising that Civil war 
) \ 
broke out. The purpose of th.is study is to explain why 
the internal dissention attracted external intervention; 
why the restraints within the international system failed 
to. operate.· Hopefully the study will also raise other 
questions about intervention; although they may not be 
answered ·they can at least be ex·amined in the conclusion • 
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. CHAPTER 1. Background to Yemen 
.. 
.,,-· ···,, 
The course of recent events in Yemen cannot ·be.·· 
explained without a preliminary examination of the social 
structure which-has remained unchanged for centuries. 
. . "' 
The Yinen tribal system dates back to antiquity, before 
recorded history, and the tribesmen first acquired impor-
ta"nc·e ~--traders before the formation of the Roman Empire • 
. The use of the sea as a major artery of commerce reduced 
the importance of th~ Arabian Peninsula as a trading route, 
and the powerful kingdoms which had been established in 
Yemen were overrun by foreign invaders. However, it was 
only the tribes in the co·astlands which succumbed; the 
tribes in the interior remained fiercely independent. One 
author goes so far as to asse»t that the Yemen "has been 
a more or less independent state for the whole of recorded 
history, since about 950 B.c. 111 The final invaders were 
the Turks and their nominal rule came to an end in 1918 
when Yemen was recogni_zed as an independent sovereign 
state. Control of the c~untry was handed over· to Imam 
. 
Yahya and he and his son ·ruled .the country with absolute. 
authority. 
. .
They were-determined to retain Yemen independ-
. ence: they resisted change and their foreign policy aimed 
b 
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at isolating the country._ While the Imams did secure 
modern equipment,. particularly weapons, it was often stored 
.away from·. sight. 
The Imam was a spiritual as well as a temporal 
lead.er. Most of the interior tribesmen were Zeidis, 
branch of Islam, and the Imam is the leader of this sect. 
The coastal tribesmen m~inly belonged to the Shafis sect 
and rough estimates indicate that they formed the majority 
of the population. But they were given no politica·l power 
and had no control over the selection of the Imam. Once 
""-', .......... _.:;i.,..... 
he·had acceded to power his word was infallible 1n all 
religious matters and law on all matters of state. Howeve.r, 
the Zeidis never accepted the code of inheriting power. 
The Imamate is open to anyone who can claim descendance 
~ 
from Mohammed and fulfills the prerequisities which relate 
to his character and standing as a citizen. A new Imam 
has to be recognized by those members of the system who 
also qualify to become Imam. The members of this group, 
which has been variously estimated to number between 5,000 
~ / l .... 
and 50,000, are known as the Sayyids. In order to stay in 
power the Imam had to retain the support of this group. 
. ,':i f ...... 
~ . 
But this was done without giving them any form of control. I 
. Quite the· contrary. The Imam, himself, was required to 
give the order for the smallest detail of state 
',1 ' 
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I : , 
administration. 
"Not an. aircraft, a lorry, or a camel 
could move nor any man j ourn~y far . . .. , 
without his consent o No one might 
.enter or depart the country without 
his fiato Every legal appeal came to 
his office, every government purchase, 
from a roll of bandages to a shipload 
of Russian tanks, required his auth-
ority. In the structure of government 
·the checks and balances were scrupulously 
arranged to prevent the emer~ence of any 
independent responsibility." · 
~. '"""· '. 
The Sayyids, however, were responsible for admin-
istering the, Imam's commands .. :·, They administered . justice 
and assessed and supervised the taxes. Since they were 
not land owners nor independently wealthy, they used their 
positions to extort money from the general population. 
The Sayyids who did not have official positions "lived on 
the sizable dole dispensed by the Imam. 113 In consequence, 
the Imam was shielded from the masses. His only direct 
contact with the people came when he received petitions. 
So the resentment of the people was directed against the 
Sayyids and not the Imam. 
Opposition to·the Sayyids was common to both 
religious groups. The.non Sayyid Zeidis, known as the 
Qahtanis, identified themselves with the great Pre Islamic 
civilization which flourished in. Yemen for ten centuries 
before Christ. The Sayyids could claim no such association • 
. ' ' 
,, . 
I 
•: 
• 
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Since they all descended from the prophet they ·had to . come· 
from the Hijaz, to the North of Yemen. The Qahtanis, 
therefore, viewed them as interlopers who had no legitimate 
authority to rule in Yemen. It was also clear that the 
l 
Shafis would also strongly oppose the Sayyid's claim to 
authority. The majority of the merchants came from the 
Shafi tribes and over time the merchants came to control 
the economic life of Yemen. They resented the fact that 
they lacked all political power. Thus the Sunnis and the 
Zeidis joined forces on this issue. It is -important, 
therefore, not.to exaggerate the differences between the 
two groups. Wenner a~~s that the Zeidis·are "in general 
outlook · and philosophy closer ·to Sunnis Is·lam than any 
other Shiite sect. 114 The religious di£ f erences, therefore,,. 
are not so deep that interfaith cooperation on many 
political problem~ cannot be achieved. The main difficulty 
in ·achieving cooperation rests on the fact that the Zeidis 
tribesmen display: 
. ·. '. '\:,_·. ;,, ·.'. 
,/·, .· . ·,' 
"contempt for the comfort and effeminacy of 
pity life and the inability of city people 
to settle their arguments and feuds them-
selveso In other words, they denigrate 
urban residents• dependence on a government 
which has undertaken to protect their 
lives and apply certain standards of justice. 11 5 
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It is correct to say, therefore, . that through 
.. ,, 
14 
the long history of Yemen, ·large areas of Yemen were neve.r · · 
' 
• 
under the control of a central government. The highland 
tribes operated independently and they resorted to fight-
ing to settle the least difference between them. When 
Yahya took control in 1918 there was no governmental struc-
ture in·existence. Yahya's first major task was to create 
a · strong regular army, which he did with the · help of the 
Turks and the Syrians. He then subdued the rebellious 
tribesmen. This was difficult because most of the tribes 
had become·used to their freedom after centuries of inde-
pendence. The Turks had endeavo_red to keep the peace by 
paying the Imam and the two most powerful tribal confed-
erations in North Yemen, the Hashid and the Bakil, a 
monthly stipend. The Imam was closely associated with 
these tribes during the Turkish occupation and this was a 
major factor in his ability to establish internal order • 
. Ingrams says that these tribes were traditional supporters 
of the Imam. 6 But Wenner says that in faqt, through the 
reigns of Yahya and his son Ahmad, there was sporadic 
fighting between subsections of these confederations and· 
also outright opposition to the Imam. 7 It might also be 
mentioned that neither of the tribes remained faithful to 
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. . . 
the Imam during the civil"war. For the first twenty years 
.,,, ... , ··~·.i1l 
,,:; 
of his reign, Yahya was constantly having;. to deal with 
tribal disturbance,s· .. ::,but by the 1940 's Yahya _had_ used his 
army so effectively that most of the trouble had been sub- ~·:·~ 
•• 'ti 
dued. Moreover he began to rely on the ancient·tradition 
of taking members of the chief's family as hostages when-
ever a tribe was defeated. The system was unpopular but 
effective. 
The structure of the army was also to. have im-
• 
portant consequences when the revolution came. The regular 
army,.made_ up of volunteers was small and the Imam depended 
mainly on the tribal force which consisted of levies drawn 
from various tribes. Both the regular and tribal forces 
were drawn predominantly from the Zeidi population of 
North Yemen. These forces had. little sympathy for the 
Shafis Muslims and so the soldiers were prepared to accept 
the orders of the Sayyid officialdom to keep the Shafis 
under control. However, the Sayyids could not count on the 
loyalty of the. troops since they had no influence with the 
tribal leaders.a 
The foundations on which the Imam's power was 
.I. 
-... : ba'sed, therefore betrayed. considerable weaknesses. He could 
only maintain the support of the very conservative Northern 
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'tribesmen by,keeping out foreign influence and preserving 
Yemeni independence. This obviously alienated the'Shafi 
who wished to build up trading connections •. But since the 
Imam's,military strength,rested on the support of the 
,.. 
Northern tribes, both YahYa and Ahmad strove to hold.back 
the twentieth century tides which were having such a dra-
matic effect on traditional societies elsewhere. Such a 
---··----- "'.'", .. ..:---. 
policy was within the realms of possibility as long as 
communications remained poor and the territory to the 
north and south were prepared to follow a similar policy. 
However, in the 1930's the British advocated and adopted 
their 'forward policy' in the Aden Protectorates which 
was "designed to bring to the whole area the well known 
benefits of enlightened colonial rule. 119 Until this point 
the British had been content to allow the anarchical 
tribal system to operate in the hinterland behind Aden. 
Problems arose after the Imam had successfqlly managed to 
establish his position in Yemen and he began to agitate 
for the extension of Yemen's, southern border which had been 
fixed by an agr~,ement between the British and the Turks in 
1914., The tribal chiefs to the south .of Yemen quickly 
appealed to Britain for protection which the British chose 
to give. But in order to,provide an adequate defensive 
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arrangement they were c·ornp:elled to penetrate the interior • 
.. The Imams were operating a self defeating policy. · 
They believed that their position could only be really 
assured by eliminating the British influence from the 
Peninsula. The prosperity of Aden acted as a magnet to 
the Yemeni people. and from tl1e safety of the British colony 
they began to make demands for change in their own country. 
However, by threatening the tribal chiefs on their Southern 
borders, the Imams were forcing the British to move into 
the interior and thus increasing the danger of instability 
which was already present in Yemen. 
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CHAP"l'ER 2. Origins of.Nasser's Yemen Policy 
'·'"'·------------"------------------... 
'•.· ,'I 
t 
In 1952, a~new revolutionary government took 
control of Egypt and .the traditional Arab rulers viewed-
its success with alarm. Imam Ahmad was particularly dis-
turbed. He knew that the assassination of his father in 
1948 was the result of cooperation between dissident 
elements in Yemen, supported by the Free Yemeni Party 
which had been established in Aden. 1 He was all too con-
scious of the dangers created by the establishment of 
revolutionary outposts in other countrie·s which cou·ld)act 
as a focal point for internal dissatisfaction. After the 
fall of Farouk, he ordered the confiscation of all radio 
... 
sets in public places in order to "prevent the populace of 
Yemen being contaminated by Egypt. 112 But the most immediate 
danger to the Imam came from Britain's activities in the 
. Aden Protectorates •. -
In 1952, the British renewed its 'forward policy' 
and it succeeded in extending its influence by means of new 
advisory treaties with principalities previously beyond 
their jurisdiction. , I Wenner wr1 tes: 
' . . . . ' 
'-· · .. · ·, ,, . 
"Imam Ahmad took violent exception to 
the measures which were aimed at the 
amalgamation of the numerous small 
shaykdoms and principalities in the 
Protectorates intqf1 a strong political 
I, 
unit under the control of a non Yemeni 
and non Arab power. 11 3 
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Wenner attributes the Imam's attitude to his conviction 
that the "British intended to remain in.Aden forever~ 
thereby eliminating Yemen's revisionary claim to that 
.. 
territory. 11 But it would seem that the Imam' s reaction 
19 
related simply to his fear of change. If the British 
successfully created a federation in the Sbuth, it would 
act as a base from which dissident Yemeni could attack the 
•. ~ _.,.i;_ .\ .. ,. . 
Imam. The Imam was in no·position to bring about drastic 
change in Yemen without alienating his Zeidis supporters. 
The Imam's major aim, therefore, became to disrupt the 
B~itish plan by promoting disunity among the tribal leaders 
in the Aden Protectorates. In January 1954, the Governor 
of Aden summoned the chiefs of the Western Protectorate and 
formally proposed a federation. The plan was immediately 
attacked by Arab nationalists from all quarters. The 
reasons for the attacks are revealed, by implication, in 
a passage from Ingrams: 
"Such an organization implied firm 
British control. It was a piece of 
nineteenth century liberal imperialism, 
but however it was wrapped up and dis-
guised, it looked like twentieth century 
colonialism; and colonialism indeed it 
was ... 4 
.. 
'\. The motives behind the British action were as.· I . .. . 
ha~ prev·.t.ously been explained,· rather complex. . . . . . '· . But · 1 t · Wcl.S. . 
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intolerable from the Arab's point of view that just as the 
,, . 
British were being forced to leave Egypt they should be 
permitted to perpetuate their position on the Arabian 
Peninsula. If Nasser was interested in gaining the con-
fidence and support of the Arab world, therefore, he had 
' < 
to attack this move. His ability to remove British influ-
ence from Egypt made·it all the more important that he 
prevent the establishment of Britain in another area in 
.. ~ ... 
the Middle East. Nasser would have been accused of being 
two faced if he had not firmly supported the attack. on the 
British in the Aden protectorates. A natural extension of 
this assessment is that Nasser would also have to be in-
I 
terested in the policies of Imam Ahmad who also wished to. 
remove the British from the Arabian Peninsula. 
The Egyptians were not the only ones who were 
interested in the Imam I s aggressive stance towards the 
British; China and Russia, the leaders of the Communist 
world, began to display a real interest in the nationalist 
. ' 
and anti imperialist movements in the Middle East. Before · 
1953 the Middle East did not figure prominantly in Soviet 
foreign policy, since then, the area has increasingly be-
··come a centre of Soviet activity. Laqueur takes pains to 
point out that this ·was not solely the result of a Soviet 
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. ;.·,,'.·· '," '.·, 
initiative. _. 
11 ••• the initiative for Soviet involve-
ment in the Middle East came from Cairo 
•, 
and Damascus as much as from Moscow. At 
',/ 
,.'.,· .• I'• I 'T ; .' 
·. ,..._' 
first there was evidence of certain Soviet 
·,'1 
doubts and a reluctance to get too entangled, 
whereas there was no such reluctance on the 
part of Cairo and Damascus which regarded 
Soviet involvement as a prerequisite for 
playing off East against West."5 
This interpretation is possible, but it would 
seem more likely that Soviet assistance was sought for the 
specific purpose of eliminating Western influence from the 
area. It is certain that the Middle East leaders did not 
intend to replace this by Soviet domination. It is h.inted 
by Laqueur that· the Ar·abs were unaware of the dangers of 
Soviet penetration. 
"When a British.military delegation had 
negotiated shortly before with ,Mustafa 
Nahas, Prime Minister of Egypt, and had 
tried to impress upon him the necessity 
of keeping the Suez bases in a state of 
readiness in case of a Soviet attack, it 
,.:i 
encountered incredulity. 'But why should 
he care about Russia?' Nahas is reported 
to have answered. 'Russia is ·four thousand 
miles awayo' A look at the map would have 
showed that this was a considerable exag- ·' 
geration, but psychologicallyo this incident 
was very revealinge For Arab public opin-
ion, Russia was perhaps further than four 
thousand miles away, and the West was still 
very much there.,, 116 
It could be argued, however, that·this·was ·a 
· fairly realistic assessment of the situation. The Arab 
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· ·. leaders knew, as many in the West did not, that any threat 
,, :'· . 
. from the Communists was internal and not external. The . ·--·----.~-:-~ -. 
threat of Soviet military intervention into the area was, . 
and still· is, virtually non existent. 7 So there is no 
. contradiction in Nasser's policy of purging the Communists 
at home8 while formulating plans to buy Soviet arms; an 
act which has been considered.· a watershed in the develop-
-. 
. ., ·' __ ,,,"'j.., •. , '"' 
ment of Middle Eastern Politics. 9 But it did not mark a ·., .... 
move into the Soviet theatre. However, by mid 1955, the 
Soviets could see that the Middle East was an area where 
their influence could be expanded at the expense of the 
' Western bloc. At the end .of World War Two, the West sue-
cessfully maintained their influence in Africa, South 
America, the Middle East, the Pacific Basin and Asia at 
the expense of the Soviets. Post war history can be ex-
plained partially in terms of the Soviets attempting to 
rectify the unfavourable position they found themselves in 
1945. lO 
At the end of· October 1955· the Soviet Union and 
Yemen renewed a friendship treaty which dated back to 1928.11 
Both countries were clearly interested in remov~ng British 
influence from the Arabian Peninsula. By now, the situation 
was becoming acute for the Imam. Earlier in the .year there. 
·. had been an attempt to depose him·and it was almost success~ 
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·fu.112 and increased his determination to eliminate the 
disturbing influence of the British. The Soviets too. saw 
advantage in removing the British from the area. It seemed 
to offer' them the opportunity to exert themselves as a 
world power. For this reason they overlooked the reaction-
ary aspects of Ahmad's rule. "The Soviet assumption was 
that Yemen's foreign political _orientation mattered, not 
its domestic policy or social structure which were bound 
12 to change sooner or later. The objectives which the 
Soviets were seeking when they began to display interest 
in Yemen have been interpreted in a number of ways. But 
Wenner .concludes: 
" ••• that whatever their long term 
objectives may have been, in the short 
run the Soviet Union expected only 
intangible benefits. The~e included 
added prestige and whatever political 
propaganda could be used with the 
nations of Afro-Asia in general and 
the Arab world in particular, as the 
result of supporting an Arab cause 
against the power and wishes of Great 
Britain. 1114 
This last factor led Nasser to become involved 
in Yemen. But the motives behind Nasser's involvement were .. 
at once more complex and yet more defined than those. of the 
'.. 
Sovi-ets. Nasser's overall object-ive was to remove British 
influence, but- it was clear that this was not going to be . 
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. an easy .process. In 194 7 when the, British discovered that 
I, 
they were unable to maintain their position in the Medi ter-
ranean, their withdrawal was covered by the Truman Doctrine. 
which effectively replaced British influence by American 
predominance. It would be a futile exercise to drive the 
British off the Peninsula only to have them rep~aced by the 
Americans. Moreover, the situation was particularly deli-
cat~ in 1956 because the plans were underway for the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal. It was important that 
the British were not given an excuse from any quarter to 
intervene militarily in the area • 
. Nasser must have been disturbed, therefore, when 
the news reached Cairo at the beginning of April 1956 tl).at 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia were arranging a defence pact. 15 
Earlier in the year, Saudi Arabia had signed another de-
fence pact with Syria and Egypt. In this case the pa9t 
was partially an attempt to counteract the affects of the 
Baghdad Pact which had had such a disuniting effect on the 
Arab countr-i-es. 16 Nasser, however, was anxious not to 
I 
antagonize the British. At the same time that the ~rab 
· defence pact was established, for example, Nasser was 
offering to drop his violent opposition to the Baghdad 
Pact if Iraq agreed not to enlist other states into it. 1-7 ···. · 
--- •' 
'. ,•,, ·11- ... 
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On May 6, it was announced that Jordan and Egypt were .to 
' 
unite their armies. None of the provisions .in these 
defence agreements were- ever made operational and it is 
.. ,; . · possible that they represented a purely tactical maneuver 
giving the impression of unity while Egypt proceeded with 
the nationalization plan. Per~aps Nasser hoped to use 
this apparent unity as a deterrent against possible British 
retaliation. 
This.hypothesis certainly seems plausible when 
placed in conjunction with Nasser's policy concerning the 
defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. On .. 
April 19, 1956.Imam Ahmad arrived in Jidda. It was·the 
first time he had left Yemen since he came to power in 1948 • 
. It was no secret that he was going to sign a military pact 
with Saudi Arabia. 18 The following day, Nasser joined the 
two Arabian monarchs unexpectedly. It was believed that 
they were going to have talks on plans to upset the British 
19 position in the Arabian Peninsula. But it was also re-
ported on good authority, that Nasser was going to urge 
Ki~g Saud and Imam Ahmad not to try to· force a showdown 
with the British for the moment. 
It was suggested at the time that he did. nqt wish 
· to sacrifice the chance .of getting British aid for his 
; '· ;· 
~- - . 
'' --- ,· 
.. 
- '' ·· - --·•···•••'"'7·~'''-!<.r";,.~.'-',··:•--.. ;,--_, ~.· .• -,.-, ":-_,_··1-C ,'.,_.--;.,f(,-.;.-.,,~••'7"!7'"-r--,.u'l":••.•:_.•_•.:,.,,;-:---...)··1·,,··_·-~,.......-,..,,' ·, •·•'.· -·· '·, ~ 
·--- - -- -- ·-------- 'c:: 
,. 
. ' . ·. . . 
, ·,··: · ·:rL:~·· · · '· · · ·.: . ·. : ' ·· ~ ..... · .. ~, .. , ... ,. ··- - . 
26 
development projects. This could well be true, ,but it' 
-
still does not explain why Nasser should become involved 
·with Saud and Ahmad since both were in bitter conflict 
with the British. This was clearly why they forgot their 
differences over their own border and agreed on a mutual 
defence pact. The Saudi were in conflict with Britain in· 
the Persian Gulf area while Yemen was laying claim to the 
. ; ~. _ .. ' 
Aden Proteeto:rates and the island of Kamaron which the 
British had seized. By identifying himself with these 
forces, Nasser was increasing his.chances of irritating 
the British.· ·A partial reason for Nasser's action has 
already been given: he had to associate himself with all 
anti-imperialist forces. But on April 22, Nasser signed 
a tripartite agree~ent with Ahmad and Saud. Under this 
agreement, which came to be known as the Jidda Pac't,i;l}O the 
three armies were to be placed under a unified command and 
a supreme council and a military council was to be estab-
lished. The three states pledge mutual assistance against 
. 21 
aggression. 
Obviously Nasser did not·have to go this far to 
placate those pressures urging unity against imperialist 
forces and it is difficult· to see how it could help him 
to get British aid. It is probable that by entering the 
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··military alliance, Nasser was hoping to be able to dictate 
policy and restrain the other two members who were threat~ 
ening to take immediate action to oust the,British from 
their positions in the area. Since Nasser also sought this 
end, it is difficult to believe that·he actively intervened 
in the activities of Ahmad and Saud simply to curry favour 
with the British;·· It would have served his purpose better 
to stay clear of the whole agreement. It is not likely 
that Nasser bel~eved Saud and Ahmad were seriously contem-
. . ' 
pl~ting --~ immediate and drastic action• against the British 
·-
but they·obviously could act.as an irritant and perhaps 
precipitate British intervention. Since the plans for 
nationalizing the canal were already well under.way, it is 
clear this course of events could be disastrous. • • By Join-
ing in on the agreement, Nasser was perhaps hoping that he 
--
could restrain the other two members\lntil after the 
nationalization of the canal. Then the British would be 
alienated in any event and Nasser would be free to engage_: 
with Ahmad and Saud in dislodging Britain from the 
·Peninsula. 
·.· At the beginning of April, the Egyptian_ propa-
ganda broadcasts against the British were virtually 
. 22 
abandoned. This too seems to fit i~to a general strat--
egy of promoting better relations with the British. Nor 
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does the Egyptian recognition of the Chinese People's .. 
Republic in April 1956 constitute a hostiltmove agai.nst 
Britain, who had already recognized the Chinese Communists. 
It was a move to assert Egypt's independence. 
If Nasser did hope to nationalize the S·uez Canal 
without ~etaliation, he failed. But this does not preclude 
the possibility that he made efforts to prevent Britain 
from taking such action. In any event, the fact that· 
Britain, France and finally I~rael,were forced to with-
draw from Egypt brought Nasser tremendou~ prestige • 
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CHAPTER 3. Yemen and EgyPt Unite 
r . 
By the 1950's, the dilemma which had faced Imam 
· Yahya, and was still facing Imam Ahmad, became ac;:u1:-e: there 
were segments of the Yemeni population, aided by the Free 
Yemenis in Aden and Cai·ro, who were clamouring for reform; 
there were also conservative elements represented by the 
Ulema, the Zeidi Council responsible for the selection of 
the Imam, who were opposed to the influx of any foreign 
influence or reforin. 1 
The Jidda Pact was clearly an attempt to centre 
attention on the British problem. Ingrams believes that 
during the conference, Ahmad stated that he had had little., 
' I 
success with the West and Nasser then offered to try and 
get Russian help. 2 It could be argued that this invali-
dates the previous thesis that Nasser was hoping to reduce 
the danger of conflict in the Peninsula, at least until. 
after the nationalization of the canal. But this is not 
necessarily so. The Imam had already established contact 
with the Soviets through the Treaty of Friendship of the 
previous year. Moreover a Soviet trade delegation had 
toured Yemen in January 1956 and this was followed by a 
trade agreement between the two countries in March 19563 . 
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/ 
and later by trade agreements with Czechoslovakia and East· 
Germany. There was no need for Nasser to act as an inter-
mediary between Yemen and the Soviet Union. But by acting 
as an intermediary, it_would be possible to influence the 
relationship and certainly to delay any developments. Any 
hope that Nasser may have had of playing such a role re-
I 
mained dormant. The ,Imam "was determined himself to con-
' 
· trol any dealings which involved calling in outsiders and 
to make his approaches direct. 114 Moreover, Saud gave· the 
Imam three million dollars ~o buy _arms, whichegave him 
even greater £-reedom of action. 
So it was on Ahmad's own initiative that his son 
and heir,went on an extensive tour of the Eastern bloc 
almost as soon as the discussions on the Jidda Pact were 
concluded. Between May and September 1956, al Badr visited 
Moscow, East Berlin and Prague. 
, .. , I .. 
"As a result of this trip, Yemen signed 
a variety of pacts establishing diplo-v 
matic relations, trade and payment 
agreements, and friendship, economic 
and technical assistance treaties with 
members of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, 
Yemen recognized Peking as the legiti-
mate government of China, with which it 
also established diplomatic relations 
while receiving economic and technical 
assistance. u5 .\ 
!·· 
.: · In October 1956, a Ru~sian ship arrived in Yemen with the 
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first· secret s~ipment of Czech arms,· the fruits of.the 
agreements Il\ade during the:summer. 
The attitude adopted by Britain towards the 
nationalization of the Suez· Canal in July 1956 made it 
inevitable that Nasser would make no attempt to interfere 
with these ,developments~ In the first place he was too 
. preoccupied wi th-:::.events in Egypt, and in- the second ·place, 
he could not be seen to be opposed to this common venture 
against imperialism. N·evertheless, Nasser must have been 
J 
less than happy with what _w·enner has called Yemen's "drift 
towards the Soviet bloc 11 • 6 Nasser's attitude towards the 
increasing Communist influenoe:.::in the Middle East became 
apparent in the beginning of 1957 when the Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Committee, which was dominated by the Communists 
asked Nasser for permission to hold a large 'Afro-Asian 
People's Solidarity Conference' in Cairo.· 
"Nasser, alt.hough still the celebrated 
hero of anti-imperialists everywhere, 
was doubtless co'nscious that Egypt with 
her trade links to some Western countries 
broken and with others severely strained, 
was drifting into economic dependence on 
the Soviet bloc to an undersirable degree. 
__ He seems to have accepted the honour of 
being host ·to the conference with some 
, 
reluctance and took precautions against 
allowing a conununist propaganda machine 
to annex Egypt's newly won prestige in 
Africa ••• 117 
-,. .-~•t;-.••-.J 
. ...... ;: --~ 
. . . ~ .. 
. . I·' 
-,,~1 •' I ~1 •· '• • ' 
- ' . 
' ', .. 
'•., , .. ·,;. ... 
. -, 
·1 
i 
I_ 
. : I 
- -, . --
. --·---•-. ;·---, -~~--r::~1-.-·.1. ,•-r··-~n/- .>< .... -' .. -:~:- ·._ .· .. -.•,, -, -- ... __ .··' -.-·-v ••.•... -.. 
32 
• 1 .. 1 .'1·' 
' _' ' ( .. 
. I,.•-::--··-.--·,.;. .. ' 
. - ' . 
'\: ~' ' 
' :- \ .,. : ; '' ~·-
.More important than the economic dependence, 
however, was the growing reliance in the Middle East on 
Soviet arms. Between 1955 and 1958 it is estimated that 
the Soviets gave 750 to 800 million dollars ·in aid ·to ; ,. .. ·,... . .... 
., Egypt, Syria and Yemen; of this, 400 to 500 million dollars 
went towards arms and ammunition. Only limited quantities 
of arms were delivered to Yemen~-between 15 and 20 million 
dollars. 8 Nevertheless, this was sufficient to allow the 
Imam to believe he nad greater freedom in the realm.of. 
diplomatic manoeuvre with both his Arab compatriots and 
I 
, ..... 
the British. At the beginning of January 1957, therefore, 
Yemen called a meeting of the ·-joint command of the Egyptian, 
Saudi Arabian and Yemeni armies to discuss British· mili-.-
tary action in South A.rabia. 9 It was clear that neither 
Saudi Arabia nor Egypt had any intention of allowing Yemen 
to determine the course of their foreign policy and so 
when the Yemeni delegation in Cairo announced a week later 
·that it had received the names of 10,000 Egyptians who had 
volunteered.to help Yemen fight the British, this was 
probably the results of an Egyptian attempt to stall on 
the Yemen demands for discussion. It is difficult to 
·, transfer names into men and this was, therefore, substan-
·tially short of joint action by Saudi Arabia and Egypt •10 · 
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Froin the time of Suez, the Imam stepped up his 
campaign against Britain and Western observers believed that 
he was taking advantage of Britain's involvement with Egypt, 
but already the suspicion was growing that he was receiving 
. 
. 
. t 11 commun1s arms. After failing to get Arab assistance, 
therefore, the Imam called for high level talks with the 
British to end the border clashes. 12 The call was not 
accepted and so the Imam stepped up·hostilities. 13 This 
move was accompanied by an Arab League report that Yemen 
needed "extensive milita~y, political and economic aid to 
resist British aggression. 1114 .However, no assistance was f • 
·'""'·' 
given, except in the field of propaganda.'. Cairo Radio 
· continued to denounce the British as imperialists •15 This 
was enough, however, to alarm thoroughly the rulers in the 
Aden Protectorates. In the sununer of 1957, things quieted 
do~16 and the Imam proposed that the British invite el 
Badr to London for talks. He clearly thought that he had 
demonstrated his strength and that the British would now 
accept a solutiqn to the problem that favoured the Imam. 
The British were under quite a different impression. They 
assumed the Imam was now in a ·more reasonable frame of mind 
·and prepared to adopt a mutually acceptable solution. It 
is not surprising:to find that.the November talks achieved 
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nothin.g •17 . El ·Badr and his father, therefore, attempted 
to develop their strategy. They: 
·"concluded that they had not obtained 
sufficient foreign support to inspire 
,. ,,,:;· 
. . \. 
the British to co~promise. Consequently, 
immediately after the talks ended, el Badr 
made another trip through the bloc countries:· 
·Rumania, Poland, Yugoslavia, the SU and 
finally the People I s Republic of China. On 
his return, el Badr boasted that he had. 
' ' 
signed ten p~cts with conununist countries. 
These were a new series of agreements 
establishing diplomatic relations and 
economic, technical and military· assist-
ance. 1118 
Undoubtedly, ·it was the month's tour of China which was most 
significant and clearly demonstrated the purpo~e of the trip. 
A.,,~communique was issued in which China affirmed its support 
for Yemen's claim to territory under British support. 19 
The UAR recognition of the C • P. R. opened the 
Middle East to Chinese influence and potential conflict 
. 
with the SU. Al though most in the West were not consciou.s 
of the fact, the 'seeds of difference·, within the commun-
. ist bloc were sowed in 1956, if not before, and they were 
beginning to 'germinate' by the next year. 20 A major 
. 
cause behind the division arose from the different atti-
. 
tudes towards the unconunitted countries. 
"For the Chinese, even more than the 
Russians, all such governments have 
the essential negative merit of keep-
ing out American bases. But short of 
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corning under Communist leadership, 
there is only one way in which they 
can acquire positive merit in Chinese 
eyes: by engaging in armed conflict 
with one of the imp.erialist powers, or 
by actively supporting liberation ~ove-
ments involved in such a conflicto and 
thus weakening the O imperi,alist camp' 
by compelling a dispersal of forces. 
The Soviets, on the other hand, can 
also see positive merit in the support 
of such uncommitted countries for some 
of their own proposals in the UN and 
they are generally conscious of the in-
. direct influence they may exert on Western 
policy formation by. influencing the 
policy of 'third' countries for which 
the West is forced to compete; con-
versely, they see in the spreading of 
colonial wars of liberation not only 
a chance of weakening the enemy but 
also a risk of provoking him to un~ 
desirable lengths which has to be care-
fully controlled."21 
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It was predictable that while Nasser maintained 
close relations with Khrushchev and Tito, relations with 
China cooled, although the Chinese were careful not to 
involve themselves in an open conflict with Nasser. 
"Instead it has generally chosen to maintain good rela-
tions with him in minor matters and circumvent him on 
major ones •• 1122 So the Chinese did not compete with the 
Soviets in Egypt, therefore, but in Yemen, which ·was 
actively engaged in the struggle against imperialism. 
Thus the Treaty of Friendship established between the. 
Chinese communists and the feudal Imam in January 1958 is 
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··not really surprising. Howe,ver, this increasingly close· 
connection between Yemen and the Communists must have 
caused alarm. As the purges of 1955 indicated, Nasser was 
no friend of the conununists, and he had no desire to see 
their influence become dominant in other areas of the 
Middle East. 
During this period, however, events in Yemen 
.were really overshadowed by developments in Syria. During 
1956 and 1957, Syria increasingly came to support the s.u. 
\ As Laqueur puts it: r 
"Russia's aims in Syria were obvious--
they were to make Syria an ally (or a 
client state) rather than a satellite. 
It was an unprecedented situation, for 
never before had a non-communist regime 
. moved so close to the Soviet Union 
voluntarily, without war or civil war. 1123 
Just how close Syria was to the Soviet Union at 
this time is open to interpretation, but the drift certain-
ly frightened the U.S. The Eisenhower Doctrine of 
January 8, 1957 was partially a response to the situation 
in Syria. 24 However, the orientation of Syria's foreign 
policy came to an abrupt end in February 1958 when the 
union between Syria and Egypt was announced and the United 
Arab Republic came into existence. The reasons why the -·--·-
Syrian Baath party leaders went to Cairo to persuade Nasse.r 
( _..,:.._,, 'J 
to accept the idea of union are extremely complex. It was 
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\ 
certainly not because they antic,ipated an impending commun-
ist takeover. But it has been suggested they may have 
feared that the Syrian communists might at some time be 
able to exploit the pressures :·from Syria's pro-Western 
neighbours. In any event, the union took place and a fear 
.··. -.• of indigenous communists certainly played a part in the 
. . . 25 
situation. 
Nasser approached the whole question very cau-
' ,1 .. ··:.~~*~:· tiously a·nd the announcement was mad·e with great restraint. 
_It was reported that Nasser wanted. nothing said which would 
"inflame the passions of the Western world. 1126 
. 
Irrespective of the influence of the Western:~·· 
world, the formation of the United Arab Republic had. a 
tremendous affect on the Arabs and Nasser's popularity 
throughout the Middle East was overwhelming. 
"Nasser was at the apogee of his prestige 
in the Middle East. He was the idol of the 
great masses of the people, while every-
where his enemies were in disarray ••• 
11 
••• his picture appeared in shops and 
cafes and taxis from Aden to Aleppo and 
Tripoli. Most Arabs felt that here at 
last was the leader they had been waiting 
for, who would stand up to the imperialis.t 
powers. 112 7 
;The union also affected the uncommitted Arabs. The Speaker 
for the Lebanese Parliament said it would enable 'th.e part-
ners to put an end to imperialist infiltration "of whatever 
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kind" and that it elevated the Arab nation to world pow~r, 
bringing the "attainment of peace to the clrea. 1128 
But these moments of triumph for President Nasser 
caused consternation among the traditional rulers of the 
Middle East. The union symbolized the growing strength of 
· Nasser and showed th·at his influence transcended the work 
of his· 'ubiquitous agents' •29 It was not these agents who ~ . ~ Q. ~ .. . 
411ft 
mader·-effective headway in the subversion of the feudal 
monachies, it was the indigenous and spontaneous feelings 
which Nasser, without any conscious effort, ignited within 
the Arab people. David. Holden suggests that the result'~ 
was an atmosphere of "nationiist hysteria that swept the 
Arab world" and that under the pressure of these conditions 
King Saud, in particular, panicked and attempted to destroy 
Nasser by: 
"spreading his agents and his money through 
the Arab capitals in an anti-Egyptian prop-
aganda campaign. But Nasser was far better 
equipped for that kind of battle, and replied 
for•cefully through broadcasts from Cairo and 
Damascus and by whispering campaigns among 
the hundreds of Egyptian teachers and civil 
servants employed in Saudi Arabia. In 
March, Colonel Abdul Hamid Sarraj, the 
chief of Syrian Army intelligence alleged 
in Damascus that Kind Saud had offered him 
E2 million and the Presidency of Syria if 
he would assassinate Nasser and frustrate 
the union of Syria and Egypt."30 
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· , .This action is contrasted with that of Imam Ahmad "who 
had the wit to see that this sudeen achievement of Arab 
unity was bound to dazzle Arabs everywhere and that the 
best thing to do was to jump aboard the band-wagon, not 
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·As a result, the day after the announcement of 
the union was made, el Badr was reported to be en route 
to Cairo to announce his willingness to join the federa-
t.ion. 32 This was in accordance with Nasser's invitation 
to form a larger federation with the UAR. Says Holden: 
"The Egyptians and the Syrians were 
patently embarrassed·by this unex-
pected response to President Nasser's. 
appeal for recruits to the Arab union. 
The rest of the Arab world looked on 
in astonishment - and some ribaldry -
· at so incongruous a partnership. But'. 
the Imam was reported to be gleeful, 
for he had made a gesture by which he 
could pose as a champion of.:Arab nation-
. alism without surrendering any signifi-
cant portion of his sovereignty. 11 33 
While this presents· an interesting and entertain-
ing specta~le, it does not seem to describe the situation 
accurately. It suggests that Nasser was on the defensive 
and that the Imam took advantage of the situation.· But 
clearly Nasser was in a position of overwhelming strength. 
In the first place, there were conferences between Saudi 
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Arabia and Egypt on the possibility of Saudi Arabia join-
ing the UAR. 34 The union was not desired by either party 
and the discussions came to notl1:ing. Nasser suffered no 
loss of prestige as a result •. It would have been very easy 
for the_Egyptians and the Syrians.to-refuse to accept the 
application of Yemen. They could have welcomed Yemen's 
participation into the union and then stipulated conditions 
which they knew the Imam would not acdept. But they did 
not do this. Instead, they created a quite separate 
structure in order to permit the inclusion of Yemen. The 
federation known as the United Arab States amounted to no~ 
more than a tight alliance between Yemen and the UAR and 
thus was very different from the federation between Egypt 
and Syria where the sovereignty of each state was dissolv·ea 
in the formation of the new state. But in the United Arab 
• 
States, Yemen maintained an army which was distinct, even 
though it accepted the idea of a joint conunana. 35 Egypt 
went some distance to. accommodate Yemen. For this reason 
it has been interpreted ·as a defeat. 
. . 
"For the UAR, federation with the Yemen : 
was at best a formal genuflection to 
the ideal of Arab unity; at worst it 
was a humiliating farce. Not only did 
the United Arab States never come to 
life; while the shining image of Presi-
dent Nasser was sullied· by his apparent 
associations with a medieval despot, but 
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even the venemous propaganda of the 
Voice of Cairo was muffled for the 
time being by the oblig~_tion to- be 
reticent about this alleged new friend 
and ally df President Nasserc The old 
genie of the Yemen had proved himself 
once again, in fact to be a master of 
political tactics.36" · 
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The.reason why the Imam wished to associate him-
self with !'lass er is clear.. It reduced the dangers of ''-·-sub-
. 
versive propaganda, but more important, he could no longer 
be identified with the reactionary forces in the Middle 
East in any clear cut fashion. This worked to his advan-
tage. By being associated with the forces of change, the 
necessity for him to participate in the process of change 
was reduced. By a single stroke he stifled criticism from 
both the reactionary ulema and the revolutionary forces 
situated outside of Yemen. It was at this latter group 
that the alliance was primarily aimed, for the ulerna did 
not like the association and they could only be placated 
by the fact that aminimum of change was involved. The 
union served its purpose in so far as the criticism from 
the progressive forces was reduced. It is obvious that 
this could only be a holding operation for the Imam could 
·not stem the tides of change simply by the power of 
association but since it reduced some of the pressures on 
the Imam, the union served its purpose. 
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It cannot be assumed, however, that because the 
·Imam gained by the association that Nasse~ must have neces-
,. 
1
.. ... . 
sarily lost. It is difficult to accept Holden's assertion 
that despite his power~! position Nasser was completely 
outmanoeuvred by the Imam, nor Wenner's _contention that 
once Yemen's request was. received, the UAR "could do little 
I'. I. 
but accept. ~. 37 Union with Yemen must have presented the . 
UAR with some positive advantages, otherwise Nasse.r would 
not have· accepte·d the situation. Egypt's calculations 
~.9-Y_have been wrong, but it is difficult to believe that· 
,-..~1~~ ·•. - - ,~.-
t9ey were not made. 
It must be remembered that the Imam was engaged 
in a bitter struggle with the British and this fact had 
encouraged both the Chinese and the Russians to overlook 
the feudalistic elements of the Imam's regime. It seems 
that Nasser's acceptance of the union is firmly rooted in 
this fact. ·The whole of the Arabian Peninsula was ripe 
for revolution; all the conditions nec~ssa;y for such an 
upheaval seemed to be present. It would be intolerable 
if the communists, either the Russians or the Chinese, 
simply by virtue of their established presence'were able 
to take advantage of this situation. They would not have 
to subvert the ~oyernment in any way, they would simply 
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43 
have to wait for the revolution,. immediately recognize the 
\ 
. 
new regime and then. establish close economic, political 
.. i" 
and military ties with the revolutionary government and so 
quite legitimately have a firm foothold on the Peninsula. 
Since there was virtually no American presence in the 
country the communists were unlikely to meet with any 
opposition to their policy. If this hypothesis is correct, 
• • • , .. r -- . · ..., 
then the Egyptians were not alone in their thin~ing. Less_ 
than three months after· the formation of the United Arab 
-----..... __ ...... ......_ . 
States, Allen w. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelli-
gence· Agency.,warned that the SU had granted 80 million 
dollars in credit to Yemen; that additional offers of 20 
million dollars had been made; that arms valued at 30 
million dollars had been de7ivered; that Soviet and Czech 
military missions of some 65 advisers were in Yemen and 
·--
. . . ~ 38 that the Chinese had offered a loan of 15 million dollars. 
He argued that the Soviets knew that there was not an early 
prospect of acceptance of the communist doctrine and that 
this was a striking instance of the use of trade and aid 
"as an investment in disorder". 
In this situation, the easiest way for Egypt to 
keep some.control over _events was by a close political 
alliance with Yemen. The advantage to Egypt of such an 
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association became inunediately apparent when. the Yemeni 
delegatiqn came forward and asked,for economic technician$ 
to help with Yemen's, economic plans. 39 ,Once an Egyptian 
_, 
,, presence was established, the Egyptians and not the commun- · 
ists would benefit from any revolutionary change which 
might occur in the country. Under the conditions of a 
revolution it might be possible to achieve a further step 
in the direction of Arab unity. But as things stood, this 
positive aspect of the union was overshadowed by the nega-
tive factor of curbing the development of communist influ-
ence. ~---- . ·-
It is possible to postulate another 'reason why 
Nasser was anxious-'to gain some influence over the Imam• s 
policy. The build up of Soviet arms was obviously an 
encouragement to the Imam to follow an active policy in 
South Arabia. During the discussion about the formation 
of the union, the Yemeni delegate asked for Egyptian troops 
d 40 e d a e h d I I f h 1 I h I h an arms, in 1cat1ng t e 1rect1on o t e po icy w ic 
the Imam would have liked to follow. The action of Britain 
during the Suez crisis indicated the policy which the 
British might follow if they felt their policy under 
attack. If the Imam continued to press the British, there-
fore, he might find himself in a full scale war and in 
this even't; ___ ~~_sser would be placed under tremendous pressure 
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· to go · to the assistance of his· Arab brother. But there 
· could be no real desire on Nass·er' s part to fight a war 
to protect the feudal Imam and, therefore, it was import-· 
/ 1.r.(f·· .. ~ .... /~~~.·1 
! . 
ant that the situation in South Yemen did not get out of 
hand and provoke the ·British to a policy of violent 
retaliation. The only way to get some control of the 
Imam's policy was by means of a political alliance. 
It would seem to be -a mistake, ,therefore, to view 
the United Arab States as a victory for the Imam and a 
defeat for N·asser. More accurately ··it····represents a non 
zero sum game, where it is possible for both sides to gain 
some advantage from the situation. 41 As events turned out, 
both sides in this bargaining situation badly miscalculated 
and the expected·pay-offs never materialized. 
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· ·.· CHAPTER -4. Impending Revolution 
. r 
Whatever the reasons may have been which per-
·suaded Yemen and the UAR to formulate their alliance, they 
were peculiar to that particular relationship. No other 
Arab state made any attempt to join the new union. More-
over, this successful example of pan1 Arabism was followed 
by the intervention of Britain and the US into Lebanon and 
. 
. 
Jordan. This involved interference into the domestic 
affairs of the Middle Eastern countries and not only 
demonst.rated the continuing strength of t}le traditional 
'imperial powers' but also revealed the relative weakness 
of the SU hold on this area. 
Accompanying this unpalatable fact of power was 
the fragmentation of the pan Arab movement when General 
Kassem came to power in Iraq and established himself as a 
rival to Nasser. As a result, the Egyptians concentrated 
on solving the new problems created by the formation of 
the UAR. 1 
Relations with Yemen during this period, however, 
were far from sta~ic, although they proved to be no less 
frustrating to Nasser than those with Syria. It is most 
unlikely that after the formation of the UAS on March 3, 
1958 Nasser had any intention of getting the Imam to reject 
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all communist aid. Such a policy could only,,have been· 
operated if the UAR replaced .. the aid which was already being 
given by Russia and China. This was not l'JOssible. So 
.there is no contradiction·between the thesis concerning the 
. JI 
formation of the UAS and the fact that a month after it was 
formed, the_ CPR agreed to bqild a highway between the two 
~· principal cities in Yemen: Sana and Hodeida. 2 
Concomitant with this development, however was 
a rapid deterioration in relations between the CPR and 
Egypt3 largely because after 1958 the communists in the 
UAR were "vigorously suppressed and its prominant members 
imprisoned. 114 It could also be attributed to Nasser's 
close relations with the Soviet Union. He paid a visit in 
May and on his return he said that the UAR would support 
Yemen with all its military and economic force against any 
aggression and that he had received pledges of support 
from the Soviet leaders. 5 A week after Nasser spoke, 
British officials announced that Aden was of no strategic 
value to Great Britain but that a British presence must 
be maintained because of the dangers of a communist backed 
b . 6 pan Ara ism. 
By the end.of 1958 there were 500 Russian tech-
nicians and instructors in the Yemen; a thousand Chinese 
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working on the Rbdeida Sana road; Yugoslav pilots replac;... 
ing the Swedes on the Yemenis airlines and more tha~ 20 
Yemeni students on scholarships in communist countries. 
But it is still maintained: 
"As a specifically conununist influ'ence 
it is unlikely that any of this was of 
much consequence; and there is no doubt 
that the Imam calculated that Russians 
and Chinese in the Yemen were much less 
likely to subvert his regime than the 
Egyptians who spoke the language of 
Arabism, both literally and emotionally. 117 
·I:t has been argued by Wenner, however, that it was • serious 
concern' about the Soviets which led the Imam to pay great-
er attention to the US efforts to establish an international 
Cooperation Administration mission in the Yemen. 8 In 
August 1959 the ICA staff arrived in Yemen and the US 
agreed to assist in building a road from Mocha to Taiz. 9 
However, the US aid could be part of an effort to placate 
the reformist-elements in the country. 
The Egyptians were concerned about the Commun-
ist influence in Yemen. They had failed to establish a 
~
"=:t~., 
real p~esence in Yemen themselves. Although the Imam 
agreed to permit a small number of Egyptian and educational 
missions to train the Yemenis, when they arrived~ they were 
· 10 placed in positions where their influence did not count. 
Moreover, any hope that the Egyptians may have had about 
controlling the Imam's policy in the Aden protectorates 
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·proved illusory. It was reported, for example, that the 
Egyptians were forced to send .. a·stern warning to the Imam 
that they would not support apy military adventure against 
the British·. ll In addition, Nasser was said to be partic-
-ularly disturbed about the installation by Soviet techni-
\. 'r ., 
cians of coastal fortifications and guns commanding the 
-Strait of Ras el Mandeb,- a strategically important area 
between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. 12 
It would appear, therefore, on tbe basis of this 
analysis that Nasser_ badly miscalculated the consequences 
,-.-
of the formation of the UAS. However, the same can be 
said for the Imam. If he was hoping for military assist~ 
ance from the UAR, he received none. If he thought that 
the union would intimidate the British, it did not. Un-
fortunately for the Imam, it did intimidate the rulers in 
the Aden Protectorates and they began to espouse the idea 
of a federation which they had previously rejected. One 
of the Imam's aims in restarting the offensive against the 
British had been to destroy the British proposal for a 
federation. Ironically, it was the Imam's union with the 
UAR which prodded six of the rulers in Western Aden to 
.form the Federation of the Arab Emirates of the South. It 
. was inaugurated on February 11, 1959. 13 
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. The -'course of events altered quite suddenly in· 
April when the Imam ,fell ill and left for Rome and el ·Badr 
· took control. In point_. of fact "nearly all governmental 
business came to a standstill 11 , 14during the Imam's absence, 
but el Badr did attempt to carry out some progressive re-
forms in the civil service and the army. Also, the Egyptian 
advisers we·re now placed in influential positions. These 
policies inevitably .ali~nated the Ulema and the Northern 
tribes. But el Badr also succeeded: in aliena~ting the army. 
The Sunnis~,;were inevitably opposed to the Zeidi leader. 
~y the time the Imam returned to Yemen in August 1959, the 
-whole country was seething with revolt.IS 
Ahmad ruthlessly executed those whom he decided 
I 
were responsible for the revolt, he rescinded all el.Badr's 
reforms and all the Egyptians were removed from positions 
of authority. Many were sent home. It was reported that 
the Imam's fears concerning the Egyptian technicians were 
nursed by the Chinese and the Russians. 16 Despite these 
measures, the Imam was unable to solve the problems with 
the tribes. In an effort to maintain order, el Badr had 
.begun to pay a subsidy to the chiefs of the Hashid and 
I 
Bakil conferation. The army was rioting and so could not 
be relied upon. When the Imam returned, he was, disturbed 
by the sums of money spent and he cancelled the subsidies. 
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Moreover, he tried to retrieve some of the money which had 
already been handed ,over to the .. Hashid conferation. Later 
in 1959, Ahmad invited the main leader of the confederation 
• I ·-· 
to see him. The leader was given a safe~·1tconduct · but in a 
fit of rage,·Ahmad ordered him to be executed. Not sur-
prisingly, this led to a series of serious tribal uprisings. 
In 1960, the situation was amost unmanageable. 
In -addition to the tribal revolt, the Imam's health was 
deteriorating. Because of the centralized nature of the 
decision making process, where the Imam was even respons-
ible for tne1t·requisiting of light bulbs for the royal pal-
aces, 17 the administration of the country virtually 
stopped. Eventually the Imam was forced to negotiate a 
peace settlement, but aware of his precarious position, 
the Imam set about rallying all the Sayyids to his side. 
· For reasons already explained, this could only serve to 
increase the hostility of the rest of the population and 
it was, therefore, predictable at this point that the 
tribes began to differentiate in explicit terms the aa~ 
cestry of the Sayyids from their own. 18 
This breakdown of the structure which supported 
the Imamate was accompanied by an equally important decline 
in the economy. Yemen is overwhelmingly an agricultural 
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country and during Ahmad's reign, agriculture was allowed.·· 
to deteriorate. Thus while historically Yemen had been an 
important grain exporter throughout the Red Sea area, in 
1960 it was a net importer of cereal. • Even more serious 
was the decline in coffee production which has always been 
Yemen's major export and an important source of foreign 
currency. In 1962, production was little more than 4,000 
' ;I 
tons whereas twe~ty years earlier production amounted to 
12,000 tons. The decline was partially attributable to 
.the fact that farmers were turning over land to the -pro-
duction of qat, but · thi-·s was by no means a complete ex-
planation._ The quality of the cotton and tobacco deter-
iorated and even qat was being imported from Ethiopia 
'··'·i -.---
\ 19 
which was claimed to grow a stronger brand. 
In addition to these difficulties the Imam was 
no longer able to keep the outside werld at bay. The Imam 
had been able to keep Egyptian penetration to a minimum 
and had reduced the danger of adverse propaganda by the 
I ,fl .• 
Voice of the Arabs but he was unable to restrain the spirit 
of change encouraged by the Cairo Radio which continually 
reiterated the achievements of the Egyptians. 20 The Imam 
was powerless to do anything about these broadcasts and 
the effect that they had. As Ingrams has pointed out: · 
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· "The Imam had learned the power of .the radio and did his· 
.. ·,. best to control its use, but he was defeated· by the small 
. i 
transister set which only cost i.2 3s. (5 dollars} 1121 The· 
I~am came und~r increasing pressure from all sides.. In 
March· 1961 there was an attempted assassination which almost 
_ 22 . 
succeeded. It left the Imam injured and unable to deal 
effectively with the situation in Yemen. His brother 
Hasan, who had been Yemen's permanent ambassador at the UN, 
was recalled. It appeared that there might be a power 
•.;.!'"~. • 
conflict between el Badr and Hassan for the succession. 
The choice, according to Zeidis law was solely in the hands: 
of the Ulema,but the Imam seemed determined to impose his 
own decision on· the situation and el Badr was i·ndicated to 
be the rightful successor. 23 
In light of el Badr' s attempts to dev~lop friend-
ly relations with Nasser and·pattern Yemeni reforms on the 
Egyptian model, it might_ seem that future relations between 
Yemen and Egypt should have been assured. But this was 
not the case. In the first place, the Egyptians must have 
been disturbed by the inability of el Badr to control 
events in Yemen in the absence of his father. Holden argues 
that after this brief period when el Badr took charge: 
"relati'ons with Cairo grew more ambiguous", 24 despite the 
1
'tacit encouragement' whi·ch el Badr received from Egypt 
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.for his first attempts at reform. After 1959 the· 'Free 
Yemeni• with their hopes for ,.establishing a republic in 
Yemen clearly gained favour in Nasser's eyes. The. second 
factor which eliminated any real chanee of el Badr receiv-
ing backing from Cairo was the collapse of the UAR on 
September 28, 1961. 
Syria's withdrawal from the UAR was a tremendous 
personal blow for Nasser. Despite his early misgivings, 
he made a determined effort to make the union work. The 
'., 
failure caused the Egyptians to rethink the whole problem 
of Arab unification. Since. the governments of Iraq, 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia "did nothing to conceal their 
pleasure1125 when the utjion failed it was clear that the 
United Arab Republic was at a dead end and that it had 
pointed in the wrong direction to achieve Arab unification. 
It was a hard way to learn a lesson, but Nasser insisted: 
"We must have the courage to admit our mistakes. 1126 
The break up of the union, therefore, provide~ 
Nasser with the first opportunity since 1-952 to seriously 
· think about· Egypt's own political structure,., The National 
Charter which came out in May 1962 was the result. It has 
been described as "the foundation stone of modern Egypt. 
It might be compar~d'. ·- .. with the Magna Charta or the -us 
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Declaration of Independence.n 27 ·This may appear unduly 
eulogistic and elsewhere Nasser I s programme has been-
described as "little more than a mild dose- of ·welfare", 28 · 
bu·t the fact remains that the direction which Nasser was 
taking profoundly disturbed many conservative Arabs and 
Imam Ahmad in particular. He was opposed to Nasser's 
bel·ief that in order to attain the objectives of freedom, 
socialism and unity it-was necessary to adopt a programme 
of revolutionary not evolutionary reformism. So despite 
the fact that in November 1961 it was announced that Yemen 
sbuld adhere to the UAS · arrangement, the following month 
.Ahmad wrote a poem in which "he gave his own candid views 
about Arab socialism and the reform movement with which 
Nasser was associated". 29 Nasser quickly retaliated and 
publicly attacked Ahmad for disapproving his socialist 
progranune30 and on December 24, 1961 Nasser ended the 
federation with Yemen.31 The break was inevitable once 
Nasser had decided that unification could only follow 
\ 
social reform. It was impossible to maintain this 
position and continue an association with a regime which 
was ack-nowledge to epitomize reaction. 
Even before Nasser broke with Yemen, the Fre·e 
Yemeni, which had their headquart~rs in Cairo for more 
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than twelve years, wer~ beginning to show signs of activity •. · 
., 
- The organization had laid low since the formation of the 
UAS but with the growing antagoni$m between the Imam and 
Nasser they requested the Egyptian authorities if they 
could renew the publication of their propaganda bulletin. 32 
In fact, the b~eak with Yemen was simply part of a more 
:--~- _.gneral campaign which had served to antagonize both Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia. There were two elements of Nasser's 
strategy, both of which appeared highly dangerous to the 
Conservative Arab leaders. The first was the belief that 
it was necessary for the Egyptians to establish ties with 
the revolutionary movements throughout the Arab world. 
The second aspect was that the methods of revolutionary 
struggle against imperialism must be adjus·ted to take account 
of the changed methods of imperialism penetration. It was 
believed, in other words, that imperial penetration no 
longer took the form of overt agression but rather took 
the ~orm of indirect infiltration via• the palaces of 
reaction' and also via the sponsorship of divisive 
political parties under the guise of democracy. Thus it -
has been asserted that Nasser had altered his view and now 
. believed that revolution must indeed be exported to over-
come these facts. It is cited that the UAR has said that 
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in this process it will not be deterr~d by "the outworn 
· arguments that this will be considered interference in the 
affairs of other." As a result of this assertion,. the 
logical consequence is that the UAR has the "duty to sup-
port every popular national movement, " but it is emphasized 
. I. 
that Egypt will leave the manoeuvres of-the struggle to the 
local elements. 11 33 
This statement of the Egyptian position can be 
compared to the statement of Lin Piao which defined the 
Chinese attitude towards national liberation movements. 34 
Both endorse the right of revolution but in each case· 
attention is drawn to the need for indigenous support. 
Both are careful not to commit themselves to anything more 
defined than 'support' • The nature of this support is 
never specified in concrete terms. It is important to 
point this out, for otherwise there is the· temptation to 
imagine that some kind of master plan is being put into 
operation and that Nasser planned the revolution in Yemen 
and that he knew that he could use the revolution as an 
excuse to intervene. 
It is certain that once the UAS was dissolved, 
· · ·· there was no further !!easton why Nasser should refrain 
from attacking the Imam and from January 1962, the Voice 
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pf the Arabs opened its onslaught. The Imanr was identi- · 
":. 
fied with imperialism and the Yemenis were called upon to 
revolt against the Imam "who was trying to, ·reinstate im-
, ~ .. ,.,, .. -·-· 11. 
perial domination in the Arab world. 11 The broadcasts 
appealed to the Yemenis to II join the battle for Arab 
liberation, unity and socialism". 35 'i'here were similar 
attacks on Saudi Arabia and Jordan and this was obviously 
the result of Nasser's belief that close cooperation be-
tween the Arab states would never be achieved until social 
justice had been brought about throughout the Middle East. 
Ingrams reflects that this propaganda campaign showed 
results during the year and asserts that this II illustrated 
well the power of misused radio on immature minds. 1136 
This, of course, is typical of Ingrams condescending atti-
tude towards the masses. More important, the judgement 
runs counter to most of the research which has been done 
on the effects of the mass media in the social sciences. 37 
It is much more likely that Nasser's propaganda 
merely strengthened convictions which were already firmly 
established. Cairo did not have a monopoly on the use of 
the radio. The Imam a1so had access to transmitters. The 
!-. I 
leaders in the other conservatively led countries were able 
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to counter the attacks· of Nasser. If he was successful in 
Yemen it was bee.a.use the conditions were right. . 'Dhe Imam 
coul·d not. effectively counter Nasser's campaign without 
further undermining the support of his traditional followers. 
There were events which he could have playea·-1..up. In Janu-
<> • 
ary. 1962, a Chinese d.elegation arrived for a ceremonial 
opening of the Hodeida Sana road and in June a Russian 
· 38 delegation ar··rived to open the new harbour at Hodeida. 
But the Imam was caught in a dilemma and there 
was no real way that he could escape. Riots and demon-
strations continued throughout 1962. On September 18th, 
Imam Ahmad died. His body was flown from Taiz to Sana, the 
capital o_.f Yemen. The last obstacle blocking the road to 
revolution was removed. 
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CHAPTER s·. The Decision to Intervene 
It took less than ten days for the opposition to 
. . 
.. · muster their forces and oust the new Imam, el Badr. The 
coup d'etat was staged by a group of army officers led by 
. Colonel Abdullah-al-Sallal. The Imam, however, escaped 
and travelled north to gather support among the Zeidi tribes. 
From the beginning President Nasser has been associated 
with the overthrow of the Imam and the regime which took 
his place. Unsympathetic observers have ~I].~~ist.ed -that 
Nasser instigated and was responsible for the coup d'etat • 
. 
It is· ftl·~ther argued that el Badr was never given a chance 
and that he II showed a genuine intention to live up to his 
. 1 intentions and his ideas of a better Yemen. 11 But in 
light · of his earlier performance, it is di.ff icul t to be-
lieve that some kind of disorder would not have taken 
':! place even if el Badr had not been overthr©Wn. Much more 
than good intentions were required to reconcile the con-
flicting demands of the various factions in Yemen. 
.•. 
Neil McLean asserts that Nasser: 
"ordered el Badr to declare the Yemen 
part of a union with Egypt, and to 
announce openly his sympathy with the 
anti imperialist powerso As proof he 
also demanded that Imam el Badr make a 
speech attacking the British in Aden. 
But Imam el Badr refused, replying: 'The. 
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... Yemen is an independent country; I wish 
it to be neutral, like Switzerland, and . '1_·:, ·.,· 
I want to have good relations with my 
neighbours in Aden to the South and with 
Saudi in the North. I do not intend to . 
subjugate my country to you Egyptians •. • 112 
McLean argues that Nasser then decided to get rid of .the_· 
Imam· and instructed Sal·lal to kill him and set up a 
republic. Since McLean has had no contact with the 
republicans or the Egyptians, he must have got this in-
formation from the exile~ royalists. It is, therefore 
possible that this is a 'doctored' version of the events 
which took place. r·t would seem most unlikely that. Nasser 
had any intention of forming a union with Yemen after the 
· disastrous experience with the Syrians. I·f he did make 
such a demand it is certain that he did not mean it. This 
is supported by the fact that when Sallal said on October· 
5th that he favoured a reestablishment of the federation 
between Yemen and UAR~ Nasser went out of his way to point 
,, 
out that while the UAR had pledged ' full support·' to the 
new revolutionary regime in Yemen, Cairo was not ready to 
take up the question of renewing federation with.Yemen. 4 
;~ 
~ff 
It should also be noted that el Badr's previous 
actions in'dicate that he was anxious to have -close re-
- : 
lations with Cairo. It is more likely, therefore, that 
· Nass.er refused to have any dealings with the· new Imam • 
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· This, of course, does not mean that Nasser was not re-
sponsible for the coup, but even this would seem to run 
counter to the circumstances which existed. . The revolu- . 
tion was not. an isolated incident. The new regime was 
quick to point out that 11We started our revolution in • ·~···. t •. ~ ,. 
1948 when Nasser was an unknown soldier." Since then there 
had been a series of unsuccessful coups against the Imam. 5 
It has also been pointed out that the coup d'etat was not 
simply the work of a small band of army officers. It was 
the joint work of military men and civilians. 6 McLean 
a11gues in support of his case that the Egyptian · soldiers 
left Egypt before the coup d'etat took place. Apart from 
the fact that this argument is no more than an unproven 
assumption (it is based on the speed with which the Egypt-
ian soldiers arrived in Yemen) it means no more than that 
Nasser had prior warning of the revolt. 
The final criticism of McLean's thesis is that 
it would seem most unlikely· that the Yemenis would allow 
· th.emselves · to be dictated to at this stage of the proceed-
ings •. Later, when the Egyptian troops landed, it could be 
. argued that Nasser's influence increased, but before that, 
'·· it would seem probable that th'e Yemenis republicans took 
the actions which seemed most· expedient to them. -If these . 
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actions also suited ·president Nasser, then, this was.purely 
f ortui tious. The· argument has been accepted that the 
revolution was the result of an elaborate plan, aimed 
. initially at Ahmad. 
"The revolution itself was the result of 
a widespread conspiracy in which not only 
army officers, including some of· the 
palace guards, but also the Free Yemeni 
movement in Aden and Baghdad were involved. 
It had originally been directed against 
the Imam Ahmad and had been intended to 
take place at Taiz. The conspirators 
were forced to change their plans, however, 
owing to the Imam's death of September 19, 
shortly before the date fixed for the 
revolt and the assession of Imam Mohammed 
who left Taiz for Sana. 11 7 
It would seem obvious that the dissident Yemeni 
would wish to dispose of the new Imam at the earliest 
opportunity before he had time to establish himself. 
They may have waited long · enough to ensure that they 
would received Egyptian backing before making any move, 
but they were the ones most likely to take the initiative. 
Mansfield has related the decision to intervene 
to the domestic conditions which prevai.led. He says: 
':, ..... · 
I '.J 
. . . ., . 
"The summer of 1962 was a depressing 
time for Egypt. Not only was it being 
attacked from all sides, but because 
of the tense atmosphere at home and the 
trial of French diplomats on spying 
charges, foreign tourists were staying 
away ... a 
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. Thus, when the revolution broke out.in Yemen it "provided 
. a way out of the slough of despond for Egypt. 11 9 More I .. _.,;,, ,.; ','/! ~·,.; __ 
~ l J 1 ·· . ' 
·-
important, the policy worked: 11 there is no doubted that the 
significant effect of the Yemeni revolution on Egypt at 
; 'i' 
that time was to raise the mora.le of the regime as a whole 
and start a revival of the country's political fortunes. 11 
In addition, llijas.~erite stock rose again among the people 
·of Iraq, Syria and Jordan. At the same time Nasser• s 
. · . . 10 leading opponents were now on the defensive." It would 
seem ·intuitively that these favourable results arising 
from the revolution would have accrued even in· Nasse·r had 
not committed troops but Mansfield seems to indicate that 
it was 1Nasser's direct involvement with the revolution which 
really brought about the rise in Egypt's f·ortunes. 
In any event, Mansfield is employing an ex post 
facto argument. Nasser could not be sure that sending 
troops to Yemen and establishing a regime in another 
country .would provide a way out of the 'slough of despond• • 
It could provide an excuse for Saudi Arabian intervent.ion 
into Yemen and so might result in an inter Arab war and 
the results would be disastrous for all the partief?. More--
over the whole idea of sending troops overseas was a 
.. ,\, .. 
"daring departure from the Arab norm". · It has been pointed 
out that "never in modem times had one Arab· country sent 
. -..:. .. 
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11 its army into another's territory in quite this way. 11 
. This undoubtedly accounts for the cautious way 
that troops were introduced into ·Yemen. The first cont in-
1 
. J . 
gents of soldiers were flo\1n ;:to Yemen in secret. 12 Foreign 
newspapers reported the arrival of these troops as· early 
as October lst. 13 But as late ·as October 7, the New York 
Times correspondent in Cairo simply reported that Egypt 
was sending all ·possible moral support. This included 
medicine and technical assistance. He quoted the\Middle 
East News Agency···"as saying that "medical supplies" and 
"technical aid II had arrived in Hodeida in UAR ship·s. The 
correspondent also stat·ea that Nas-ser had ~-~ssured Sallal 
. 
. that Egyptian troops and arms would be:forthcoming if 
14 Yemen were attacked. On October 7, reports that the UAR 
was supplying Yemen with men were specifically denied by 
ff . . l 15 UAR o 1c1a s. It was October 19 before the Yemeni 
government first reported the arrival of Egyptian troops. 16 
Al Abram ·reported the same day that a powerful Egyptian 
striking· force had been sent to Yemen soon aft~r the start 
of the revolution. 17 It was a further ten days before it 
· was announced that the Egyptian troops were fighting in 
. . 18 
· ··Yemen. This hardly suggests that Nasser seized upon the ~c· 
. .... -... ~ 
opportunity to reassert Egypt's position in the eyes of 
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the Arabs and the world. The Egyptian presence was only 
acknowledged when the facts were t_oo well publicized to 
deny their existence. There was certainly no question of 
,' 
·Egypt entering Yemen with banners unfurled claiming to 
defend the new regime against the machinations of the 
reactionary feudal Imam supported by Saudi Arabia. 
The manner in which the Egyptian troops were 
interdicted suggests, _ in fact, . that Nasser felt that he 
had no alternative other than to support the regime, but 
that he was fully aware that the action ~could have danger-
ous consequences. He was perhaps hoping to avoid these 
consequences by introducing the troops in a surreptitious 
manner. This interpretation is to some extent supported 
by Holden. 
. . ' 
.- .. > - ,'"; 
II •t f 1 • th t ••• 1 was a oregone cone usion a 
he (Nasser) would agree to help them, 
not only because his agents and his 
propaganda had openly encouraged them 
- beforehand, thereby morally committing 
Nasser to their cause, but also because 
he simply dare not leave them at the 
mercy of King Saud. To have done so 
would have betrayed the vague hopes of 
social justice that Nasser had aroused· 
among the Arabs, and would have serious-
ly diminished his stature as an Arab 
leader. 1119 
· No doubt Nasser hoped that the success of the 
repuplican regime would bring long term gains, like the 
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fall of Saud -.rand .,the expulsion of the British from the 
":. ·~11i1" -~~.~ 
, 
Peninsula. But it. is doubtful if these constituted the 
· .. real reasons why Nasser took the step of sending troops. 
Such gains were too intangible and involved too many im-
ponderables. If Nasser had been sure that the new repub-
lican .regime could have survived w~thout bi's assistance 
·it is inconceivable that the other reasons would have been 
,,.4,': 
sufficient to encourage his intervention~ It involved 
the serious risks of becoming militarily involved with 
both the --British and the Americans. The possible pay offs. 
to warrant such an enormous risk would have to be large 
and unambiguous. McLean has argued that Nass~r 
11 invaded Yemen not because of his interest 
in the Yemen but as a first step to dom-
inate the Arabj.an Peninsula. He intended 
to use Yemen as a base for political and 
subversive activities in Saudi Arabia and 
at the same time to turn us (the British) 
out of Aden 11 • 20 
·1).ana Adams Schmidt offers a similar interpretation: 
"in Yemen, Nasser exploited the revolution 
against the ancient. Imamate to establish a 
foothold on the Peninsula. His objective 
was not so much to help the population 
against the royalist Yemeni as to wage war, 
to begin with psychologically and if neces-
sary militarily, to overthrow the monarchies 
of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arabian 
Peninsula and to win control of the penin-
sula's immense oil resources. 11 21 
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Given the fact that McLean has been an important 
-_ correspondent for the British newspapers and Schmidt for the 
American newspapers it is inevitable that much of the re-
porting on Yemen has come from observers who are distinctly 
unsympathetic towards President Nasser. Their interpre-
•• 1 ~' • . 
tations of Nasser's motives do not explain why he 'invaded' 
·-- .~ -.,/• ... 
·-
Yemen because he would have had~these facilities as long 
as the republicans remained in power. Nasser intervened, 
· primarily, in order to secure the republican government .• 
He must, therefore, have had good reason to believe, before 
the troops were sent that without his assistance the re-
publican government could not remain in power. Thi.s con-
clusion could easily be reached on the-basis of an exam-
ination of the failures of the previous coups against the 
Imam. 
It is generally argued that Nasser would never 
have sent -the troops if he had known the cost that it 
would involve.22 McLean attributes the miscalculation to 
Nasser's "total ignorance" of Yemen's history:. 23 · Holden 
attributes it to "over confidence·based on ignorance 11 • 24 
Both thes·e assessments seem u~duly harsh in light of the 
circumstances. Nasser does seem to have been aware that 
· he would encounter opposition, otherwise he. would never ...... 
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have sent the troops. But ·1even more important, as the 
..,) 
previous analysis has illustrated, tremendous opposition 
to the Imam had built up in all quarters prior to the 
revolution. If the Egyptian failure was as inevitable as 
the commentators seem to suggest, it must be asked why the 
republicans asked for their as·sistance •. · The fact of the 
matter is, that it was by·· no means as obvious as many have 
suggested that the Egyptians could not achieve their ob-
jective. 
The Egyptian intervention did·have one immediate· 
and positive effec~. It ensured that Saudi Arabia did not 
actively intervene on the side of the Imam. However, the 1-
negative effects turned out to be more significant. In 
the first"place, ~he presence of Egyptians on Yemeni soil 
provided a rallying cry for the royal is.ts and it proved 
sufficient to coalesce the factions among many of the 
nprthern tribes.· In the second place, the Egyptian 
. ·j ! 
' -· ~j i 
.. Jl presence also destroyed whatever chance may have existed 
' ' 
·fo+ ~stablishing unity among the republicans. Many of. the 
republican supporters did nc;>t approve of the Egyptian· 
presence and resentment quickly grew as the Egyptians came 
to dominate every aspect of Yemeni life. In a way, the 
domination was inevit-able. · One of the first tasks of the 
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·. new government was to drive the Sayyid officialdom from 
"ff I 25 o . ice. Since_ the Sayyid '. s had been solely responsible· 
for the administration of the country, there was no one 
trained to perform their functions. It is not surprising 
that the Egyptians ended up carrying out these functions .~;. 
and it was predictable that they would develop a. superior 
attitude·.towards the Yemeni in consequence, as they appear-
ed to be incapable of ruling themselves. 
This, however, was not the only reason for the 
friction within the republican government; the religious 
division soon came to bea source·of conflict. It_ has 
already been suggested that a sharp division between the 
Shafi and the Zeidi Sects had been avoided becauseL of the 
,.,,j { common dislike of the SayYid. Once the Sayyid were re-
moved the dispute between the two became more clearly 
defined. Initially there was an attempt to preserve an 
even balance between the Zeidi and the Shafi in the govern-
ment. Sallal was a Zeidi, but the Vice President, Beidhani 
was a·Shafi and the cabinet posts were evenly divided. In 
an open competition, however, in which only individual 
skills and competence--.,,:were counted, the Sha£ is would un-
doubtedly ,have had a dominant role in the contro~ gov-
ernment. The situation might be compared to the one in 
Nigeria, where the Ibos far outclass the ,,other tribes in 
... ,' 
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education and business acumen. In.Nigeria, the Ibos 
· managed to assert th ems elves throughout the f ederat·1·on . and 
this resulted in open warfa~e between the tribes. In 
. ' -~. 
· Yemen, this factor prevented the formation of a·. united 
front against the common royalist enemy. During the course 
of the war, power gradually gravitated into Zeidi hands. 
\ 
Prominant Shafis holding significant posts were replaced 
by Zeidis or Shafis having little popular following. The 
, 
result has been that.since the civil war broke out, the 
religious dispute has become more distinct ·and the Shafis 
believe that they observe a clear move by the Qahtan·i 
Z ·d· t d · t Y 26 ei is o omina e emen. 
It cannot be dogmatically asserted that anyone 
who knew the.history of Yemen and understood its people 
could have foretold the outcome of the revolution. In 
fact, the outcome depended on a large number of complex 
interrelated facts which were impossible to forecas~ 
accurately. There can be~ no doubt that the ·new govern-
ment was very axious to gain outside assistance2' par-
ticularly in light of the Imam's escape, which it is 
probable they knew about, despite assertions to the 
contrarY. 28 When they asked Nasser for assistance, either 
·before or after the coup took place, they were asking him 
to make a difficult decision. On the one hand, he had 
),,'· 
. .:.i,,.; I ' 
. - i 
•.• 
,>, _· •. , 
• • ~ • • ! 
,r . 
! 
i ' 
1 
t (, 
I 
'c 
I 
r 
I 
C 
' 
C 
t 
c 
C 
i 
C 
C 
C 
[ 
. --· 
I,, 
. . I 
72 
. ·'I 
openly and dramati·cc\ll·y d~fended the right of revolution 
. ·•· 
I• 
and had promised his support to all its leaders. On this 
occasion, the leaders of a revolution were requesting 
assistance against a regime which was generally acknowledged 
to be the most reactionary in the Middle East and whose 
ruler had publicly ridiculed President Nasser's reforms. 
Nasser knew, moreover, that if assistancevas not given 
there was a good chance that the regime would not survive. 
If this happened, then Nasser would lose the initiative 
and it would be futile to pose as the champion of Arab 
unity, progress and social "··reform. On the other hand, 
there were grave dangers in sending troops abroad. It was 
an irrevocable step and once made, it would be difficult 
to withdraw them before victory was,.1 secured. 
In most Arab states, the new government, if it 
had the support of the army, could be sure that it also 
controlled the preponderance of military power _in the 
~ . ·. 
rt \ l~ 
. "\ 
country. This was not so in the Yemen where the prepon-
-derance lay with the northern tribes whose leaders were 
bound. to be hostile to the new regime. It is probable 
' ... 
that Nasser sent the troops on the assumption that the 
future of the regime could be secured with a token force 
of Egyptians, sufficient to deter a Saudi attack and to .. 
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bring order to the recalcitrant tribes. If this is so, it 
was dependent upon the further assumption that the majority 
. of the tribes would accept the new regime and not turn to 
support the Imam. This was not an unreasonable assumption 
in view of the resentment which had built up against Ahmad 
at the end of his reign. ~he assumption was most likely 
·, 
....... ,.,... ... 
to prove incorrect if the Imam received arms and money with 
which to pay the tribes. The new regime might even have 
overcome this .problem if they had quickly appointed a new 
.. 
Imam with purely spiritual powers. It was undoubtedly a 
mistake for the new regime to abolish the Imamate complete-
ly. It was an institution which formed a profound and in-
tegral part in the lives of the northern tribesmen who 
;) 
• "'/:t 
were not s-eriously affected by the Imam's temporal power. 
If a new Imam had been elected immediately on the under-
standing that he would play no part in the new government, 
this might well have satisfied many of the northern tribes-
men. Since the Zeidis do not accept the principle !fP~~~ 
-t /. . 
hereditary succession, el Badr had no better claim to be 
Imam than any other qualified Zeidis. The republicans 
recognized this later and were prepared to a~ree to such 
.. · an arrangement, but of course by that time they had com-
pletely alienated the Northern tribesmen who were now 
, .r: ,, 
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engaged in a 'jihad' or holy war against the republicans. 
Whatever reservations Nasser may have had about 
entering Yemen, he overcame them and from a very early date 
he was committed to supporting the new regime. His pub-
licly stated position, however, gave no indication of this 
fact, initially. The· day that it was r_eported that el Badr 
had been assassinated and the new republic was proclaime_~1: · 
the Egyptian minister of state said that Egypt was opposed 
to any external interference in Yemen. 29 The republicans 
immediately adopted a pr~ Nasser .stance saying that their 
foreign policy would be based on solidarity with Arab 
countries, consolidation of :the Arab League, and promotion 
of economic relations with the Arab world. The economic 
bent of the country was clearly revealed when it stated 
that it would try to build up capitalism but would dis-
1 . 30 courage any monopo ies • On October 8, Sallal said that 
his government had no intention of pressing the claims ·to 
Aden put forward by the Imams as they had enough problems 
to deal with inside Yemen. 31 · There was, therefore, a 
conscious attempt to present a very moderate front to the 
world. 
The regime was quickly ·recognized by the Soviets, 
32 :the first country to do so, followed by the UAR. . But 
once the UAR and the SU were associated with the·new regime 
. . 
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, it was not long before the Sallal government c·ame to be· 
v·iewed with grave suspicion. Part of the trouble stemmed 
.from the hostility shown to the new regime by the Saudi 
government. The moderate policy which Sallal seemed to 
be initiating did not extend to relations with Saudi Arabia. 
On October 11 Baidani, the· Vice President said that Yemen 
considered itself to be at war with Saudi Arabia and later 
sai,).al pronounced that he hoped eventually ,to establish a 
I l' , f h ' ' 1 I 33 Repub 1c o t e Arabian Pen1nsu a. 
The new government in Yemen caused consternation 
in Saudi Arabia. ·The Saudis were convinced that the coup 
had·been engineered by Nasser and that it represented his 
first move to take over the Peninsula. On October 17, 
King Saud dissolved his governtnent and handed over control 
to Faisai. 34 The new government irmnediately acceded to 
long standing demands for internal reform which observers 
_ described as almost revolutionary in their implication; 
these included legislation on education, social security 
and regulation of labour. But the reform which acted as 
a symbol_of the changes which were taking place was the 
abolition of slavery. 35 Thus the Yemeni revolution had 
-repercussions which reverberated throughout the Arab world.· 
It seemed to threaten the very existence of the conserva-
I· 
tive rulers. One commentator wrote: 
. , . \ .. 
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11 It has shaken the Middle East even 
more drmatically than did the defection 
., 'I· 
of Syria from the UAR. Middle East 
tensions are again mounting, in some 
ways unaccountably. 11 36 . ·.~.·. ; . ', 
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The effects were~unfortunate as far as Nasser 
was concerned because the more important and dangerous the 
events seemed, the more inevitable it became that the con-
servative leaders, particularly of Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
· ·'would feel drawn to support the Imam. The fact that the 
Yemeni revolt caused Saudi Arabia to instigate such drastic 
reforms is evidence of the very real and direct affects on 
d:>ther countries caused by the -revolution. The impact en-
... 
,; 
sured that Saudi Arabia became involved in th.e con·flict. 
They refrained from becoming militarily involved, but they· 
soon began to give money to the royalists.37 
But the revolution had even wider affects. It 
occurred at a time of extreme world tensions. Both Cuba 
and Berlin had become centres of attention for.the great 
.,,_ 
powers and so it could be commented: :' t. ' f' 
,:,. '·. 
"The outside world, with plenty of 
other troubles, is worried whether the 
coup in Sana September 26 has qanger-
ously altered the power balance of the 
volatile Middle East ... 38 · 
. . . 
. ) \ 
. . . 
There is no doubt that the West was disturbed by the si·t- · 
uation for this reason and this inevitably increased the 
problems of Na·sser. It meant that the US came forward and 
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··assured Saudi Arabia of protection against any a~ession·. 
This meant-that Nasser's hands were effectively tied. He 
was unable to put any real pressure, even by_ way of thr·eats, 
on Faisal to persuade him to stop supporting the royali~s. 
Once Faisal started to give the royalists money and supplies 
it was certain that the Imam could win the support of many 
of the tribesmen. Without this backing, he would have had 
g~_eat difficulty. Moreover, the support which Faisal gave 
to the Imam turned out to be very much more effective than 
the aid which Nasser gave to Sallal. McLean has estimated 
that by 1965 _ the royalists had immense tribal resources 
' 
upon which to draw and that they might have numbered as 
' mal'ly as 300,000. 39 It would seem fairly certain that the 
Imam could nev'er have established such extensive assistance 
.. 
without being able to pay and supply the tribes. 
It is important to understand this fact because 
superficially it might appear · that the republicans were 
only surviving because of Egyptian support while the 
royalists had a wide base of support. In reality, however, 
_, the support which Faisal gave proved to have a much more 
· devastating effect oh· ·the course of the war than the 
· assistance o,ffered by Nasser which insome ways did more 
' ,f, 
harm than good. 
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CHAPTER 6. Initial Peace Moves 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the Yemeni 
·· conflict to explain was the inability of the parties to 
reach a peaceful settlement in the early stages. There 
were persuasive reasons why both Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
should have been anxious to resolve the dispute.- It was 
very quickly apparent, for example, that Nasser was over-
conunitted and that the task of establishing order in 
Yemen was going to prove long and difficult. The non-· 
military per.son·nel who were sent to Yemen were badly 
needed at home. 1 It was also soon established that the 
Egyptian troops were unpopular in Yemen and furthermore 
that the Egyptians did not enjoy being there. 2 
crucial factor was the cost •. By November 1962 it was estim-
ated that there were 10,000 troops in Yemen as well as 
"immense amounts of war material in the form of infantry 
weapons, communications equipment, planes of various types, 
tanks and armoured and scout cars not to mention artillery 
and other field weapons. 113 Although it is very difficult 
to estimate the exact.cost, it has been put at 350-500,000 
·dollars per day.4 
, .. ,., .. 
While an overseas war may help to stimulate the 
economy of a highly developed country, the diversion of 
capital.and resources from the domestic economy of a 
, 
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\ . 
developing country can have profoundly adverse effects. 
It is difficult to believe that Nasser was not·· disturbed 
by this drain on Egypt's finances. It has been suggested 
that he was·not fully informed on the cost of the war, but 
this does not seem to be a realistic explanation. Nasser 
reads the Western press and must, therefore, have been 
aware of what others estimated the cost. Even if he be-
lieved.the reports to be completely prej~diced, it is un-
likely that he would not make an effort to find out what 
the real cost of the war was to the Egyptian economy. In 
any event, the reasons against continuing the war were 
sufficiently strong by November for the UAR to indicate that 
it W<:iS ready to. discuss .a settlement of the conflict. 
The conservative leaders also had good reasons 
for wishing to see the civil strife in Yemen brought to an 
end. It was inevitable that this violent upheaval wou_ld 
tf'i' : 
i ~ ' 
· · bring demands f.or reform ·be~{ond the borders of Yemen. · It 
was possible -that th-e strife would spread to other a·reas 
in the Arab world aided by the power of the 'demonstration 
. ef feet• • In an attempt to undermine the forces of change 
the Saudi government acquiesced in many of the demands for 
reform. But this was not sufficient. It was also impor-
tant to restore Yemen to a peaceful state. So long as 
strife continued, the Egyptian government would be provided 
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· ·with an excuse for retaining troops on the Arabian Penin-
sula. There were two policies which the Saudis could fol-
low in an effort to secure peace in Yemen. In the f·irst 
place they could recognize Sallal's government and do noth-
ing to assist the Imam to recover control of the country. 
Since the ~audi government was deeply suspicious of Nasser, 
such a policy involved d~ngerous possibilities. There was 
no guarantee that the Egyptians would remove their troops 
or that Sallal would request such a move. Furthermore, if 
the troops were moved,· it would still be possible for Nasser: 
to use Yemen as a base from which to organize subversion 
against Faisal's regime. 
There was, however, a second possible course which 
could be followed. This was to give full backing to the r··1 
Imam and encourage him to regain control of his country • 
. . 
This would place Saudi Arabia in a position·to influence «.,...,,,. ·°' ' 
the direction of Yemen's future in a way which would be com-
patible with their own. The success of the move would,also 
rep~esent a tremendous blow· to Nasser's prestige. Since 
nei§her policy was assu;ed of success coupled with the~ 
' 
.sure fact that a 'revolutionary' repubiican regime would 
pose a constant hazard for the Saudis, it is not surprising 
that they chose the latter course. 
· But this policy was by no. means given unanimous 
1 . . . . ·r -·· 
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support and there was a section of ·Saudi and Jordanian 
· · opinion which was strongly opposed to giving support to the 
royalist cause~ This opposition was quickly and dramatic-
_ ...... ?lly brought to light on October 2 when a Saudi military 
aircraft landed with US arms and ammunition at the Aswam 
airfield in. Egypt and three Saudi officers asked for 
political asylum. They stated that they had been ordered 
to· deliver the weapons to a Saudi unit stationed·near the 
:--,.-/ . ... 
frontier in order that they-might be passed onto the Yemeni 
royalists. Between October 3 and October 8 three more 
Saudi airforce p~anes defefted. On October.17, six mem-
bers of the Saucl.i cabinet were dismissed for drafting a 
memorandum recommending that Saudi Arabia should recognize 
Colonel Sallal • s regime. Hussein wa.s faced with similar 
dissention in Jordan. This was indicated, for example, by 
the resignation of Kamal Sheer, the powerful Vice President 
of the development board. He said his decision a~ose from 
Jordan's policy towards Yemen. He believed. ~that the Imam 
was a lost and a bad cause, unworthy of. King Hussein. 5 
Nevertheless, the rulers of Jordan and Saudi 
. . Arabia quickly backed the royalist regime. . They, together 
with Morocco were the only Arab states to withhold recog-
nition from the republican government. Immediately after. 
· the revolution,. Prince Hasan,· Imam Ahmad's brother flew 
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from New .,York to Jidda where he was joined by other members 
'. 
·, 
of the royal family who had managed to escape Yemen or had 
been abroad when the revolution took place. On October 1st 
Saudi Arabian troops were reported to be concentrated .along 
the Yemeni border. The same day the Jordanian government 
sent a military mission headed by Jordan's chief of staff 
to establish contact with Hasean. There was, therefore, 
good cause for the new republican regime to feel concerned 
.... J'<l 
• I 
about the possibility of an invasion or at least extensive 
assistance to the royalist forces, by outside powers. This 
fear was shared by other Arab states which supported the 
revolution and 200 Syrian army officers offerea·to fight 
for the republican cause. But these states made no overt 
demonstration of their support. It was in a response to 
an 'urgent appeal' from Sallal that Nasser reaffirmed the 
1956 Jidda Pact whereby Egypt was committed to defend 
Yemen against external attack., 
It is apparent, however, that there were reasons 
<r 
· at this stage why both the Sauds and the Egyptians should ..
have favoured a peace settlement. In the early stages it 
could not have been absolutely apparent to the.Saudis that 
· the republicans could not establish .. ·:.control over- the whole 
country. The fact that such sweeping reforms were introduc.~ 
.· ed with such speed is an indication of how dangerous they 
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perceived the situation to· be. If international pressure 
had been brought to bear upon them at tthis point to recog-
nize the Sallal regime and withhold all support from the 
... \ . 
Imam, conditional- on the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops 
and a guarantee for their own territorial integrity, the 
• Saudis might have accepted. Such a move, however, could 
. ' 
only hope to have been successful at the ·very beginning of 
the crisis uefore the positions of the contending parties 
had crystallized. It was in the third week of November 
that the first move was made in · the international f,ield to 
attempt to dea~ with the situation. Then President Kennedy 
wrote to Nasser, ·sallal, Saud and Hussein offering his 
'good off ices' .towards a settlement. 6 
The failure of the West to react immediately to 
the Yemen crisis can, -of course, be explained by traditional 
diplomatic reluctance to become involved in an apparent 
domestic crisis. However, it could also be explained by 
Deutsch's concept of a communications overload. 7 . The si-
multaneous crises in Cuba and Berlin in 1962 were so time· 
consuming that it was inevitable that Yemen should be over-
looked.· 
'Throughout October 19,p2, both Saudi Arabia and 
· Egypt had ro·om to manoeuvre in the diplomatic field. 
Initially. Nasser maintained tha.t all states should_ adopt 
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I •,'•· 
·". . 
i 
i 
i 
I 
l 
i '' 
-
, -h~~· ----~=--=··''''·,:::::---... ':""7 .. •.'.,·7'7'."'.·,,:,•,.~,· .•• .~,,~,,,'•,".'"7'"'.; __ ,:"".""."' .. · ,~,1,1.,.".":""'.'.,,·~--•',1-... ~.--.•~'"'"'."".:: .. '."""",: ~.-•• ,."."".'"', .• ~,.:,.-;.,~-,;,;·,~; .• ,,.,~,,",_.,., ... ~·,,,.,+.J,====== ... "'°'~-~·,,~•-,..;~..__,,~n~--~--~-•~_,..,._~~••_.-.,~,--... ~,-,,.-~-••'-· . ,...·,1,;,.!111111!,,. ~ ................ lllla,III---~~~·~,~~.  ... ..-----___, ·- .. ,. __ _, __ .... ~-.-, ·,.,.,..,.,,-._...., .... ,. ' .. 
84 
' ,·• 
(), ,.. . 
a policy of non intervention in Yemen and al though Egyptian· · 
troops wer.e being sent to Yemen 1i,~hroughout the month it was 
''··-
not until the very end of the mop:th that it was officially 
admitted that Egyptian troops were engaged in the fighting. 
Similarly, Faisal maintained in New York that it was im-
; 
,, ' 
perative that all countries refrain from interfering in the 
revolutionary struggle underway in Yemen. 8 This position 
was maintained at the diplomatic level although aid was 
being given to the royalists. As late as October 23, when 
it was fully established and admitted by the Egyptians that 
troops had been sent to Yemen, Faisal insisted that Saudi 
Arabia would not offer military aid un·less it was specific-
ally asked for by the Imam. 9 
.. 
Although the republican regime insisted through-
out October that they were being invaded by Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan and South Arabia, it appeared that they were in 
firm control of large areas of the country and that they 
were not being confronted by any great royalist danger. 
But after this point, fighting increased in intensity and 
there was a rapid. deterioration in relations between the 
UAR and the royalist·supporters.Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 
On October 30, the Middle East News Agency claimed that 
1,000 Saudi troops supported by tribesmen had invaded Yemen 
in the Harad area •. The Saudi government denied having 
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troops in Yemen, but the reports clearly marked the begin-
ning of a major royalist offensive in the North West. In 
conjunction with this move-: there were also attacks in the 
--
East and north east of Yemen. It was apparent.to the 
Egyptians that irrespective of whether the Saudis were 
supplying troops, they were supplying extensive aid to.the 
royalists and thus ending any possibility of the.republic-
I 
ans quickly subduing the entire country. It was imperative 
that this sourca of aid was cut off and this was probaply 
·the rationale behind the~ Egyptian attacks on the Saudis 
villagePs which followed the royalist offences. This is 
a more likely explanation thaa the belief that it.was 
hoped that the air attacks would stimulate revolution in 
Saudi Arabia. 10 In either event the policy failed. The 
Saudis broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt and on 
November 4 a military alliance was concluded between 
Sau<it·Arabia and Jordan. Plans were also made to car;y 
out reprisal raids against Yemen. This was re ealed when 
--
the Jordanian Air Force Commander in Chief defected. He 
stated that he did not want to participate in the raids 
. . 
against Yemen and he asked Egypt for politi~al asylum_. 
It should be noted, however, that the testimony·of defec-. 
. ,•.,-,,,, . 
. , ~:.,, 
tors is always S:tJspec·t. i ' ' 
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From this point on,·· the conflict became irrevo-
cably polarized. As the royalist forc~s, backed by Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan, showed themselves to be increasingly 
.. effective,. sq Nasser was forced -to increase': his support to 
the royalists. On November 10 a joint defence pact was 
signed by Yemen and the UAR. Moreover Sallal began to 
adopt a more belligerent line when the reports of a Saudi 
Arabian attack were made known. The earlier statements 
that the Yemen government was too occupied with internal 
problems to renew the territorial demands of the Imam were 
- forgotten anda on November 13 Sallal declared that his 
government no longer recognized "the artificial frontiers 
created by colonialism to divide the Arabi~n Peninsula 
into separate countries" and that it was intended to 
"liberate our beautiful country from Saudis shame. " These 
Yemeni claims must have increase Saudi Arabia's suspicions 
that they were confronting a major Egyptian threat. On 
November 13, the Yemeni republican government warned that 
if Saudi or Jordanian aircraft attacked Yemen,. there would 
be bombing reprisals. The population was advised to keep 
away from airfields, radio stations, royal palaces and 
government bu·ildings. 
These threats immediately placed the United 
States in a very difficult position. They were firmly .·· 
I ' 
'. .: .· ··. 
__ ... _,_.,,··, 
committed to the territorial integrit¥ of Saudi Arabia. 
~ No American government could toleratie a situation where 
87 
President Nasser could have some ·influence over the future 
of the Persia.rt Gulf oilfields. If the Saud.is government 
fell and some kind o.£ Arabian federation was established, 
such a situation could arise. But they did not wish to 
appear to be associated with the defence of the Imamate. 
As so often happens, the US found that its commercial in-
terests and their desire to promote social reform could not 
be combined in a compatible policy. If the Saudis govern-
ment was giv.en complete support, then the US was admitting, 
by implication, that they did not oppose the restoration of 
the Imamate in Yemen. There was, therefore, a desperate 
attempt to give assurances to both sides. On November 16, 
Robert Stookey, the US charge d'affairs in Yemen met with 
Dr Baidani, the Yemeni Vice President. It was assured that 
' 
if Saudi Arabia or Jordan should attack Yemen, all US air-
craft would be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia or would adopt 
a neutral stance. Baidani then gave assurance that .. Yemeni 
aircraft would attack Jordan and Saudi Arabia only if they 
attacked first. 
At the same time the US wished to offer reassur-
ance ·to the Saudi government and demonstrate that the US 
would not be 'a; '"d_isinterested bystander if rebels 'l:&hould 
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88 
attempt to overthrow the government. 11 This is, no doubt, 
the explanation why us jet fighters from bases in Western 
.· Europe carried out demonstration·,_·-fligl1ts over Jidda and 
Rijadh and a us warship was sent to Jidda. These were· 
meant to be a silent but effective means of warning Egypt 
of the dangers involved in a war with Saudi Arabia. There 
There was a real fear in Washington that the tensions caused 
by the Yemeni conflict might escalate into a general Middle 
12 Eastern War. It might seem that such a prospect could 
only be envisaged by exponents of 'crisis management'- those 
wh.o believe that every possible contingency should be exam-
· ined and prepared for - and that in an era of nuclear super 
powers, general warfare among smaller nations, such as 
occurred in the Balkans before world war one, is unimagin-
able. But it may be that extensive local war has only been •· 
avoided by the all pervasive influence of the super powers. 
Throughout the Yemen war, the US has placed constant pres-
sure on Saudi Arabia to remain uninvolved. If thi·s had 
not been applied it is by no .means ·impossible to imagine 
active participation by the Saudis in the Yemen and a con-
sequent clash with Egyptian forces. On the other hand, it 
is possible that the Saudis had no real desire to get in-
volved and used the American threats to justify to the 
: royalis~s their non-involv~lllent in '·the war. 
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The longer the fighting w~nt on the more diffi-
. cul·t it became for the US to support simultaneously the 
regimes in Saudi Arabia and Yemen and in addition espouse 
the cause of·. '.pe·ace. The Americans best hope was an early 
. 
settlement among the parties directly involved. This·con-
clusion was reached even before the Americans recognized 
the Sallal regime,· and Kennedy offered his good. off ices. 
In his letters to the responsible parties it is believed 
that he proposed a phased evacuation of UAR troops from 
.. 
Yemen, the ending of Saudi and Jordanian aid to the royal-
ists and the withdrawal of the Saudi army from the Yemen 
border. 
·, There was some justification for believing that 
this offer of mediation would be successful. The week 
before the letters were sent, th·e Egyptians were circulat-
•• 
... 
·ing a report stating that Cairo was willing to withdraw 
their troops if Jordan and Saudi Arabia would halt their 
support to the royalists. It was believed by diplomats in 
0 
·Cairo that Nasser was anxious to withdraw from the Yemen 
and was looking for some means · of achieving this end. 13 
· On November 28 Al Abram reported that · the UAR government 
·. had assured the. US that the UAR• s military aid was not 
intended to cause the collapse of the Saudi Arabian·and 
Jordanian monarchies, but merely to·protect_the Yemeni 
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republic from their designs. The UAR, therefore, was will-
ing to withdraw its troops from Yemen, on condition that 
the USA persuaded Saudi Arabia and Jordan to end their aid 
to the royalists and that all Jordanian troops. were with-
drawn from Saudi Arabia. It is doubtful, however, if this 
was a complete statement of the Egyptian position. In 
'\ 
reality they would only agree to withdraw their troops 
after the republican regime's future was guaranteed. This 
meant, in essence, when the regime was in ·a position to 
stand on its own feet, or, if another state was prepared 
to accept the respo-nsibility o~ defending the regime. 
Any hope of a peace settlement however was ended 
by Faisal who rejected the US proposal. He argued that 
the Imam was still the legal ruler; that he had the support 
of the people and that he could regain control of. the capi-
tal during the winter. 14 The position taken by the Saudis 
is not difficult to explain. By this time they realized 
that it would be vnt:.ually impossible for the Egyptians to 
eliminate the support engendered by · the Imam. The Egyptians 
were caught in a vicious circle. They were considered to 
be an intruder, even an enemy, by many of the uncommitted 
tribes.. If they attacked the royalist forces, support for 
the Imam .would increase. If the Egyptians withdrew their 
troops, this would be seen as a victory for the Imam and 
.... 
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, many of the uncommitted tribes would'. support the Imam in 
order to ensure that they were on the winning side. ·It 
.:!):;> 
seemed that whatever the Egyptians did, they were bound to 
lose in the long run, provided that the Imam was given 
.•. 
material support. · ·There was also .good reason for be'lieving 
· that once the Imam was firmly established he would be able 
to hold his position without external aid. In this event, 
the Saudis could afford to be seen withdrawing and still 
be sure that the Imam would regain ·control. 
l 
The Saudi Arabians, therefore, saw no advantage 
in an immediate pe_ace settlement and they made their pos-
ition :·cryst~l clear, and placed the US in a very difficult 
situation. It meant that. they had to meet the demands of 
the Egyptians, partially at any rate, or ·face the alterna-
tive of being associated with the forces which favoured the 
return of the Imam. This was certainly how the majority 
of people in the Middle East would view the situation. The 
~ way out of this dilemma for the Americans lay -in the direc-
tion of rec911ition. 
Once the Egyptians and the republicans discovered 
that it ·was going to be a long and difficult job to defeat 
the · royalists it was important to them that the republican 
.: regime should receive widespread recognition. At the same 
time the Americans were hoping that they could use their · 
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.offer of. recognition as a means of finding a peace formula. 
It was predictable, . therefore, that the republicans and the · ·· 
Egyptians should prepare the way for US recognition. The 
Cairo offer to withdraw troops clearly eased the way as did 
the statement of President ~allal on December 9 that Yemen 
· ·-,) · had no "aggressive intentions" against Saudi Arabia •. ',The 
~---,---,"""' ••• --
_,.... __ ';""j-;::::._ _, -----" ......:.......:._· ., .. -~--
-n 
conciliatory stance adopted by the UAR and Yemen indicates 
., how important it was to them to obtain US recognition, in 
contrast to the· reaction of the Yemeni royalists who pro-
tested that Kennedy's offer to mediate without consulting 
or informing the royalists was "unprecedented treatment of . · 
a friendly state." They no doubt realized how vulnerable 
.i; ,. Ii. _ · 
their position would become if the US did recognize the 
republicans because it would mean that there would be in-. 
er.easing pressure placed on the Saudis to withdraw,their 
support from the Imam. 
The US continued to negotiate with the contending 
parties for a month in order to establish conditions under 
which it would be prepared to recognize the new regime • 
. The situation was made particularly difficult because of 
the attitude of the British, who argued that recognition 
was a purely technical matter resting on the issue of con-
trol. They decided that the republicans did not have 
adequate control to warrant recognition. But the iss.ues. 
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. were more complex· than this would ·suggest. Although. rela-
. tions with the Imam were · often hostile the¥ ,~:were considered .. 
.. · to be preferable to .those wit·h a 'Nasser inspired.' regime. 
In fact there was a serious debate within the British Foreign 
Office on this issue. · Some saw, Yemen as an opportunity for 
Britain to recover some of the prestige which she had lost 
. . 
~ during the Suez Campaign. But the Colonial Office and the 
Defence Ministry argued that the stakes were too high: 
~-·~·-.:. 
"The security of the base was para-
mount and could not be committed-to 
any deal with so unreliable person 
as President Nasser ... IS 
The argument was patently absur91d since it had already been 
admitted that the base was no longer of any strategic ~alue. 
But this argument, nevertheless, won the day and served to 
' 
intensify the hostility between the _British_and.the Egypt-
. 16 ians. 
The American embarrassment was eased to some ex-
• 
tent when Sallal made a declaration that it would honour ti 
Yemen I s previous international obligations, including '"~-1--
those made with Britain guaranteeing non intervention into 
the Aden Protectorates. The US no doubb hoped that this 
would encourage the British to recognize the new regime. 
But the major point. of the recognition was that it should 
lead to some positive solution of the conflict. The US 
·, 
·attempted to do this· by making a bargain with the Egyptians, 
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·· · · . whereby Egypt would withdraw her troops if the Saudis would 
stop support:i..ig :the royalists and withdraw from the frontier. 
· The US did received an agreement from the Saudis .to this 
effect, 17 the UAR agreed to withdraw its troops18 and on 
· Decembe~~l-8, the US recognized the republican regime.19 
Australia and Canada quickly followed the US lead and on 
December 20, the UN General Assembly recognized the repub-
I, .. 
lican rather than the royalists delegation. 
If the US did have serious hopes that their policy 
would establish peaee~on the Arabian Peninsula, they were 
disappointed. Neither the UAR nor Saudi Arabia complied. 
The Saudis government had made their agreement under pres-
sure and had no intention of reducing their support until 
there was some sign that the Egyptians were going to l~av~. 
On the day that the US recognized the republicans, it was 
publicly announced in Cairo that the.Egyptians would with-
draw from Yemen subject. to the conditions mentione¢1, but 
in addition, the withdrawal was only to take place when 
the republican regime requested it; such a request was not 
likely to be forthcoming so long as the regime felt en-
.. 
dangered by the royalists. 
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CHAPTER 7 ~ US and ·UN Involvement ~, 
•.i.... .. ~---_:.-~ . ,. 
Tensions between the UAR and Saudi Arabia reached 
a new high almost inunediately after the US had recognized 
the republican. regime in return for the agreement from 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt that they would withdraw their sup-
port. On December 30 Mecca Radio stated that the UAR had 
bombed Najran, a town in the South of Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudis repeated their charge on January 1, 1963. Two days 
later Faisal ordered general mobilization in Saudi Arabia 
and on January 4 it was stated that aid to the royalists 
would be increased. This inability to carry out the terms 
of the agreement is a recurring feature of the struggle. 
It is always followed by· mutual recriminations. Very often 
it appears that Nasser is the prime offender but this 
largely relates to the different nature of the two commit-
ments. The royalists were largely .self sufficient and 
could go for long periods without overt Saudi assistance. 
The Egyptians, however, were committed militarily and any 
attempt to withdraw produced a demoralizing effect among 
the republican leaders, who, while disliking Egyptian 
occupation, recognized that they were necessary to main~ 
tain the status quo. 
The result was, that whenever peace proposals 
were put forward by either side they contained a built in 
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advantage to themselves and made it inevitabl~ that the-.-
.· other side rejected the proposal. In bargaining theory, 
· the clause which insures that the other side will reject 
the proposal is known as the 'joker.• 1 The situation might 
be compared to the disarmament proposals made by the .US and 
·the SU which are always made unacceptable to the other 
party because of the different structure of their military 
forces and strategy. So, for example, on January 7 it was 
stated that the Saudi government would accept a .settlement 
of the Yemeni question on the following basis: 1) All 
b. ! 
foreign forces of any nationality should leave Yemen; 2) 
After their. withdrawal all direct and indirect help to both 
sides should cease; 3) The Yemenis should be allowed to 
choose the regime that they wanted; 4) An international 
commission should supervise the carryipg out of these 
measures. 
It would appear on the surface that this offers 
a fair way o·f ending the conflict. · But the propos·als con-
tain an obvious joker. Since the Saudis had no troop 
commitment, the withdrawal of Egyptian troops involved 
unilateral action on the part of the UAR. The position of_ 
the republic would be considerably weakened and so the 
first stage in the Saudis proposals involves an inevitable 
strengthening of the royalist position~ It must also be . 
-.... - .. --., . 
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· · remembered that the UAR presence was not imposing the 
wishes of a minority group on the c,ountry. The republican 
... 
gove.L""nment represented the wishes of the major·ity of the 
·---~- . 
country. The weakness of the regime related to the mili-
tary strength being monopolized by the Zeidis. The UAR 
always insisted, therefore, that all outside aid to the 
.royalists must be stopped before the UAR troops would be 
withdrawn. The imp_lications of .this was that any peace 
proposals had to contain some provision for protecting the 
republican regime from the military strength of the North-
ern tribes_. Needless to say, the Saudis always rejected 
proposals which followed this principle. 
--4. ·-
Just as the US and the SU , always wish to . appear 
to want disarmament, for the benefit of the rest of the 
world, so in the Yemen struggle, both the Saudis and the 
Egyptians wished to give the Americans the impression that 
they were_anxious to withdraw from the dispute. One corres-
pondent went even further than this and suggested that it: 
"is liJ.cely that both sides are talking 
in a manner to appease and please the 
US government while at the same time 
stoking the fires of war in Yemen. 112 
· In· fact it would seem safe to assume that both sides .were 
anxious for peace, but peace on their terms, and this is 
where the difficulty lay. 
The Americans,\ in particular,, were very anxious 
·.i,.,. ,ri' 
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.. / 
to· find some means of overcoming the obstacles that lay in 
the way of a peaceful settlement. But the State Department 
'.:-.k,_.. t~·· 
. . . ·.,I.\ 
quickly realized that they·:·qj'ad little room to manoeuvre. 
As one" author pas put it: 
,/ 
"Fundamentally the· weakness of the 
. ·\~. 
American position was that their 
interests in the dispute were too 
evenly balanced o Where nothing can 
be surrendedu no risks can be taken; 
and the United States could no more 
abandon the Saudis to unqualified 
~Nasserite pressure than cut off aid 
to Egypt and hand Nasser over to 
the Russians on a platter ... 3 
\ " 
At the beginning of 1963, therefore, the US came 
to the conclusion that some kind of machinery must be set up 
by an international agency which would allow the outside 
parties to disengage. 4 The next few months were devoted 
· to ··this task. But at the same time they attempted to use 
their influence to prevent further inflamation of the dis-
pute. So following the UAR raids on Najran, Kennedy pub-
licly reaffirmed support for theSSaudis government. He did 
this by making public, at the request of the Saudis govern-
ment, a letter which Kennedy sent to Faisal on October 25, 
1962. Part of it read: 
. . 
• . '· ' t.. • ' J", ~ '' ,,~ 
·, 
"Under your firm and enlightened leader-
ship I am confident Saudi Arabia will 
move ahead successfully on the path of 
modernization and reform which it has 
already chartered for itselfo In pushing 
this course you m~y be sure of the full 
US support for the maintenance of Saudi 
integrity. 11 ·-.A.~ . . ,f.,., 
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The letter was widely interpreted,-as .a warning to the UAR 
-
against-interference in Saudi Arabia •. White House spokes-· 
. 
men, however, insisted that it was believed necessary to 
disclose· ·:us~•; support because. of opposition to Faisal Is 
policies of modernization and reform. 
It was also made clear that the US support for 
Saudi A+abia's 'territorial integrity' did not entail any 
·1·t ' S mi 1 ary commitment. This, of course, rendered the 
'support' ,,a.lmost valueless. However, the statement did = 
not accurately represent US position. At this point, 
military aid and advisory missions were being enlarged. 
The US aid missions were helping the Saudis to establish 
radar network and anti aircraft batteries on the Southern 
border with Yemen. In addition, direct US support was 
. 
represented by plans for joint US-Saudi parachutist ex-
ercises at Riya_dh and Jidda. Later in the year it was 
learned that a US air unit was ready to be based in Jidda 
at 48 hours notice.6 Also, discussions were going on with 
the British and the French about the purchase of fighter air-
craft. As the Saudi position was strengthened, the royal-
ists position was also improved. Aid from·Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia was increasing and it was also reported that the 
royalists were receiving arms from Pakistan and there was 
talk of arms from Iran. 7 Thus despite US protestations, 
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there was sound .evidence for Egypt to believe that Saudi 
Arabis had full American support including military backing 
which'i would allow the Saudis to follow whatever policy they 
8 
wished. The result must have been to ·increase the Egypt-
ian determination to stay in Yemen • 
. The dispute thus began .to acquire dimensions 
which in no way related to the origins of the problem. The 
\ 
situation is analogous in this, and many other ways, to· 
events in Vietnam. In both instances it has appeared to 
uninvolved parties that an acceptable settlement should 
-not be too difficult to achieve, but such a settlement has 
always been evaded. - A major reas·on for this lies in the 
fact that none of the outside parties have had complete 
c,_ontrol over the factions they are supporting. Peace form-
ulas have tended to concentrate on the needs of the outside 
·parties rather than on the needs of the parties directly 
involved. ~bus in January 1963, US officials were convinceq 
that the UAR was willing to pull out of Yemen, which was 
proving to be a costly and inconclusi~e war, as soon as cer-
tain conditions were met. These conditions obviously in-
volved concessions on the part of Saudi Arabia. There would 
. •· 
. ' 
-"".. 
seem to be a close connection between this fact and the in- ·· 
creased assistance which the US was giving to Saudi Arabia 
at this .~·time. 
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A pr..~requisite to any concession. which the Saudis 
might make to secure the future of· the republican regime · 
was an adequate defence system against ·attack from the South.-· 
By securing this defence system, the US was effectively 
opening the way to a peace settlement, although the Egypt-· 
. , 
' " 
·ians were unlikely to view the situation in this light. In 
practice the very reverse happened. Once the Saudi Arabian 
defence system was secure, there was no real need to get 
·the Imam to end the Civil War. If .the defence system had 
not been secured, the Saudis could never have been sure 
~ -·· t 
. " 
that the Egyptians would not open an offensive attack on 
their Southern border. The Saudi Arabians were not at all 
anxious to engage in a war with Nasser--even if they were 
assured of victory, and, therefore, if Nasser could have 
made,a threat of an attack credible, the Saudis might l'l~ve 
been persuaded to exert pressure on the Imam and make him 
accep~ a peaceful settlement which involved relinquishing 
all temporal powers. But once the Southern border had been 
... 
secured there was no way that the UAR could pressure Faisal 
into attempting such a move and the US had also limited 
their effective barga·ining power. 
Once it was apparent that the US initiative in 
the form of the Kennedy peace proposals and US recognition 
of the new regime had not resulted in a new momentum in 
the direction of peace, the US began to promote the idea 
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' 
· . of UN~ ·partic.ipation in the dispute, particularly the idea 
' ') ,. 
of a UN presence. On January 12 it was~ reported that the. 
UN was exploring the possibility of mediating in the Yemeni 
9 -·. conflict, at the prompting of the US. Ten :.days later, 
Yemen republicans announced that they were receiptive to 
the idea of a UN mission but not permanent observers. 10 
It was also believed that the Egyptians were ready to accept 
.;.ll--- ''\, .... 
,,_.f L 
the interventi.on of the· UN • 11 At this point, a compromise 
solution for the Yemeni confrontation was being advoc~~~d 
by the Americans. It was suggested that the republican 
regime should be maintained.but that the Imam would be 
restored as the spiritual head of the country. It also 
seemed that this idea might be viewed sympathetically by 
, Although the UN had seated the republican delegate 
in the General Assembly, it was believed that in light of 
the military performance of the royalists, the UN would 
not ignore the Imam and his government as did the US in 
their mediation attempt. At this time it was also reported 
that the Egyptians were exploring the idea of electing a 
new Imam and allowing him to retain his spiritual powers. 12 
While this proposal seemed to 9pen the way to a 
peaceful resolution of the dispute there were other develop-
ments which seemed to increase the urgency of reaching a 
solution and getting the Egyptian·troops out of the Yemen. 
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·The failure .of :Britain to recognize the republican regime 
-
resulted in a marked increase in tension between Yemen and 
---
the South Arabian Federation. Be.t~een January and February 
1963 the republicans came i~;o contact on a number of 
occasions with the forces of the Federation. On February 
10, the Yemeni Republican Government requested the British 
to close their delegation in S~~a. The antipathy shown 
between· the British and the republicans certainly increased 
the problems of the Americans and made it more difficult 
for them to find a solution to the problem. 
The other major ftevelopment which seemed to in-
~ crea~e the danger of the confrontation in Yemen was the 
fall of Kassem on February 7, 1963 and the renewed friend-
ship between Egypt and Iraq. The governments of the twe-~ 
countries pledged' positive steps' to link the capitals 
of the four liberated Arab states - in UAR, Iraq, Yemen 
and Algeria. Then on March 8 the Syrian government was 
overthr.own and a pro Nasser group took control. Nasser 
showed himself to be extremely wary of establishing close 
relations with other states13 but commentators were quick 
to seize on these developments as portents for the future. 
"Elated by the Nasserite revolutions in Yemen and Iraq, 
President Nasser has revived his old dream of an Arab Em-
pire stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and· 
- " 
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has launched a new movement to unite 'the.whole Arab nation' . · 
under the slogan of 'unity, freedom and socialism. 11114 
It would appear that President Nasser's dreams 
ebb and f lo with every new development in the Mi.ddle East. 
But as in 1958, it.was not Nasser who wished to rush into 
. a policy o.f unity with other states. While Syria and Iraq 
wanted firm association with Egypt as soon as possible, 
Nasser wished •to work slowly and cautiously· in evolving 
. . .. . ... 
some practical form of association. 1115 Nasser believed in 
the 'inevitability of unity' and Mohammed Heikal, 'the editor 
of Alahram, which often reflects Nasser's own views, said 
that it wasn't important that immediate unity should be 
16 
restored. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these 
events were alarming to the conservative Arab rulers and 
-
to many in the West. They provided a further reason why 
the Western powers wished to see the Yemen issue settled. 
It was to this end that Dr. Ralph Bunche, the UN 
Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, and one of 
the UN's most experienced negotiators was sent first to 
Yemen and then to Cairo, at the beginning of March. The 
original plan was to see both the royalists and the re-
publicans but in the event Bunche decided only to see the 
republicans. In protest, Faisal refused to see Bunche. 
This effectively invalidated the purpose of the mission and 
. \ 
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, .. 
al though the reasons to explain the change of plan which 
caused this state _of affairs have not been givell:,,, it must 
be assumed that the Yemeni republicans and possibly the 
Egyptians made this a condition for Bunche's mission."- The 
US quickliz realized the futility of the UN mission and in . 
an attempt to save the situation sent Ellsworth Bunker, 
. " 
one of their most distinguished diplomats to see Faisal 
and get him to see Bunche.17 He failed and the consequence 
was that Dr. Bunche could only put forward an ineffective 
·.·' I'•' ... •"i 
I=. -= 
plan suggesting that all the nations involved, Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia, UAR and Britain should all exchange non interference 
·pledgeil~·lS 
i . , 
.This was obviously unsatisfactory, and in order 
to prevent a complete break down,· the US again sent Bunker 
to the Middle East·>:at·;.the beginning of the following month 
,·· - -. 
(April 1963) in ~n attempt to lay the ground work for a 
new UN peace offensive. Bunker saw both Faisal and Nasser, 
but.again there was no attempt to contact "the royalists or 
the republicans. He did, however, secure agreement from 
both the··- outside powers and on April 12 he handed a proposal 
to U Thant. 19 The agreement provided for: 
1) Saudi Arabia is to stop supplying aid 
to Yemeni royalists on a disengagement date 
fixed by the U.N. (April 29) 
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2) Egyptian troops are to be withdrawn 
'as quickly as possible', thereafter, 
with no deadline for complete withdrawal. 
The Egyptians are to be permitted to 
leave a training mission.of unspecified 
size in Yemen. The rate of withdrawal is 
to be geared to the fighting in Yemeno If 
royalists continued to resist, Cairo is to 
withdraw its troops slowly to ensure that 
the republican government is not overthrown. 
3) UN Observers are to occupy a buffer zone 
20 kilometers (12~ miles) wide along the 
Yemen Saudi border to insure that Saudi 
assistance to the royalists is stopped. 
4) Observers are also to be stationed at 
unspecified key points to monitor Egyptian 
withdrawals. 
5) The Imam and_his immediate entourage who 
are expected to seek political asylum are 
forbidden to use Saudi territory as a base 
for subversion against the republicans. 20 
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The following week, a UAR spokesman said that both 
Egypt and Yemen were willing to accept UN observers to 
supervise an agreement barring outside interference in Yemen's 
. · 1 21 c1v1 war. U Thant then attempted to rush through plans 
to create a UN Observation team.22 In his report of April 
30, U Thant stated that Major General Carl Carlson von Horn, 
the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization 
in Palestine, was to visit Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAR 
for consultation on the implementation of the agreement. 23 
But it was quickly apparent that neither side was going to 
abide by the agreement. Thus while the first contingent of 
Egyptian troops left Hodeida on May 4, the Saudis were 
i. 
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to point out that they were being replaced by rein-
-; ____ _ forcements and so a kind of rotation system was being estab-
lished. At the same time, the UAR and the republicans 
alleged that the Saudis were continuing to assist the 
royalists and this was later confirmed by the UN Mission. 
The failure to carry out the agreeme.nt could be 
attributed to bad faith on the part of the parties, but it 
would seem that the causes which underlie the 'bad faith'. 
were inherent in the way that the agreement was formulated. 
. 
-
..... -~ -
It made no reference to the nature of the conflict and by 
ignoring intrinsic factors -in the dispute, it made the 
failure of the agreement virtually inevitabl.e. Both the 
UAR and Saudi Arabia intervened· in Yemen because the status 
quo was upset; because both the internal factions received 
support, the instability remained. Indeed after the inter-
vention, the situation became increasingly unstable. It 
was difficult to assess the strength of the support for 
either side, but it was apparent that with Saudis assis-
., tance the Imam had established considerable support. The 
agreement·presupposed that the Imam would completely ab-
dicate all control to the republicans despite the fact 
that he had the backing of a considerable sector of the 
population. The Saudis who endorsed the agreement were, 
in reality, not in a position to enforce it. 
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As one correspondent put it: 
"The odd man o,1t is the Imam himself. 
He has refused to call off his tribal 
. warfare, although Saudi authorities 
are trying to persuade him to go into 
affluent European exile ... 24 
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It is difficult to assess·exactly how hard the Saudis tried 
· to persuade the Imam to call off the war, but the fact 
remains that the agreement took no account of the parties 
directly involvea. It can be argued that the purpose of 
the agreement was to get the outside parties disengaged 
but as has al:r~_ady been· explained this involved certain 
problems. It would not be difficult for the republicans 
to demonstrate to Nasser that once his troops were removed 
it would be much more difficult for him to renew aid to 
the republicans than it would be for the Saudi Arabians 
to renew assistance·to the royalists. Obviously, any with-
. . 
drawal agreement was going to contain this built-in advant-
age favouring the Saudis. It made it important to Nasser 
to have concrete provisions in the agreement to protect . 
the republican regime. The provision in the Bunker agree-
ment was .self defeating because it involved the continuance 
of Egyptian troops in Yemen which was what the agreement 
was trying to eliminate • 
The only way to have effectively ensured that 
Egypt removed her troops and Saudi Arabia stopped assist-
ing the royalists was to remove the factors which caused 
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them to interven.e in the first place. · If this had happened. 
there would have been no need for a .UN mission to police 
·_the agreement. Once the reason for stc:¥ ing disappeared, the 
intervention would.stop of its own accord. This argument 
r ·.• •- • ·,• , . ~ 
-
closely parallels the belief in arms control theory that 
.. -.political disputes must be settled before serious measures 
. of disarmament can be instituted. While many have attacked. 
the logic of this argument when applied to·disaxmament(it 
would appear self evident, for example, that political dis-
putes will still occur in a disarmed international system 
· ju~t as they do in a domestic system) it would seem that 
the ideas contained in the -field of 'Peace Theory' do merit 
serious attention in-attempts to resolve international 
. fl. t 25 It 't' 1 1·t ld th t th fl' t con 1C .... r- -'if~ n U1 1Ve y WOU seem a e con l.C · 
between the republicans and the royalists ghould have been 
settled first and the problem of Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
would then have settled itself. 
It can be argued that such a policy ~as impractical, 
but since the efforts to remove the influence of Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt from Yemen proved unsuccessful for five years, it 
l 
might have been worth attempting to resolve the internal 
dispute. In fact the UN made no efforts in this direction. 
While it could be argued that this would involve interfering 
in the domestic jurisdiction of Yemen, and thus contravening 
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, it is also clear that the UN 
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can intervene in the· domestic affairs . of. a state if these . -· . - -~I ' • 
events are endangering international peace and security 
(article 51) • It is not difficult to show that internal 
developments in Yemen were endangering international peace 
and·security. 
·~··· ~-.., ' . 
Since no efforts were.i'.:-;mfi.ae on the international 
level in this direction, it is very difficult to assess 
what the chances of success would have been. At first · 
glance it would appear that .the chances were slim since 
. ;~:r"' . 
. •i-' . 
the Imam was .. determined to regain control. However, if the 
Saudis had. been closely involved in finding a solution to 
the internal problem, they might have found it difficult 
to resist putting pressure on the Imam. In the same way, 
if the Imam was participating in an international confer-
ence it might have been difficult to refuse a compromise 
solution, such as allowing the selection of a new Imam who 
would be the spiritual leader of the country. Once this 
new Imam had been installed, it is difficult to believe that 
the disengagement of the Egyptians and the Saudi Arabians 
would not soon have followed. This, of course, i, pure 
speculation. But the point is that there was no attempt 
to bring all the participants together to formulate such a 
solution. Solutions to domtstic and international problems 
cannot be imposed by an autonomous body. The parties 
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involved must be active participants in any attempt to find 
• a sol~tion to the problem.· It is the task of the autonomous 
. . 
agency to bring all the parties together • 
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CHAPTER 8. Bargaining Positions 
The date for the disengagement of the UAR and -, 
Saudi Arabia was fixed for April 29 and following the 
acceptance of the UN agreement there was a tacit truce. 
But ·on May 10, el Badr denounced the UAR promise to with-
· draw as a fraud and ordered the resumption of operations 
against the r·epublica.ns: •1 At the end of May, Saudi 
Arabia threatened to renew help to the Yemen, royalists 
if the UAR did not leave. 2 The UAR, however, insisted 
that they would not begin to leave until the UN mission 
arrivea. 3 Although the agreement was not operational, both 
sides were anxious to appear in a favourable light. They 
agreed to pay for the UN mission when it arrived, though 
t~ey must have doubted that it would ensure the successful 
implementation of the agreement. Sallal, too, was anxious 
to maintain an air of reason'ableness and he promised to in-
..... 
stall a new Imam with only spiritual powers. 4 
The major ob,stacle to implem~nting the agreement 
seemed to be the absence of the UN Mission. Thant stated 
in a report to the Security Council on May 27, 1963 that 
UN observers were urgently needed in Yemen and that he in-
tended to send an advance party in a few days. It was 
, · decided that the mission would not exceed two hundred men 
and would stop for four months (although this was later 
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modified to two months) • The cost for four months was es·-
, 
timated to ))e 807,SOOdollars and-an additional 102~400 
dollars for each additional month if the mission was ex-
... ~1-
t ended. Since the cost was to be borne by Saudi Arabia 
, 1'-j,L .. ~ .. ,..k~ , . 
and the UAR U Thant was able to take·this unilateral·action 
without worrying too.:·rmuch about the consequences. The SU, 
supported by France, predictably convened the Security 
Council and it was argued that only the Security Council, 
not the Secretary General, could authorize such an operation. 
The· ·secretary General• s action was approve·d, how-
ever, since both France and the SU felt that the action·was 
desirable and together with the other members of- the council 
the Secretary General was given ex post facto authorization 
for his action. The UNYOM was beset with constant diffi-
culties and in the end it proved to be no more successful 
than the initial attempts by the US to achieve a peace 
settlement. The resignation of General -von Horn on 
·August 20, 1963 was to start a bitter feud between the 
general and the UN central administration. 5 
As the first two month period drew to a close, 
all Thant's energies were expended in attempting to get 
Saudi Arabia and the UAR to defray the costs for a further 
two months. He reported to the Security Council on 
September 4 that there had been no encouraging progress 
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made ·towards· effective implementation of the disengagement 
·agreement and that in some respects the. agreement had not 
been fulfilled by either party. As every two mon
1
i;hs passed 
),·,.' 
and no -further progress was made, Thant had to persuade the 
two parties to defer payment for an additional period. The 
" 
. US was closely involved in these ·negotiations and often 
) 
their influence was decisive in persuading the Saudis govern::·-
ment to extend the period. 6 In July-1964, Saudi Arabia 
agree~ to pay·for one more extension but no more. 7 
The reason·for the UN Mission's prolonged stay 
was the parties' desire.to prevent ali~nating the US, and 
the World community in general. As long as the UN Mission 
remained in Yemen at the expense of·both parties it gave 
the impression that efforts we~e being made to find a pe·ace-
ful settlement. However, the failure to achieve a settle-
ment indicated that both parties still hoped that they 
could establish peace on their own terms. This interpre-
tation may, _however, be too cynical. It may be that both 
the Saudis and the Egyptians entertained a genuine hope. 
It is possible, f~r example, that Nasser believed that if 
Saudis' aid halted, the resistance from the Imam would 
disappear and it would be possible to withdraw the Egyptian 
troops without bringing about the downfall of the republi-
• can regime. 
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As it turned out, t'h:e UN mission was too small 
to determine effectively if Saudi aid had stopped. Although 
in its later reports the mission admitted that it could find 
no evidence of official aid being sent to the royalists by 
the Saudi government it did observe that the aid must be 
coming from somewhe·re. It is likely that the aid was shipped 
- through unofficial channels from both Saudi Arabia and the 
South Arabian Federation.a It has been pointed out, for 
example, that wh-ile the British did not openly assist the 
Yemeni royalists, they did turn a blind eye to active inter-
t . 9 ven ion. 
.... 
It was, however, relatively easy for the observa-
tion mission to see that the UAR was not abiding by the 
-· . 
agreement and so from their point of view the mission under-
mined their position. 
In any event, by the middle of 1963 two things 
were clear; firstly, that the Yemen war was stalemated and 
the situation could last for years10 and secondly that the 
royalists were assured of a victory if the Egyptians chose 
to leave. Once this was established,. Faisal held a definite 
advantage in any bargaining situation with Nasser. From 
, · this point on he would be much more willing than previously 
to negotiate a settlement. This placed Nasser in a very 
difficult position. He was anxious to withdraw from Yemen, 
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but he did not wish to withdraw from a position of weakness. · 
In terms of bargaining theory, his only chance was to con-
vince Faisal that he was determined to maintain an irra•tional 
position. 11 In this C'ase, all he had to do was to convince 
Faisal that he was prepared to leave his troops in Yemen in-
def ini te.ly. If he could convince Faisal that this was his 
~ ~Ill .. 
policy, then he would have cancelled out Faisal's initial 
bargaining advantage. 
Thus, even after Nasser had made the agreement 
with the UN to pull out the Egyptian troops, it was reiter-
ated by Nasser himself and by his close associates that. 
Egypt would. not pull out of Yemen before realizing the 
objectives of intervention, and, in particular, the defeat 
of the royalist troops. 12 Th.is, however, was not sufficient. 
Faisal, knowing the strength of his position, was able to 
make his demands appear more reasonable. It was at the 
start of 1963 that Faisal no longer insisted on the return 
of el Badr and his only demand was the departure of the 
. . 
Egyptian troops. After that, Faisal was even said to be 
prepared to accept the maintenance of a republic. 13 In 
· reality, however, the Saudis firmly believed that once the 
·Egyptians left, it would be easy to restore the Imam. The 
position of the Saudis was undboutedly reflected in the 
plan submitted to the UN by the Yemenis royalists at the 
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beginning bf 1964. It was suggested that the Imamate should 
·---· 
be preserved as the chief of state to meet the requirements 
of the Zeidi sect, and in addition:·.an elected assembly 
should be established to meet the demands of those seeking 
democratic reform. The assembly would have legislative 
powers in some fields and consultative powers in others, 
~ 
while the Im~ would chose a premier and a cabinet. 14 This 
. proposal ·was completely unacceptable to the republicans,· 
' ' 
but by putting forward such a solution _it gave the royal-
ists the appearance.of being much more willing to compro-
mise than the republicans·an~·the Egyptians. 
I 
The republican government was already breaking 
down into factions and the stance adopted by the royal is.ts 
increased the trend. From the beginning, the government 
was aware that it was important to win the support of the 
Zeidi tribes. By January 1963, however, Dr. Baidani, the 
Vice President felt that this policy was being followed at 
the expense of the Shafis. He withdrew to Cairo and was 
subsequently dropped from the Cabinet. Then on August 12, 
. 1963, Baidani arrived in Aden and made a number of violent 
political statements in which he denounced the republican 
regime and the Zeidis leaders and advocated the formation 
of an independent Shafi State in Southern Yemen. The 
Republican government deprived him of his Yemeni nationality 
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I 
· and accused him of being a foreign agent. ·· When he returned 
to Cairo he was placed under house arrest while the police 
investigated his "suspicious contacts with the British 
authorities." 
- ,1 .. j -'" 
-··•r I 
Despite these measures aga_in~,t.,. Baidani, there 
was some support for his·ideas in Yemen. It was· argued· 
that the secessionist sentiment was c9qsed by the secret 
talks which took place in August 1963 between the Zeidi 
re·publican leaders and the Imam. 15 It was believed that 
the possibility of a coalition was being discussea.16 
However the talks came to nothing and the reason no aoubt 
stemmed from the insistence that a solution could not be 
found in.the creation of apurely spiritual Imamate. The 
royalists were thinking in tenns of a coristitutional mon-
archy.17 Inevitably, the conflict within the republican 
regime strengthened the barg,aining ,·position of Faisal. 
Since he knew that~some of the republican regime favoured 
a compromise with the royalists, it made it difficult for 
... Nasser to euggest that he could not in any way modify his 
stance because of the obduracy of the republicans. Faisal 
on the other hand could argue that the royalists were ab-
solutely determined to retain some control over Yemen and 
that he had no means of swaying them from this position. 
This is what Schelling has called "the power to bind one-
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· .. _· -1·£ .. 1·a se .• It was advantageous for Faisal to open negotiations 
as soon as possible. Thus although some were surprised ·when 
Saud and Hussein turned up at the first Arab summit meeting 
in January 1964 (January 13-16) to discuss the Israeli's 
projected "diversion of Jordan waters, it was quite a pre-
dictable mC,We, but it was well known that relations between 
the conservatives and Nasser had been poor for some time. 
Relations between Jordan and the UAR were.broken in 1961 
·and relations with Saudi Arabia were severed when Egypt 
began supporting the Yemeni republican regime. 
It was reported that Nasser and Saud had~reached 
agreement on Yemen and that Saud was to meet Sallal at a 
Conf e·rence for the Arab heads of state in Cairo. 19 The 
meeting took place in February20 and Sallal said afterwards 
that Saudi Arabia and Jordan were the 'best friends' of 
Yemen. The two countries in question, however, denied that 
there had been any ag-reement with Salla1. Negotiations 
between the UAR and Saudi Arabia continued nevertheless, 
and at the beginning of March high ranking Egyptian officers, 
including Hakim ~er went to Riyadh to meet Faisal. After-
wards a joint communique called for the "independence of 
Yemen and the freedom of the Yemeni people" • It was agreed 
to resume diplomatic relations immediately and further talks 
were scheduled for the following month. These talks were 
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. · never held. 21. . :.. ..... . ,· I '• •,., ~~-, ,• 
It· is-- interesting to note that U Thant• s report 
for this period - January 3 to March 3 - stated that mili-
tary operations by the royalists indicated that "arms and 
ammunition in appreciable amounts have been reaching the 
area from some source though not necessarily across the 
northern frontier." It was also reported that the-royal-
ists appeared to be well provided with money and had en-
gaged a number of foreign experts to train and direct their 
forces in\~_;modern guerrilla tactics. It seems possible that 
Faisal chose to seize the diplomatic initiative at the time 
the royalists were gaining;lhe military initiative. It was 
unlikely that under these circumstances the Egyptians \\Ould 
alter their stance._ They were, however, prepared to im-
prove relations with the Saudi Arabians and after the first 
'<·~.. .. . 
Arab summit in January both sides agreed to cease waging 
propaganda warfare. The Arab League, represented by Iraq 
and Algeria, acted as an intermediary during this period 
and they proposed that the Egyptian troops be replaced with 
~n all-Arab force. 22 There was a precedent for this set by 
the Arab force which allowed the British to withdraw in 
from Kuwait in 1961, but this example did not provide much 
encouragement since the expedition was not regarded as a 
striking display of Arab unity or efficiency. 23 
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It has been argued that the Egyptians were · def in-
itely interested in organizing such a force, 24 but it is 
difficult to believe that·. they. seriously thought that the 
scheme had much chance of success. Also it is difficult 
to believe that either the Saudi · or the royalists would have .. 
tolerated such a plan. It--- is possible that even the repub-
licans were not at all anxious to· see the u~popular Egypt-
ians replaced by yet another set of Arab intruders coming 
to defend their freedom. 
Wenner argues that there is a close connection 
between these manoeuvres to get Egypt out of the war.and 
the activities of Colonel Sallal. 
.. --'.· 
"The activities of the Egyptians in 
their search for a graceful exit from 
Yemen did not go unnoticed by Abdullah 
al Sallal and his close supporters. 
Fearing that the UAR was perhaps ready 
to abandon the republic, the Yemeni 
President undertook to obtain other 
sources of support. 1125 
On March 18 Sallal arrived in the Soviet Union where he met 
Khrushchev and signed a Treaty of Friendship in which Moscow 
recognized the full and absolute independence of the Yemen 
Arab Republic over Yemeni territory. He also received the 
promise of increased economic and technical assistance and 
the offer of a hospital and.two schools. 26 Foll~wing this, 
Sallal went to Czechoslovakia where it was believed he 
signed an arms deal; from there he visited Bulgaria, Rumania, 
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and Hungary. Finally in June he visited the Chinese People's 
Republic and.in June of 1964 he signed a ten year treaty of 
Friendship replacing the treaty concluded with the Imam in 
1958. Treaties of Friendship and technical· assistance, how-
ever, cannot really be viewed as a substitute for the Egypt-
ian support. The Soviets could only have been effective if 
they had sent large numbers of.troops to relieve the Egypt-
ians. The ,possibility of· this happening· can~ot be dismissed 
out of hand. The Soviets did have an ·active policy in 
Yemen and their support of the revolutionary regime had 
.. 
quickly gathered momentum. When,the revolution broke out 
there were about 60 Soviet technicians left in Yemen from 
the staff of 150 which had been stationed there in 1961 
when the Imam was still in control. Max Frankel reported 
·in the early stages of the war that the Soviets flew some 
of the bombing missions. By April. ,1963 the number of Soviet 
technicians had reached 450. The number began to increase 
rapidly after March 1963 when the UAR assured the US that 
their troops would withdraw. By mid July 1963 it was re-
ported that the number of Soviet military technicians and 
instructors had reach 900 to 1,000. 27 However, in September, 
Dana Adams Schmidt reported that many.of these men were 
"merely skilled labourers." He went on to argue, however, 
that they might be the most significant element in the 
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-whole picture. The reason given for this assessment was 
••-· r:,_ .. •, I 
that the Egyptians were building a 2~ mile airstrip capable 
of taking any kind of jet.plane. 
"This may give Yemen something of the 
value of Cuba in the Soviet view~ It 
would be a site from which they could 
not only threaten the Middle East but 28 also carrying operations deep into Africa. 11 . 
If this view is accepted, then Sallal's tour around 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1964 
· could·have ominous implications and would certainly cause 
Nasser to pause before pulling out his troops. It would be 
one thing for a coalition government to be established in 
Yemen and quite another to see Sallal becoming increasingly 
dependent on the Soviets for support until Yemen finally 
became a Soviet satellite. Nasser was certainly not anxious 
to see the Soviets replace Western influence in the Middle 
East. A realistic assessment of the situation wru ld seem 
V to indicate th.at there was no possibility of the Soviets 
entering the Yemen morass as the Egyptians departed. It is 
true that the Americans performed a very similar operation 
when the French left Indo China, but this was because the 
area seemed to be crucial to the strategic· position of the 
Western world. Yemen could not be viewed in a similar 
light by the Soviets. The Russians, no doubt, would have 
been pleased if Yemen could have been brought within their 
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sphere of influence, but it is unlikely that they would have 
been prepared to·pay a price for such an objective. 
In fact, it seems unlikely that Sallal's.µ-iove to 
gain communist support was aimed at Nasser. If Nasser had 
seriously wished to move out· of Yemen at this point, it is 
likely that he would have strongly backed a member of the 
government who favoured compromise. Sallal seems to have 
.been in a very difficult position. The Shafis clearly did· 
not like him because of his association with the Zeidis. 
It could well be that if negotiations took place; with the· 
royalists, the Egyptians would prefer strong Shafi repre-
sentation to· protect their interests. At th~ same. time the 
Zeidis did not. strongly support Sallal because he was un-
. willing to compromise with the Imam on any fundamental 
issues. If this analysis is correct - and it is purely 
speculation - then one of the reasons why Sallal stayed in 
power would be because neither of the religious .sects could 
get together and agree on an alternative leader. 
If it is accepted that Sallal's tour of.the 
communist nations was not directed at Nasser, then it could 
be argued that there were no ulterior motives behind it, 
other than that it was a means of increasing support for 
the republic. This is certainly an adequate explanation. 
It can be suggested, however, that by meeting with the 
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communist leaders, Sallal · was increasing his p·restige and 
so curbing domestic criticism. In addition, the move could 
(-•.' •Cl,.' 
'· 
·be directed against the royalists and the Saudis. It has 
been argued that by knowing that the Egyptians were anxious 
to reduce their Yemen conunitment, they had achieved a dom-
inant bargaining position. Sallal, by demonstrating the 
active support of the communists and hinting, by implication,· 
that they could replace the Egyptian·s, he was effectively 
eliminating this bargaining advantage. This does not mean 
that Sallal and Egypt did not wish to- negotiat.e a settle-
ment, but simply that they did not wish ta-bargain from a 
position of weakness. 
' ............ 
There is a major difficulty· in arguing that Nass.er 
was genuinely interested in negotiating a settlement in 
Yemen. The difficulty arises from an attack which Nasser 
.£~,· 
,tll • 
. made on the British position in the South Arabian Federation. 
Relations between Yemen and the Federation were ver¥rpoor 
from the time that Britain did not join the US in granting 
recognition to the republic. In April, however, when Nasser 
visited Yemen he said: 
"We swear by God to expel Britain from 
all parts of the Arab world. " Adding 
"Britain, which looks upon your revo-
lution with hatred and disgust must 
take up its staff and leave Aden and 
the South. 1129 
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, ____ He argued that the British -were aiding the royalists to , pro-
long,_ the war and thus provide themselves with an excuse to 
. . th 30 remain 1n e area. Nasser's inflamatory statements 
quickly led commentators to reassert the view that "Egypt's 
goal in Yemen already extends beyond the settlement of the 
Civil war." 31 This opinion was widely accepted in the Wes.t 
and it was reported that the US Congress · believed "that 
Yemen represents only the first overt milit&~y expression 
o·f Egypt's expansionism. 1132 
Certainly Nasser's speeches give substance to this 
· argument, but· it is doubtful if it offers a real explanation 
of Egypt's policy. Some commentators did notice that while· 
Sallal always called the South Arabian Federation, 'occupied 
South Yemen', Nasser merely referred to it as the 'occupied 
S0uth 1 • 33 Nasser also adopted a very cautious attitude 
towards the question of unification. He told an enthusiastic 
crowed in Taiz that unity already existed in the solidarity 
between the two people. But he added that he could not 
agree to a constitutional union so long as Egyptian troops 
remained in Yemen. This does not suggest a policy of expan-
sionism. It is true that Nasser wishes to eliminate foreign 
influence from the Middle East' and he also wishes to see 
\ 
regimes in power which promote the will and welfare of the 
people. His popularity indicates that he is not following 
' . 'i' ! ''•. 
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an idiosyncratic policy. Nasser is also a realistic politi-
cian. He knows that there are definite limits to any action 
which a state can make. While not wishing to abandon the . 
republican war in Yemen, he was aware that the· war was ··not . 
popular. On the other hand he knew that if he withdrew and 
the· royalis'ts regained control he would no longer ·rbe viewed 
as the idealistic Arab statesman, but rather as a cynical 
realpolitik politician. In _some way he had to retain sup-
port both at home and abroad for the duration it would take 
to negotiate an acceptable withdrawal. One way to do this 
was to associate the war with the struggle against the 
British. However, he did not wish to support the traditional 
claims of the Imam, which is, no doubt, why he simply re-
ferred to the 'occupied south• • There was no guarantee that 
the rising nationalist groups in the Federation would want 
to join with Yemen (although as events turned out they did) 
and, therefore, there was no point in supporting the claims 
of one group at the expense of alienating another. 
There is no doubt that Nasser would have supported 
the nationalist movements in the Federation even if the war 
in Yemen had not been in progress, since it was, it was 
equally obvious that he would use Yemen as a base from which 
to support the attack on the British. The support given by· 
Nasser and the republican regime was to an indigenous 
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nationalist movement, which wished to remove the· British so 
that they could rule their own country. The British quickly 
came to realize the diffic'1lty of counteracting such a move-
ment. Thus while they were v~ry successful at dealing with 
I 
the Imam's penetration, they were forced to withdraw when 
· · · . confronted with this new force. A1 though the issues of 
Yemen and the South Arabian Federation may be closely inter--
. related, the two issues were initially quite distinct. 
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CHAPTER 9. Further Compromises 
It is apparent that the position adopted byi;.he 
republicans and the Egyptians was not regarded as unreason-
able by other states involved in the dispute. Hussein, for 
example, moved from a vehemently pro-republican stance to a 
position where he was able to recognize the republican 
regime. This happened in the summer of 1964. 1 Perhaps one 
reason for this step was to allow Jordan to have a more 
!lexible position in any negotiations, permitting Hussein 
to act as a mediator between Faisal and Nasser. The second 
Arab Summit Conference held in September 1964 at Alexandria 
raised the possibility of further direct negotiations on 
Yemen. ... ~ .... 
It was argued that Faisal's presence at the con-
ference· meant that he must have been confident that Nasser 
.. ' 
was willing to compromise. 2 However, before the summit 
opened on September 11, there was friction between the two 
Arab leaders. Nasser wished to make Yemen a major issue of 
the conference while Faisal was resolutely opposed to such 
3 
a plan. Nasser gave way on this point, an obvious indi-
cation that he was anxious for settlement. Yemen was dis-
cussed, however, in private sessions when President Are£ 
and Ben Bella acted as mediators. It was reported that 
they pressed Faisal to recognize the republic and discussed 
'. ·~ .. 
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the idea of an Arab army to replace the Egyptian army. 4 
.,, 
After -fhe talks, the UAR and Saudi-Arabia issued a communi-
I . 
que which announced that the two parties had agreed on~ 
course of full cooperation and that they would u11dertake 
· .the necessary contacts with the parties involved for a 
peaceful settlement. It was'also believed that they had 
agreed to a new government which would include royal~sts 
but no members of the Imam'"s family. 5 · 
Within · a week it was reporte:d that· from Saudi 
· Arabia that a cease fire had gone into effect between the · 
Yemeni royalists and the republicans. 6 It was argued at 
the same time, however that: 
·1 -.. ; 
-_. -
,JI t 
"Many Middle Eastern observers thought 
Nasser was simply manoeuvring for time 
to regather his forces. They believed 
his eventual aim of overthrowing ·the 
Saudi monarchy and pushing the British 
out of the Arabian Protectorates re- · 
m~ined unchanged. 11 7 
~-.. : 
. r 
· There · is no doubt that Nasser would have liked to get rid 
of the British and the Saudi monarchy, but it is doubtful 
if this was the reason why the troops were not pulled out. 
• ... ~1 - -
The Egyptians were having enough trouble handling the Yemeni 
royalists; it is difficult-to believe that they seriously 
imagined they could engage Saudi Arabia in a military con-
flict •. In the same way, it was not the presence of .Egypt-
. ian troops in Yemen that eventually forced the Briti.sh out 
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of Aden. Neither of these reasons, therefore, offer an , · 
adequate explanation as to why the Egyptians did not remove 
their troops. J, 
Initially, in·deed,. it seemed that Nasser and 
Faisal had managed to create a satisfactory settlement. 
·Shortly after the meeting in.Alexandria, Nasser sent Vice 
President Abdel·Hakim to the Northern frontier of Yemen to 
meet the Saudi defence minister, Prince Sul tan Saadi. 8 It -
.. was during these talks that it was decided that the- UAR and. 
Saudi Arabia should promote peace talks between the warring 
·. - 9 
factions, . and at the beg·inning of November royalist and 
republican delegations went to Erkwi t in Southern Sudan to 
discuss a settlement. 10 The two delegations reached ~gree-· 
ment on the following terms: 
1) A cease fire would come into· force on 
November 8, 1964. . 
2) A national Congress would meet in a Yemeni 
town on November 23 to lay down the principles· 
for settling existing differences through 
peaceful channels in order to maintain sta-
bility in Yemen. 
3) The Congress would consist of a chairman, 
63 ulema, 63 tribal leaders and 42 military 
leaders and 0 men of experience' in addition 
to the 18 members of the preparatory committee. 
4) The Congress would implement the preparatory 
committee 0 s decisions and would request the UAR 
and Saudi Arabia jointly or separately to help 
carry out the agreement. 
·, . 
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The ceas~e fire did, in fact, go into effect on 
November 8., ',·However/} it was quickly apparent that it would 
be more difficult to implement the other aspects of the 
agreement. On November 20 it was announced that the national 
congress had been postponed for a week. It was postponed 
again a week later and finally on December 13 it was post-
poned indefinitely. Although there were disagreements over 
where the Congress should be held and whether the republi-
cans should have a larger representation at the Congress, 
the real issue at stake was the future of ·the Imamate. It · 
~ 
·, -, was not, of course, surprising that this should foinl the 
·focal point of the dispute, but it does bring into question 
why the two sides agreed to come together at Erkwit in the·. 
. first place. The fact that they came together would seem 
. \, 
to indicate that both sides were willing to compromise; the -=--
failure of the Nati9nal Congress to meet indicates that this 
was not the case. This, however, is perhaps.too extreme. 
Both sides were prepared to compromise on their original 
stance, but this was not sufficient to bring them onto 
common ground. Thus the royalists no long~r demanded a 
return to the status quo but were prepared to accept the 
establishment of a constitutional monarchy. The republicans, 
for their part, were prepared to accept the royalists in 
the government and they even indicated on occasions that 
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they would tolerate the return of the Imam, provided his 
powers were limited to spiritual·matters. There waso there-
fore no common ground on which the republicans and royalists 
could negotiate. However, the positions of both parties 
were known to each other before they went to Erkwi t and 
I• .•• 
· their positions t~wa;rds each other must have been confirmed 
right from the· beginning of the meeting. · The cease fire 
· and the other agreements, therefore, must have been made in · 
full knowledge that they would not be fulfilled. On the 
basis of this analysis, i~ would seem a fair assumption 
that both parties went merely to appease the UAR and Saudi · 
Arabia. In the case of the republicans it may have had an . 
additional purpose of silencing the criticisms from internal 
factions. Despite Western scepticism about Nasser's motives,· 
• - _ _J ----. .• L....-.:-J_k J.l . ,.-...... - -- ~· ..!! 
,. ..... 
for collaborating with. Saudi Arabia, the republican leaders w_ • • 
themselves were greatly disturbed by Nasser's rapprochement 
with Faisal. 
It was reported that they believed that Nasser was . 
"selling them down the river" and that there was a state of 
panic among the officials.11 Sallal,~ in particular, was 
resentful about what he considered to be attempts by outside 
powers to bargain over Yemen's future. 12 The Erkwit Confer-
ence served a useful function for him; it demonstrated to 
the opposition factions that Sallal was prepared to compromise< 
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and it al'so · served to provi¢le evidence for Nasser that the 
royalists had not really altered their position. It is cer-
i1 ·" ·-, 
tain that Nasser would be unwilling to accept the compromise 
J 
solution of a constitutional monarchy; he may have been 
anxious to end the conflict, but not on those sort of con-
ditions. The Erkwit meeting, therefore, also served a use-
. ful function for Nasser: it showed that he was anxious to 
get a settlement; it brouglt. him closer. to Faisal so he was 
in a better position to bargain and get Faisal to reduce 
h:is support to the royalists: and by appearing reasonable 
he made it more di-fficult for Faisal to refuse a compromise. 
In any event,.· in light of the ;incompatible positions adopted -
by the republicans and the royalists, it is not surprising. 
·to learn that by the beginning of December, the royali~ts 
had renewed the offensive and had reoccupied most of the 
. territory which the republicans had taken from them in the 
summer. In addition the UAR atr force started bombing the 
royalist positions again. 
If Sallal did hope to mend the split among the.·· 
republicans by sending a delegation to Erkwit, he failed. 
At the beginning of December 60 disident republican Shafis, 
including eight senior officers and army officers fled to 
Aden. Then on December 11, three important republicans 
resigned from the·goverrunent, accusing Sallal 1 s regime of 
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alienating popular support through its corruption and in-
competence. They proposed that the President's powers should 
be transferred to a five man Council of Sovereignty. Six 
more Ministers resigned on December 26 and the next day only 
one of Sallal's ministers failed to resign. Sallal left for 
,.,-----___..-
· .. Cairo the same day to consult with the Egyptians. . On Decem-
ber 28, five dissident republican leaders arrived in Beirut 
· to explain the l'real Yemeni viewpoint". In reality they had 
nothing new to propose; they urged that the UAR must leave 
Yemen and that the Saudi Arabians must stop assisting the 
royalists; it was demanded that the country be allowed to 
~-,, 
decide its own future and_,, they suggested that this could· be 
done by holding a conference of Yemeni tribal chiefs, relig-
ious leaders, intellectuals, fartners and military leaders.13 · 
Although the disintegration of the republicans had 
. . 
never manifested itself in s-uch an acute form before, it was 
a recurrent problem and this instability within the regime 
· ·was a major and increasing difficulty to which Egyptian 
policy had to adjust. The upheaval in December 1964 was 
just another example of the failure of the republicans to 
settle their differences within the existing internal polit-. · 
ical structure. Although the dissident republicans in 
Beirut chast-ised the SallalLregime and purported to repre-
sent the 'real' Yemeni viewpoint, their views did not 
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· basically differ from those of Sallal • s supporters; although · 
they attempted to gain support by demanding the removal of 
the Egyptians, this was an empty gesture. They could only 
demand the removal of Egyptian forces if they could bring 
about a reconcil~~_t_ion with the royalists. ·They were not 
in a position to do this for they maintained the same nego-
.jtt.4.ating stance adopted by Sallal. In other words, despite 
. their offer to hold elections which would decide upon the 
fut~re system of governmentl4 the dissident republicans were 
.as opposed to the idea.of a constitutional monarchy as 
Sallal. This fact became increasingly apparent. 
This explains why Nasser backed Sallal solidly 
during the vicissitudes of the Sallal regime despite mis-
· givings about Sallal's ability. 15 On January 5, 1965 Sallal 
returned from Cairo; ignored the demands of the dissident/ 
/ 
republicans; established a new government under the former 
Vice President, Hassan al Amri; and declared a state of 
emergency. The royalists and the Saudis must have recog-
nized that under these circumstances there was no chance of 
meaningful negotiations with the republicans and they, 
therefore, decided to press the attack.. Between January 
and July 1965 the royalist forces took the offensive and 
were exceptionally successful. By the beginning of August 
it could be conunented that the royalists had taken over as 
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much as a third of the total area which had previously been 
occupied by the Egyptians, within the space of two months • 
. By mid January it was reported that all negotiations between 
the UAR and Saudi Arabia had been suspended. Saudi Arabia, . 
as might be expected pressed in vain for a resumption of 
talks, but it was clear that negotiations were closed until 
the UAR had evidence that the republican government was re~ 
established. 16 · 
During this phase, the republicans could obviously 
be blamed for prolonging the war and so, concomitant with 
LI 
- - L.-.-J 
the military assault, the Yemeni royalists en.couraged devel-
. opments on the political front. This, of course, is in strict 
conformity with guerrilla theory. 17 They made public a 
"national charter" at the end of January in which the Imam 
, agreed to submit to a Legislative Assembly provided that the 
. · 18 e I I UAR withdrew. This action achieved its purpose since the 
Imam's popularity did iricrease. 19 However, this could be 
attributed to the successes of the royalists on the military 
. front which served to raise the morale of the royalists; 
this inevitably attreacted new followers. The success of 
the royalists was the result of the increase in military 
and financial aid which they were receiv~ng from Saudi 
Arabia, the Principalities of the South Arabian Federation 
.and Iran. 
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Inevitably, the royalist victories tended to under-
mine the Egyptian position and consequently Sallal's, since 
he depended on Egyptian backing. It has also been argued 
· that---the Royalist National Charter was issued to increase 
the tensions within the republican faction. It is unlikely, 
however ~hat the Charter had much appeal for the republicans 
since it called for a constitutional monarchy, a solution 
wh.ich- all the republicans rejected. In any event, the 
forces. disuniting the republicans were sufficiently strong 
' ,. 
that in April Amri resigned and Sallal asked Mohammed 
Nooman to form a new Administration. This was clear evi-
( 
dence of th-e strength of the dissident republicans of which_ 
. Nooman was a leader: he · was one of the three ministers who 
resigned in December 1964 calling Sallal's regime corrupt 
and inefficient. Nooman agreed to form a government on 
. condition that a peace conference· was held. . The peace con- . 
I 
·ference, however, was concerned not with the strife between 
.· the royalists and the republicans but with the conflicts 
among the republicans. 20 It was obviously hoped that this 
move would strengthen the republicans and create more 
favourable conditions within which to negotiate. The new 
government was no longer weighted in favour of the Ze1dis 
as all previous government had been·. -··,The cabinet consisted 
of nine Zeidis and nine Shaf is and Nooman was the first 
-· _,·,-... h 
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Shaf is to become prime minister. It ·· could be that Sall al 
was hoping that ~ increasing the power of the Shafis he 
was inc~easing his commitment to the republican solution. 
So long as the Zeidis faction had ·the upper hand among the 
republicans, the royalists could legitimately hope that they 
' 
would accept the return of the Imam into a position of some 
authority. It was clear that the Shafis would not tolerate 
such a so_lution, though they would be anxious to achieve a 
peace settlement. By extending the power of the Shafis, 
Sallal was binding himself to a particular solution and re-
ducing his ~bility to compromise. His own powers, for ex-
ample, were diluted by the formation of a six man Presidential 
Counc.il. At the same time, the move was also a rebuff to 
the Egyptians since six of the Shafis were sympathetic to 
the Baathist party. 21 
Between May 2 and 5, the national peace conference 
of 5,000 tribal leaders and other leading personalities was 
held at Kharmer, which is on the Hashid tribe's territory 
about twenty miles north of Sana. The ,republican tribes 
were widely represented, but the royaJ.ist tribes refused to 
attend. 'The conference approved a number of proposals aimed 
at restoring peace. These included the formation of a 
-·· 
permament committee of tribal and religious leaders which 
would make contact with the royalist tribes, delegations to 
all Arab countries to se·~k their cooperation in ending the 
! 
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· · · war and the formation of a people• s army 11,000 strong which 
would relieve the Egyptian forces. Despite the fact that 
Nooman was irrevocably committed to the rE?pubiican solution 
his actions indicated that he genuinely believed.that it 
was possible to achieve a settlement with the royalists on 
this basis. On May 13 he opened talks with the Egyptians 
to arrange their withdrawal and two days later he was a 
·me~er of the delegation which visited Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Syria ana· Joran. 
Jordan put forward a peace solution to Nasser and 
Faisal on June 14 and two days earlier a mediation mission 
from Kuwait arrived at Riyadh for talks with Faisal at the 
request of the r'epublicall:s. A joint communique was issued· 
on June 15 which stated that the two sides had agreed to try 
J 
and find a way to se~tle the Yemeni conflict. There was a 
· certain air of unreality about these peace overtures in fa.ce 
of the royalist offensive and the reported increase of 
Egyptian troops from 35,000 to 60,000 men. In. a way, Nooman 
·· · had no alternative but to press~;ahead with his mutually-
. · _inconsistent policies, but the uncertainty of his position 
was clearly revealed on June 27,when Sallal -appointed a 
. . 
supreme council of the armed forces without consulting the 
' 
cabinet. Troops were sent to Sana Radio to enforce the 
broadcasting of the order. Sallal was obviously attempting 
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· to reassert his authority. As a result, Nooman resigned , 
· ,. :.and flew to Cairo to confer with the Egyptians. It was be-
-
lieved that Nooman was attempting to force the Egyptians 
"'- ·.·-~t .. ' 
• 
· to choose between Sall al and himself. ~2 
It was inevitable that Sallal should be the 
Egyptian choice. Nooman was associated with the Baathists 
which did not endear him to Nasser. Moreover there was 
grave danger associated with any attempt to superced Sallal. 
He represented the Zeidis interests and if .. J1e were to lose 
power to the Shafis, relations among the republicans could 
det·eriorate. The situation was complicated by the fact that 
Nooman had identified himself as the peace candidate and had 
engendered a good deal of support among the tribal leaders. 
On July 6, Sallal formed a governm-ent himself which was 
dominated by military officers. This inevit~bly increased 
the hostility of the Nooman supporters. Cairo was disturbed 
· · - . by this turn of events and Sallal visited Cairo and the 
Egyptian officials attempted to arrange a compromise between 
· · him and Nooman. Sallal revoked the decision by which he 
had made himself prime minister and Amri was again asked 
to form a government. .In addition, Sallal agreed to abide . 
· by the resolution passed at the Kharmer Conference. The 
· Nooman faction was reported to have reluctantly acquiesced· 
in this deed!sion but most of.Nooman's leading supporters 
~ •, -
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refu~_~d_ to serve in the cabinet. Despite these moves, 36-. 
leading republicans and two hundred of their followers 
~ 
turned up in the South Arabian Federation on July 20 and 
'' 
issued appeals to the UN and the Arab League asking them to 
ensure the withdraw! of the UAR forces from Yemen, the ful-
fillment of the resolutions of the Kharmer Conference and 
the reestablishment of the Nooman Government. 
The split between the Sallal faction and the 
f·· .l •... --• 
. Nooman factioncentred on the issues of 'peace' and 'war' 
although it originated in the religious issue. Nasser was 
obviously anxious to reorient the situation and on July 22 
he announced that peace negotiations had been reppened with 
Saudi Arabia and that the UAR had .a plan which, with Saudi 
··.cooperation, would enable her to· withdraw her troops from 
Yemen in six months or less. This can be seen as an attempt 
to heal the split within the republican party. At the same 
time, however, Nasser did not wish to give the Saudis the 
i~pression that the turmoil among the republicans was forc·ing 
him to retract his support. So, at the same time he announc-
ed -that the UAR troops would not tolerate indefinitely attacks 
by British and· Saudi mercenaries and that if negotiations 
failed, the UAR would have to liquidate the points of aggress-
ion which would develop into armed conflict with Saudi Arabia. 
In a speech made on the a~niversary of the Egyptian 
I .. 
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revolution, Nasser said: "If they want peace, we are ready 
for it. 
23 
means." 
If they are not we. shall have to resort to other 
'• The speech was undoubtedly made for internal con-
sumption and although Nasser sent a personal representative 
to discuss negotiations with Fais_al, the king chose to take 
Nasser's speech very seriously and on. August 4 it was re- __ .,-
ported that over 10,000 Saudi troops were massed on the 
'· I 
' 
·Yemeni b9rder ready_to invade in the event of an Egyptian 
attack. ·of course, since there were no plans for an Egypt-
.. 
ian 'invasion' the crisis petered out and it was during this 
period that negotiations went ahead t·o arrange a meeting be- · 
tween Faisal and Nasser. The result of the negotiations·was 
th.at Nasser agreed on August -l-6 to meet Faisal in Jidda the 
following~ week. Faisal offered to meet Nasser on neutral 
territory,-· but. this was rejected because Nasser said that 
he did not wish to deal with Faisal ·· as an 'enemy and a 
stranger'. 
I-;.... • . 
Before. going to ·Jidda,· Nasser met with republican 
.leaders including Sallal and Nooman. It is· reported that 
Nasser accused Nooman of establishing an anti Egyptian. 
government. This confirms that he had been irritated by 
· · the presence of the Baathists in Nooman• s government. How-
. ever, afterwards Nooman stated that he was convinced that 
the UAR desired to end the war. Nasser arrived in Jidda on 
' 
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August 22. A decade had passed since his last visit. An 
agreement was quickly reacbed and was signed on August 24. 
There were nine points to the agreement. 
\_ . ..("' -
. . ,,. . -
. . ' -..-..- \ 
1) The people of Yemen must decide the 
form of government they desire through a 
plebiscite to be held not later than 
November 23, 1966. 
2) The period up to the plebiscite would 
be considered a transitional period. 
3) With the cooperation of UAR and Saudi 
Arabia, a conference of 50 representatives 
of all the national forces and leading 
personalities of Yemen would meet at Harad 
on November 23, 1965, to define the system 
of government during the transitional 
period, form a provisional government and 
determine the form and nature of the 
plebiscite. 
4) Saudi Arabia and the UAR undertook to ·t 
r~spect the decisions of the Harad Conferenc.e 
and to cooperate to ensure their successful 
implementation. They agreed to form a joint 
committee to organize the plebiscite if-the 
conference considered it necessary. 
5) Saudi Arabia would .immediatelf stop 
military aid of all kind and foroid the 
use of their territory for op.erations 
against Yemen. 
6) The UAR would withdraw all her forces rom 
Yemen within the 10 months beginning on 
November 23, 1965. 
·7) Fighting in Yemen would end immediately 
arid Saudi Arabia and the UAR would form a 
joint peace commission to supervise the 
cease fire and control the frontiers and 
portso Food aid would continue- under the 
commission°s supervisiono The commission 
would be entitled to use all transport 
,_ . 
. . . . ' ; . 
· .... 
' I 
. facilities within Yemen and to move 
through Saudi territory if necessary. 
8) Saudi Arabia and the UAR would form 
a joint force, to be used by the corn:mis~ 
sion when necessary to prevent any vio-
lation of the agreement or a-ny action 
-intended to obstruct it or provoke dis"'!"' 
order. 
9) President Nasser and King Faisal would 
remain in direct contact to overcome any 
difficulties in carrying out the agreement. 
145 
The agreement was praised by all Arab leaders, 
except the Syrians who claimed that Nasser had betrayed· the 
Yemeni revolution. Their interpretation was possibly cor-
rect. One correspondent noted that the agreement was an 
admission of total failure for Nasser. 
~ 
"Mr. Nasser h·as had to go back to Cairo 
without any guarantee, indeed little 
likelihood that the republicians, to 
which he conunitted so much manpower, 
treasure and prestige will survive ••• 
Indeed he faces the risk that under the 
Jidda agreement the monarchy can return 
to power. 11 24 
Although the agreement was greeted as a genuine effort by 
' Faisal and Nasser to end their differences, the agreement 
contained the seeds of its own destruction~ 
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CHAPTER 10. Aftermath of Jidda 
' ,, ::,. ' ' . ··~,., ' 
Initially, the results following the Jidda agree-
ment seemed to be encouraging. The royalists headquarters 
announced on August 25 that it had ordered its forces to 
stop fighting although they were to hold their positions 
until after the Harad Conference. The following day, the 
Egyptian troops began to withdraw from the Saudi border 
where they had been -massed. On September 5 it was agreed· 
that the Saudi Egyptian force would begin its work not 
later than September 25. A week later Faisal visited 
Cairo and he and Nasser issued a joint communique offering 
their support for the Jidda agreement and their intention 
to develop economic, .cultural and other forms of cooperation 
between the two countries. The af feet of the agreement on 
·the internal unity of the republican pal;"ty was also dra-
matic. There was an immediate reconciliation between Sallal. 
and the dissident .republicans who.had been in communication 
., -
with Faisal and this proved symptomatic of a general improve-
ment of relations. It would thus seem that the major object-
ive of the Jidda agreement was quickly achieved •. 
The successful implementation of the Jidda agree-
ment depended essentially on the ability of the republicans 
and the royalists to resolve their differences. Despite 
disagreements even before the conference began1 it did start 
..... ...=::::_ ----- •- _M.,.._•M<J - ,< • ...;,.--'. •._ •• _._,-.-,_ - - -- -- --~-
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. on time, on November 23, to the surprise of many observers •. · 
The republican delegatz.ion was .dominated by the 
.-- .. ~ 
moderat'e republicans and there were only three members of 
the delegation who were .regarded as members of President 
Sallal's faction; Sallal himself was not present. This is 
important since it means that the failure of the conference 
cannot be attributed to direct pressure from the Egyptians • 
. The republicans had insisted that members of the Hamiduddin 
family (of which Imam Badr was a member) be excluded from 
the royalist delegation at Harad. The royalists accepted 
i 
. • j.. 
but.it is rep~rted that they did so only under pressure from 
·-
\the Saudis. The royalist delegation, therefore, was mainly 
made up of chiefs from the royalist tribes, although it also 
included three dissident rep~blicans, who clearly favoured 
the return of the Imam. The UAR and Saudi Arabia were rep-
resented by two observers. 
. .. ,... -
· The peace conference ran into dif f icul·ties as 
. 
· ·. soon as it conunenced. . The talks were stalled on the ques-
tion of the designation of the new coalition government •. · 
The republicans insisted that it be called the Republic of 
I 
- ,:_ ·. 
Yemen while the royalists demanded that it should be referred 
to as the State of Yemen: a neutral term which avoided 
connotation with the royalists or the republicans. Both 
. 2 the UAR and Saudi Arabia baqked the royalists on this issue. 
__________.;__,~-c:::: :...........: -_ -=- -
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. ~ 't ' 
-148 
The republicans . sent a very bitter note to Nasser .saying 
that they had not realized that the Jidda agreement had 
abQlished both the Imamate and the republic and that the 
function of the conference was to chose a government which 
· was neither republican or Imamic. 3 The republicans con-
-tinued to argue that the function of the conference should 
be to decide the future of the Hamiduddin family, although 
it was clear that Nasser and Faisal had ,agreed that this 
decision should be left to a plebiscite. This was the 
position taken by the royalists. The republicans, there-
fore, began to resent the· Jidda agreement which they saw 
as an attempt by outside powers to impose a solution con~ 
cerning problems which were solely the responsibility of 
Yemen. 
After the conference, Iriani, one of the impor- · 
tant moderate republicans, argued that the two parties had 
in fact reached an agreement on the nature.of the coalition 
· government and the plebiscite but that after further dis-
cussions with the Saudis, the royalists retracted oni·.t.heir · 
agreement •. "We felt.Saudi Arabia was imposing its.views on 
the royalist side w~ile the UAR left us complete freedom·in 
I ' 
bargaining with the royalists. 114 The difficulty concerning 
the ple~iscite centred on the timing of the departure of 
the Egyptian troops. The royalists demanded the inunediate 
I 
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·. withdrawal of the UAR troops· to be followed. by a plebiscite 
inunediately afterwards. The republicans, on the other hand, 
insisted that time was neede~ to arrange the evacuation of 
the Egyptians. Although the moderate republicans were anx-
ious to see the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops they did 
. . \ 
not wish to se'e them depart before the arrangement of a 
·permanent settlement. The conference was deadloacked on . 
. these two major issue_s: the form of the interim government 
and the timing of the_ Egyptian withdrawal. It broke ·up on 
December 24, 1965 because, . Jof the beginning of Ramadan. It 
was agreed, however, that the conference should be resumed 
in February and that both sides int_the meantime should ob~ 
serve .the armistice and.iefrain from propaganda against each 
other. This agreement, however, did not prevent Saudi 
Arabia from privately threatening to resume aid to the 
royalists unless the UAR troops were removed at the begin-
s ning of January. 
There were, however, reasons extending beyond the 
·tot. 1:_ Yemeni conflict which explain why relations between the UAR 
and Saudi Arabia should deteriorate. The UAR was disturbed 
by the growing friendship which had developed between Faisal 
and the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, a traditional 
' I 
enemy of Egypt. It seemed to be part of an attempt by 
Faisal to establish a solid conservative bloc with which 
I . 
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to confront the revolutionary Arab states. Perhaps a more 
important reason for Egypt's concern stemmed from a 400 
~ 
· million dollars arms deal which Faisal had-·c·oncluded with 
Britain and the us. It was apparent that Saudi Arabia was 
not going to embark on a military adventure against Israel 
and, therefore, it was not unreasonable to assume that 
Saudi Arabia's increasing strength might be used against 
Egypt in Yemen. It might be supposed that the Western 
states would not allow the weapons to be used in such a 
fashion, but Nasse·r could clearly recall that two major 
members of the Western alliance had perpetrated an attack 
on.Egypt by Israel. 
The Saud.is, for their part, were equally suspicious 
0£ the Egyptians. They knew that the Sovie·ts were the main 
source of Egyptian arms and industrial credits. They be-
lieved that the Soviets were responsible for the delays in 
,,. 
the withdrawal of_ Egyptian troops from Yemen which they 
.argued was serving to endanger the fulfillment of the Jidd·a. · 
.,r·· 
agreement. They argued that the Soviets saw the continued 1
• • 
conflict as the best means of ·extending t:heir foothold on 
·6 the Arabian Peninsula. 
It was certainly true that the communists were in~ 
volved in Yemen. In May of 1963 the Soviets granted Yemen 
a 65 million ruble credit (72 million dollars). By May 1966 
I 
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the US had supplied nearly 50 million dollars in aid.· The 
I 
' West Germans were also helping to create irrigation projects 
and Kuwait made a preliminary grant of 3 million dollars. 
In addition, the Chinese were also engaged in aid projects.7 
The Soviets influence in Yemen, therefore, was by no means 
overwhelming • At the same time, as has already been argued, 
-, . 
· it is unlikely that Nasser. had any desire to have the ·soviets 
in a predominant position in Yemen. Moreover, the Soviets 11 .. 
. ft·: 
had never shown -any real interest in taking ·a too active in-
terest in Middle Eastern politics. The British and the 
~ Americans had showed the Russians in 1958, when they sent 
troops into Jordan.and Lebanon, the type of situation which 
could result if they became too involved with any of the 
Middle Eastern countries. By 1966, the Soviets se~med anx-
ious to develop friends in the Middle ~ast and t~ey knew 
that they could not do this by attempting to dominate the 
government of any of the count:ti.es •. 
So, although the fears of the Saudis are under-
. ··.standalble, it is much easier to explain the failure of the 
Egyptians to remove their troops from Yemen in terms of the 
continuing dispute between the royalists and the republicans 
rather than in terms of Soviet influence~:·- · The impasse 
reached at the Harad conference had the effect of forcing 
the moderate republicans into a closer alliance with the 
pro Egyptian faction. The moderate republicans accused 
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Faisal of having interfered and trying to guarantee the 
survival of the Imam and the royal family. They blamed him 
for the failure of the conference saying that he had shut 
the door on a compr'omise. One important Yemen nationalist 
is repor·ted to have said: 
"The Egyptians control our army, our 
currency and virtually run our ministries, '\.,. 
but without them we can do nothing. We 
don't really feel secure without the 
Egyptians because historically we have 8 
-had such bad experiences with the Saudis." 
Under these circumstances the republicans should 
have become a more united entity and the.constant criticism 
which had confronted the Egyptians from the moment they had 
arrived in Yemen should have declined. It would also seem 
that Nasser's negotiating stance had improved and that he 
should have been able to put increasing pressure ·on Faisal 
to compromise. But none of this materialized. In the first 
.. place, Nasser appeared to adopt an increasingly aggressive 
stance. On February 22 Nasser said: "If anyone thinks we 
have become tired because we have stayed in Yemen so long, 
let me say that we are a struggling nation, a fighting 
c, 
nation, a patient nation. We ·can stay in Yemen for one 
year, two years, three years or even five. 11•9 
It was quickly pointed out that this new stand 
occurred at the same time that the British declared in the 
Defence White Paper issued also on February. 22, 1966 that 
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they intended to leave Aden by 1968. _ Indeed, Nasser made 
reference to this development when he threatened that if_ 
there were no settlement in Yemen he would keep his troops 
- there until the British left in 1968. For reasons which 
have already been explained, it is doubtful if this were 
more than a bargaining counter. It was important to Nasser 
that the British did not establish a government in the 
South Arabian Federation which preserved the feudal infra-.. 
i 
structure of the society but it was possible for him to 
I 
support the Aden nationalists without maintaining troops in 
··r··-.. 
I ; , 
Yemen. The new British policy on Aden, therefore, can pro-
vide no more than a partial explanation as to why Nasser 
decided to continue the war. The inability of the royalists 
ard republicans to reach agreement together with the Saudi 
military posture also constituted. important reasons. 
At the same . t_ime that Nasser was threatening to 
renew the war he was also attempting to restart negotiations 
between the royalists and the republicans. Faisal, however, 
refused to cooperate. He argued that t}le republicans had 
not altered their position since the first Harad Conference 
and, therefore, any future conference would be a waste of 
time. When Nasser sent a letter to him suggesting that a 
provisional government be composed of two thirds republican 
and one third royalists,. Faisal's associates said that he 
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was so insulted that he refused to reply.lo 
---· At the same 
time h·e appealed privately to the US for diplom~tic and 
military support, including US ai~power, if Egypt resumed 
the Yemen war. He warned that Saudi Arabia might intervene 
directly if the truce was broken. Since the US had already· 
promised very extensive military aid to Saudi Arabia,· :,it 
' 
was inevitable that it was again going to become embroiled 
in the Yemeni struggle and would have to pursue- an active 
policy here in an effort to maintain peace. 11 The British, 
too, were closely involved with Saudi Arabia and had sold 
12 Hawker Hunter jet fighter~ plus British pilots and crews. 
Saudi Arabia signed a contract with British concerns for 
the rush construction of a military airfield within five 
miles of the Yemeni border.12 It is not surprising under 
these circumstance that Nasser came under increasing press-
ure from his own military commanders. On April 1, 20 
Egyptian army officers were secretly arrested on charges 
of plotting against Nasser because of differences over his 
Yemen policy. This was the most serious anti Nasser move 
for some years. It was believed that the arrested officers 
had argued that Nasser was making amistake by not withdraw-
ing quickly. However, Nasser was also under pressure from 
officers who advocated a more aggressive policy and it was 
believed that some were itching to invade Saudi Arabia. 13 
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As so often happens on· these occasions when the 
decision. maker is pressed from two extremes, an intermediate 
policy is followed in an effort to isolate the extremists on 
both sides. The policy which Nasser adopted was to withdraw· 
.:from the outlying areas, which had involved an expensive 
holding policy. . Troops were concentrated in the triangle. 
formed between Sana, Hodeida and Taiz. There is no doubt 
that Nasser rea.lized when he withdrew his .troops in accord-
ance with previous agreements with Faisal, that this would 
be a good military posture to maintain, since it would per-
mit a substantial withdrawal of troops without endangering 
the security of the area. 14 It is against this background 
that Nasser's aggressive speeches must be viewed. He was 
at his most aggressive on May 1 when he said:· 
"Faisal will wake up one morning to 
find his aerodrome bombed and wiped 
out by the Egyptian airforce. We can 
wipe out their planes in five minutes. 
All patience has its limits. In recent 
years, we have let the Saudis arm the 
royalist bands. Now we are changing our 
policy. In the event of aggression 
against Yemen or infiltration from Saudi 
Arabia, we shall not be content to strike 
at the bases of aggression, we shall 
occupy them. " 
. / 
I, '.'-' 
.., 
This speech was followed by a· statement issued by the Sallal · 
government laying claim to areas in Southern Saudi Arabia 
which they argued the Saudi had seized during an aggressive 
campaign in the 1930 1 s. 
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These claims sound aggressive·and arrogant. But 
it must be remembered that they followed the Saudi announce~ 
ment that they were going to buy the Hawker Hunters and 
build an airfield strategically placed near the Yemen bor-
der. More important, the threats were made at the same time 
·that the Egyptian troops were continuing to withdraw into 
the triangular area between the three major cities. The 
speech was certainly discounted by the royalists. At the 
beginning of June Imam Badr stated that Nasser appeared to 
be carrying out the cease fire agreement and that the May 
. Day speech was for internal consumption and that the threat 
of invading Saudi Arabia was an idle bluff.15 In any event, 
by the time the May Day speech was made,,the peace negoti-
ations had completely collapsed and the joint peace commis-
sion formed by the UAR and Saudi Arabia was no longer func-
tioning effectively, 16 although it had investigated out-
,. 
breaks of fighting at an earlier date and concluded that 
it did not consti·tute a resumption of the civil war •17 It 
was reported at the end of April that both the UAR and Saudi 
Arabia were marking time and that neither wanted a settle-
ment at that particular moment. Indeed it was argued that 
the moderate republicans were also uninterested in peace 
talks. As one observer put it: "They are wiser and more 
cynical than last year. They have had their conference and 
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found themselves controlled by others. They don't want to 
_ _., . 
be humiliated like that ·again. They have learned that this ·_ 
is not really their country yet. 11 18 
It was, no doubt, the combination of these _-factors , I 
·- < 
which led to the failure of the attempts by the Amir of 
Kuwait to reconcile the differences between the UAR and --·•1,~---~A~:;~* . 
Saudi Arabia. The Amir sent a message to Faisal and Nasser 
on April 18 and these efforts continued through the next 
few months. A new agreement was finally reached in Kuwait 
on August 19, 1966 after negotiations between representatives 
of the UAR and Saudi Arabia. But these negotiations were 
doubtless a facade to appease the Americans who were con-
stantly pressing the two countries to resolve their dispute. 
-The US, moreover, did not refrain from using direct economic 
pressure on the UAR and when Nasser asked the US for aid 
amounting to 150 million dollars after the US programme of 
aid ran out in June 1966, this request was refused, for as 
long as the Yemen problem remained unsolved. 19 Egypt's 
' 
, ...,, . .... J 
problems were compounded when at the same time the IMF 
turned down the request for an emergency loan of 70 million 
dollars. It was argued that the IMF was not satisfied with 
the UAR's economic reforms or their Yemen commitment. 20 It 
is likely that Nasser thought that it was the second factor 
·which . .Jdetermined the decision of the IMF. However, this 
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· was not the sort of pressura. to which the Egyptians were 
I 
likely to be responsive; indeed it could serve to strengthen 
their resolve in the opposite direction. It represented an 
atternpt'hy the Western powers ·to reassert their influence· 
in the area. 
····! 
1,• 
A very much more serious threat to Nasser's policy 
came from an unexpected source, the republican government 
in Sana. It has been sugge-sted . that Nas.ser could have ex-
pected close cooperation from the republicans after the dis-
illusionment at Harad. This seemed to be the case up·: .. to 
April 1966, when the republicans be.gan to adopt a new strat-
egy. Sallal had been in Cairo since the summer of 1965 and 
Yemen was controlled by General Amri, who in the past had 
been a faithful follower of the Cairo line. However, for 
several months before Sallal returned to Sana on August 12, 
1966, Amri pursued an increasingly independent policy which 
brought him into alliance with the moderate republicans 
headed by Ahmed Nooman. The first overt sign of this in-
dependence came at the end nf April when Amri reshuffled 
the cabinet and brought in several new ministers of which 
the Egyptians disapproved. It is likely that the reason 
for this disapproval was that the ministers were Baathists. 
Nasser's fear of such a development can be explained by 
, 
reference to his experience with the Syrians. 
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--It is likely that the Baathists would favour a 
sharp decline in Egyptian influence in Yemeni affairs. But 
because the republicans_ could .not survive without outside· 
assistance it was equally likely that th~ republicans would 
be forced to turn to the Soviets for support. From the 
early stages of the revolution the.Soviets had had a mili-
tary mission assisting the UAR in training the new Yemeni 
army and constructing a military airfiela. 21 But during 
this_period Nasser could be sure that the Yemeni leadership 
would always show allegiance to Ca=i:.ro rath·er than Moscow. 
During the summer of 1966, Nasser's actions indicate that 
he was becoming uncertain that this was still the case. 
5uring a visit to Cairo by Mr. Kosygin, the UAR government 
tried to prevent General Amri from meeting Kosygin until 
Kosygin himself insisted on seeing Amri. At this time the 
Soviet Union offered to arm and equip a republican army of 
18,000 men. The UAR vetoed the proposal. They also vetoed 
an offer by East Germany to supply military equipment to 
Yemen. This, of. course, ran counter to the initial policy 
which was to welcome Soviet assistance. 
This may be the reason why Nasser decided to 
crush the anti ·Egyptian faction in the Yemeni government. 
It was not the reason which was accepted at the time, how-
ever. One observer, Hederick Smith, argued that a plan had 
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developed in Sana by the 'Yemeni first' republicans. to replace 
Sallal and open peace negotiations with the royalists outside 
Egyptian channels. The moderates envisaged a 99.-·:.member 
national consultative assembly to rule the country for one 
. year. The royalists would withdraw the Imam and _his family 
_, ... presumabl•y while Cairo withdrew all her troops. At· ,,the·end 
of the year, the Assembly was to determine the future form 
of the Yemeni government and settle all basic questions in-
cluding whether the royal family could return. The plan 
also included a supreme stat~ council in _p_9alition with the ""·· 
royalists. Smith said· that the _FOP·osals had been winning 
support among the Yemeni republicans during July 1966, 
although they had not yet approached the royalists and it 
was at this point that "Nasser moved to squelch Yemeni 
opposition. 1122 . ._, ( ' 
The action which Nasser took was drastic and in-
volved flagrant interference into the domestic jurisdiction 
of Yemen. Sallal was sent back to Sana .on· August 12 des-
pite opposition from General Amri. Amri, therefore, took ~ 
rr 
fOSitive action in an effort to prevent the return of 
Sallal. On the evening of August 11 the Sana airport was 
; ~ ~ ,' ,. .' I , 
occupied by Yemeni troops. These, however, were forced to 
withdraw by the Egyptians. There was intense opposition 
to the return of Sallal and a group of 'Yemeni First' . 
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republicans decided to hold a press conference outside 
Yemen in an effort to force Nasser to allow them to follow 
a more independent policy. The Egyptians refused to a·liow 
them to go, but 0 0n September 9 a delegation of leading 
republicans arrived in Cairo for talks with the UAR govern-
ment.· The group included Amri, Noom~n and Iriani. On 
September 16 the Egyptian-security police arrested the 
.. 
!> -~, 
leading members of the delegation. Twelve of the group 
were detained while all the other members of the delegation 
were kept under close surveillance. The same day Sana 
Radio announced that President Sallal had accepted the res-
ignation of General Amri and his cabinet, and on September 
18 Sallal made himself Premier and formed a new government. 
The Egyptians, therefore, had performed a bloodless coup 
d'etat, a move which they must have know would cause bitter 
hostility not only in Yemen, but in the outside world. 
It is :· di£ f icul t to agree with the explanation 
given by Smith. Esse~tially, the peace proposals which he 
describes ·are no different from the ones which the republi-
cans put forward at the Har ad conference and which the · ._) 
royalists had rejected out of hand. It is difficult to see 
why these new proposals should have stood a better chance 
of success. It would seem that the dissident republicans 
were merely using the question of peace proposals as a means 
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·.-. of gathering support. They were essentially more interested . 
in eliminating Egyptian.inf~uence even if it involved an 
increasing commitment to_the Soviets. It.would seem more 
plausible to suggest that it was this factor which persuaded 
Nasser to try oustirig t}le dissident republicans from the 
scene. 
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CHAPTER 11 •. EgyPt's Withdrawal 
The return of. Sallal .seemed to auger a period of. 
renewed violence. This was foreshadowed by tl1e brutal policy 
,. ' implemented by Sallal in an effort to reassert his position. 
As a result df Sallal's repressive measures, many rep~~li-
cans fled to the mountains north of Sana, an area controlled 
by the powerful Hashid tribe and which had been evacuated of 
Egyptian.troops during the general withdrawal the previous 
year. Sheikh Abdullah Ben Hussein al Ahmar who was the 
major chief of the Hashid Confederation and a former member 
of Nooman's government was reported to be leading these 
dissident republicans and was attempting to set up a third 
regime opposed to the royalists and Sallal's regime. 
The Saudis too had used the cease fire following 
the Jidda agreement to strengthen their defences. In 
December 1965 they made their 400 million dollars arms deal 
with Britain and the US which was to be operational by 1968. 
Following Britain .. ' s decision to leave Aden by 1968, Saudi 
Arabia succeeded in getting th.e Western powers to operate 
an emergency programme which was completed by October 1~66 
and completely secured the Saudi Arabian border with Yemen. 
It included ten jet fighters and 37 thunderbird ground to 
. . · 1 1 air m1ss1 es. The Western powers gave the weapons i~ an 
effort to deter Egypt from attacking Saudi Arabia, but of 
.:..-;._---,.l...-...W.-n ,~~--, r.; ,:::,~g.-------, 
·• ,.. 
.. 
' ' 
164 
..... ~. 
c9urse, · as has been. arg·ued, · it also permitted the Saudis to 
aid the royalists with impunity. This was clearly what 
Na~ser feared and he may have stepped up the war, with the 
·1·, • 
.. 
return of Sallal, in an effort to bring the fighting toa 
'\. quick conclusion before the Saudi position was further 
strengthened in 1968. This would explain the bombing raids 
on the Saudi port of Jizan and the oasis town of Najran which 
occurred on October 14, 1966. They could be viewed as a 
warning to the Saudis that the Egyptians would not be deter-
red by the new defence mechanisms and they would be advised 
to desist from aiding the -royalists. Faisal made no official 
announcment about the raid and news of it was not broadcast 
in Saudi Arabia, which suggests that Faisal recognized that 
the bombing did not indicate any formal attempt at aggression 
2 on the Egyptian ' s part. :--
Nevertheless, many of the Arab states were disturb-
ed by the continued split between the two Arab leaders. 
Towards the end of October, the Sudanese decided to mediate 
. 
--.. between the UAR and the Saudis. There were already frequent 
skirmishes occurring between the Egyptians, royalists and 
dissident republicans. It was reported that the royalists 
were urging Faisal that the time was opportune for an attack 
but that Faisal was holding back in the hope that Egypt 
.. r ' • 
. 3 would respond to the Kuwait and Sudanese attempts to mediate. 
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At the same time it was reported that several · thousand . people 
had been arrested in Sana and Taiz. 4 But there were consid-
_ erable discrepancies in these reports and it is difficult to 
ascertain their accuracy. In any event, the Saudis decided 
. that the situation had deteriorated so badly from the repub-
licans point of view that it was worthwhile resuming the war 
and an order was given out to this effe.ct in mid January 
1967, 5 although as late as April it was being reported.that 
the royalists were still "straining at the leash held by 
Faisal. 11 It would seem, therefore, that the order to resume 
··:>. the war was a propaganda ploy which was designed to curb the 
activities of the Egyptians. In reality the Saudis were 
probably not anxious to open the war again until the British 
and American arms deal came into full effect. ·6 
The Saudis said that they had taken the step of 
renewing the fighting because they feared the UAR plans to 
spread their programme of revolutionary expansion into the 
Southern part of the Peninsula. However, it should be noted 
t!fl, 
that the move also coincided with outbreaks of sporadic 
subversive violence in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government 
charged that the saboteurs were Yemeni infiltrators trained 
and sent across the border by the UAR. Another factor in 
the Saudi decision may have been the reports that the UAR 
was using gas ~gainst the royalist strongholds in Northern 
I 
. . .. ·-· -- - .. -· - - - =-... .., . ...,... ... ----- , ..... -· .. -,• . .3/___.._- _.~ .... ~~!.; 
, . I . 
1-- , .. 
(•' .:. . 
t 
~ ' 
.... 
t 
i:---- • • 
• 
_., __ - . -- -- -
166 
· Yemen. 'J Once the Saudis had g.iven. formal permission to re-, 
new the war they no longer felt restraine_d from accusing the 
UAR of attacking Saudi territory. 
The accumulation of events obviously marks a new 
Egyptian offensive. The attacks on Saudi Arabia were aimed 
at cutting off the.main Saudi supply centres from the royal-
ists. The move was condemned by the international conununity 
and it did not achieve its stated objective. But it may 
have helped to raise the Jllorale of the republican regime 
and this may well explain why the policy was periodically 
,·- "-· 
pursued. The Egyptian use of gas was also condemned by the 
international community and again, the action can be ex-
plained on practical grounds. The royalists were pro~ected 
in deep caves by normal bombing raids and, therefore, the 
only way that the Egyptians could effectiv~ly harrass the 
enemy was by the use of gas. 8 
There were still estimated to be 70,000 Egyptian 
troops operating in Yemen but it was apparent that the 
~ 
-republicans situation was still uncertain. On February 11, 
r: 
r : 
1967 the Tunisian government withdrew recognition from the 
Sallal regime and the following week the Jordanians also 
withdrew:iecognition and it was soon announced that they were 
sending a military training mis·sion to the Yemeni royalists. 
9 
However, there were signs that theroyalists were not as 
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united as they had been formally. The existence .. of a sep-
arate republican force which appeared to be willing to 
negotiate with the royalists served as a disuniting factor· 
in the royalist faction. The dissident republicans proposed 
to form a coordinating committee and an interim secretariat 
and that on each of the~e bodies the royalists should make 
up two thirds o~ the membership. The proposal, however, was 
oppose_d by some of the royalist leaders, particularly Prince 
... 
.. . 
. , ; 
Abdullah, the son- of Hassan the royalist premier, despite 
the fact that it was receiving the approval of the Saudis. 
Abdullah asserted that the Saudis insistence on cooperation 
with the dissident republicans was designed to divide the 
Yemeni and maintain Saudi influence. He went further and 
stated that "Cairo gives the puppet republican government 
more autonomy than the Saudis give the roya1ists. 1110 This 
would seem to confirm the opinion of the republicans at the 
Harad Conference. 
The increasing complexity of ~he relationships 
I 
within Yemen was only one aspect of a generally deteriorat-
1 ·~·ing condition on the Arabian Peninsula • The war had now 
been going on for five years, but peace seemed further away 
\ 
t}"'\ 
than ever. There was evidence of considerable unrest in 
\ 
\ 
Saudi Arabia. 11 The Saudi Arabian formula consisted of 
large scale arrests and mass public executions. In the 
I • ,,-.' 
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middle of March, 35, 000 Yemeni were rounded up and . depor'ted 
by boat. At the same time in Aden the British were faced 
. with waves of violence which required large scale troop 
actions before they could be subdued. At the beginning of 
.1967 it appeared that the pro EgyptianFLOSlwas being trained 
and equipped from Yemen but it was later revealed that the 
NLF which had broken ties with Egypt was receiving similar 
. t 12 ass1s ance. The Saudis tended to blame the British for 
pulling out at an inopportune moment. But, in fact, there 
is no reason to suppose that it was the British decision to 
withdraw that caused the general upheaval. It· was the result 
of accumulating events over which the British had no real 
control. Nevertheless, they were disturbed by the course of 
events and it was agreed to offer the new federation some 
kind of protection once the troops had actually withdrawn. ~2 
The Americans shared the British concern and at the 
beginning of March 1967 the US State Department announced 
that the declaration made by President Kennedy on May 8, 1963 
on unprovoked aggression in.the Middle East was extended to 
cover Southern Arabia. The original declaration was issued 
. 
· 14 to co~ier the security of Israel and Jordan. This decision, 
of course, was just a continuation of a general policy in-
augurated with the Truman Doctrine of 1947 whereby the 
Americans assumed the re_sponsibility of securing Western 
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interests in.areas which the British were forced.to relin-
' quish because of economic necessity. The move was also an 
·acknowledgement of the sharp deterioration in relations be-
tween the US and Egypt which had been steadily.improving 
during the early sixties. This was, no doubt, the result 
of the US refusal to renew wheat shipments and the threats 
to curtail aid if Nasser refused to agopt a more paa:i.ve 
foreign policy. In any event, Nasser gave a 'furiously 
anti us• speech during the annual celebration of the form-
ation of the UAR.ls Whatever influence the us may have had 
in the past, by this point, their ability to influence 
Nasser's decisions was compl·etely dissipated. Thus during 
the 1967 Arab Israeli War it was-Moscow's voice, not Wash--
ington's which helped to determine the course of events. 
During March, the US mission in Yemen began to be 
harrassed and at the end of April the US wa~ asked to remove 
its aid mission. 16 ,I In addition, by arming Saudi Arabia the 
West dramatically revealed the impotence of Nasser. It is 
impossible to ascertain what influence this had on Nasser's 
decision to direct his attention towards Israel but there 
would seem to be some connection. The arguments put forward 
in this paper would tend to suggest that if the Yemen dis-
pute had been satisfactorily resolved, then the Arab Israeli 
war of June 1967, might never have broken out. As it was, 
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Nasser was simultaneously facing failure in Yemen and con-
tinuous taunts from Jordan and Syria about the Israeli sit~ 
uation. It could be argued that a leader should be immune 
to taunts from other countries, but given the nature of the 
situation in the Middle East, no Arab leader can afford to 
ignore these outside influences if he wishes to preserve in-
ternal stability within his own state. Since this is the 
situation, it is to this situation which the West must react. 
It is unreasonable to offer advice to the Arab leaders~which, 
if implemented, would effectively encourage their own down-
fall: yet it would seem that, .unintentionally, the West in-
, sisted· on offering such advice. On the one hand, the West 
armed Saudi Arabia and· e·ffectively ensured that any solution 
in Yemen would be at the expense of Nasser, at the same time 
the West withheld aid from Nasser and suggested that further 
aid would not be forthcoming until Nasser agreed to abide by 
certain rules dictated by the West. It is unlikely that the 
West wished Nasser to see the situation in this light, but 
this is undoubtedly how Nasser viewed it, and it was inevit-
able that he should find the Western attitude intolerable. 
Inexorably, Nasser seemed to be pushed into an 
extreme position and the West did little to help him out of 
his dilemma. On May 18, U Thant agreed to Nasser's request 
to withdraw the UNEF17 and on May 22 Cairo announced that 
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the UAR had decided to prevent Israeli shipping and oth~
1
~ 
'I 
ships carrying strategic cargoes to Israel from passing 
throt1gh the Gulf of Aqi~ba. 18 And so, with a relentless and 
cruel logic, the six day war came and went, and by June 1 
there was talk of a new power structure in·~ the Middle . East, 
although in reality, all the war. had done was to confirm an 
existing balance of power. T'he belief that a new situation 
had been created led.to all kinds of false predictions. 
Hanson Baldwin argued that: 
"This new balance of power a11d the psycho-
logical and political impact of the Israeli 
victories are bound to influence the inter-
Arab conflicts in this area ••• Both the war 
in Yemen between royalist and republican 
forces and their supporters and the terror-
ism in Aden are likely to be intensifiea.19 
It was stated that Nasser would have to achieve 
victories elsewhere in order to reestablish his lost prestige. 
But the reas~n why Nasser was involved in these conflicts was 
because of the lack of purpose among the major Arab leaders. 
The Arab Israeli war helped to eliminate some of these di£-
. 
ferences temporarily and for this reason, Nasser was able 
'\ 
to withdraw from Yemen and assist in the settlement of the 
·-
conflict in Aden. Faisal solidly backed Nasser on the 
Israeli conflict and thus permitted Nas·ser to resolve the 
other differences between them. If the West had offered 
Nasser wholehearted suppo~t at an earlier date there is a 
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possibility that Nasser could have resolved his differences· 
at an earlier date. The ·west was· unabl(:~ to assist in this 
... ,j .,process because they wish.~d to seem sintul:taneously: to be 
offering assistan~e, to Nasser, Faisal and the Isra~lis~ In 
this com~licated juggling process it is not surprising that 
' 
the overall affect was a considerable decline in the infl~u-
ence· c.~ the ·west in the area. 
The restoration of Arab unity which had been con-
. spicul·ously absent c.luring ·the previous year was qt1ickly 
apparent. Thus when the Intern~tio11al. Conunittee of t:he Red 
Cross issued a report on the Egypt.ian use of gas in Yemen, 
the Saudis refused to comment on· t.he reprlrt in the UN, in 
order to emphasize Saudis solidarity with tne UAR ).n their 
1 . h ·~1 20 strugg e wit Isra~. The following week, Rourguiba, who 
had been attemptit; to follow a more rr~oderate _policlr towards 
Israel, and had refused to break relations with West Germany 
when it recognized Israel, sent a message~expressin·J com-
plete solidarity and support for the UAR. Al.I t:~.e ot:her 
Arab states fell in line behind the tJAR. 
By the middle of June the first serious attempts 
to withdraw EgYJpt from Yemen were already underway. As soon 
as the June war ~tarted, Nasser withdrew 10,000 men and by 
mid Jur1e c, :Eu.~.i:ther 5,000 had left and it was estimated. tl1at 
there were about 25 to 30,000 Egyptians left. 21 
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when this happened·that it would be clearly ascertained that 
the events in the Southern sector of the Arabian Peninsula. 
~were completely independent of any action that Nasser had 
taken. T~is explains why it was at the time when Nasser was 
most obviously reducing his commitment in the area, ~he 
violence in the South Arabian Federation reached its height. 
By the end of June a 700 strong battalion had to be added 
to the British forces in Aden in order to deal with th.e 
worsening situation. 22 There was a growing fear among the 
British that they were going to leave a Congo-like situation 
behind them. At the same time,· Egyptian .tr~9ps __ ---,~ontinued 
to dwindl.e and by the end of June it was believed the t there 
were as few as 12,000 left and that the UAR armour and heavy 
equipment was being pulled out of Hodeida and that the air 
force was cut back to six planes. 23 
· While this voluntary withdrawal was taking place, 
attempts were also being made at the diplomatic lev.el to 
-- ---· 
arrange .a formal agreement on Yemen. At the end of July the 
Arab foreign ministers met at Khartoum to try and arrange a 
;-T summit for the Arab leaders. 24 At the meeting, the UAR 
foreign minister Riad requested an "urgent reactivization 
. ' . ... ~... . ' 
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of the Jidda agreement". 2_5 It was believed that if the 
Saudis accepted the UAR proposals to facilitate their with-
. · draw al from Yemen, the chances of a new J\,rab summit would 
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be greatly enchanced. 26 - The Yemeni delegate, however,· was 
.. 1-,. 
disturbed by the UAR_call for a return to the Jidda Pact. 
This move would involve a plebiscite and this was a develop-
ment which the republicans were anxious to avoid. 27 However, 
i~ the Egyptian initiative did not receive \the approval of 
the Yemeni republicans, it was certainly welcomed by the 
other Arab states. It was this issue which had partially 
accounted for the sharp cleavage in the Arab World which 
prevailed until the June w·ar. ('It was believed that "Nasser's 
gesture in the ·Yemen could unify the Arabs. 1128) It seemed 
that only the Yemeni re~ublicans could prevent a new accord 
~------~--among the Arabs. There seems little doubt that they were 
anxious to do this. Thus when it was reported that the 
' Soviets had asked the Yemeni if they could establish a mili-
tary base in Yemen, this was probably a rumour started by 
the Yemeni republicans themselves in an effort to force 
Nasser to continue his aid. 29 The Egyptians ignored the 
report which was quickly denied by the Yemeni embassy in 
Moscow. JO 
_...... .... . 
However, the willingness of the UAR to implement 
a peace plan did not ensure an r:immediate settlement in Yemen. 
The Sauds did not demonstrate a marked enthusiasm for the 
UAR proposals. They argued that the UAR must completely 
31 
withdraw before a settlement could be reached.· It was· 
apparent that this was just a negotiating stance designed 
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· to spee·d up the UAR exit. · In reality the Sauds were very 
anxious to see Nasser leave Yemen before the British left ·· 
Aden and would help to faci.~itate such a move. 
In these circumstances all that was~. required for · 
· a settlement was a mediator to bring the two parties to-
gether. The role was filled by Mohammed Ahmed Mah~oub, the 
Pre·sident of Sudan, who it· appears was anxious to prove. that 
the Sudanese "were fully fledged Arabs and Khartoum is an 
Arab capital where kings and presidents foregather."32 · On 
August 1st Mahgoub saw NaStSer in Cairo where he heard that 
Nasser was prepared to accept any reasonable settlement. 
Later in the month he visited Jidda where he formed the sug-
gested terms for a settlement and took them to Cairo where ~ 
they were accepted. The final terms were worked out at 
Khartoum and finally agreed to on August 3lst.33 The agree-
ment was inunediately denounced by Sallal who argued that it 
was an ' inter£ erence in our internal af f·airs. '34 
The plan was appropriately vague. It was to deal 
simply with the UAR and Saudi Arabia and contained no refer-
ence to a plebiscite, which was an important element in the 
Jidda accord, and it specified no time limit on ·the Egyptian 
withdrawal. Three countries were designated to supervise 
· the execution of the peace plan. Theyi-:were Morocco, Iraq 
and Sudan. The agreement instructed them to consult the 
' •O 
,_. ___ ---
35 UAR and Saudi Arabia 11 0n all matters impending implementation"• 
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The final agreement was reached during the Arab summit be-
tween the heads of state. Both Nasser and Hussein told 
the other Arab leaders that the time had come to reach a 
political settlement with I_srael. Hussein said: "We 
should face reality in an honest adult way. Boasting of 
glory does not make glory and singing in the dark does not 
dispel fear. 1136 This air of reasonableness characterized 
the overall policy of both Nasser and Hussein. Although 
Western commentators often seized upon the increasing in-
fluence of the Soviets in Cairo, there were determined efforts 
r{ 
to mend relations with both ·Britain:and the us. It was 
decided to renew diplomatic relations with Britain; they 
had been broken off in connection with Wilson's policy dur-
. 
. 
. 
ing the Rhodesian crisis in 1.965 when Smith declared UDI. 37 
Mohammed Heykel in Ahram pointed out that it was essential 
that the UAR had ties· with the US II A head on clash with the 
US was, and still is, in my opinion, an error which we can-
not afford and for which we are not equipped. 1138 
At the same time that the Arabs were att,empting 
to solve their differences, the British were also beginning 
to see a solution to their difficulties in Aden. By the 
summer of 1967 the federal government in the South Arabian 
Federation had completely disintegrated and it was becoming 
· increasingly uncertain to what authority t~e British auth-
orities were going to hand over control. By the beginning 
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· of September, however, the nat·ionalist group known as the 
NEF was rapidly establishing itself as an organization which 
could control the country and the British decided to start 
negotiations with the NLF. The · aim was to allow them to form 
a new government. 39 This provides an excellent example of 
Cozer's argument that one group will always prefer to deal 
with an organized opposition rather than a large number of 
disorganized groups. 40 So, in spite of the fact that the 
NLF had been one· of Britain's major sources of trouble and 
discomfort in the area, they were pleased to see them subdue 
the opposition factions: although this made them stronger, 
it also made them more easy to deal with. 
The continued presence of FLOSY posed a problem, 
but on September 23, the organization agreed to hold talks 
' th th NT·F d th 1 · . f. 41 w1 e Li un er e persona supervision o Nasser. 
This attempt failed and for the next month Nasser attempted 
to bring together these two badly split groups. The NLF 
leaders praised President Nasser for.his assistance.42 At 
the beginning of November it was announced from Cairo that 
} 
the two nationalist groups had reached an agreement. The 
British inunediately announced that their troops would be 
withdrawn within two months arid that in view of the success-
ful implementation of the Khartoum agreement the British 
also cancelled the offer of naval and-bomber deterrent 
.• 
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'. forces to protec~ temporarily 1 the independenc~ of South 
Arabia. 43 Although fighting broke out between the NLF and 
FLOSY almost immediately afterwards44 the NLF quickly assert-
ed their military superiority and the South Arabian Army 
I. 
pledged its support to the NLF and in consequence the group 
demanded .tli,at it be recognized as the sole representative 
of the people of South Arabia. The British accepted this 
request and on November 29 the last British troops left the 
Arabian Peninsula after 128 years and control was also hand-
ed over to the NLF leaders who renamed the country the. 
-~ 
Republic of South Yemen.45 This revealed their close affil-
iation with the republican government in Yemen. 
At the same time the Egyptians were faithfully 
complying with their agreement and as the British left Aden 
the last of the Egyptian troops were at Hodeida ready to 
leave the republican government to its fate. After five 
years of fighting the Egyptians voluntarily departed from 
the Peninsula;::-..the initial objective of securing the repub-
. I, , . 
lie still unfulfilled. ( ,, j 
It has been argued that Nasser's'withdrawal from 
··' 
· ·· ·.· ··· the Peninsula marks the complete failure of his policy. This,· 
however, is based on _certain assumptions about his· aims. If· 
it is accepted that the major objectives were to establish 
•" r .. , ... ~ ,4,., 
. radical governments and remove the influence of the British·, 
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I .· 
· then he· has in some measure achieved his purpose_.._ It has 
been reported that Nasser is now a tired and a harrassed 
. man, believing he has failed his country and wishing to re-
tire. 46 He bas let it be known that Egypt does not intend 
to assist revolutionary forces outside of Egypt. But this 
may reflect a new understanding of the nature of revolution 
and that he now accepts that revolution cannot be export~d. 
A view that Mao Tse Tung has also come to accept • 
It may be that the Israel defeat has provided an 
excuse to withdraw from his previously held position. But 
Nasser, like every other decision maker, is subjected to 
many different pressures which influence his policy. One 
commentator has observed that while the resolve to withdraw 
is doubtless genuine and will allow a relax·ation of inter-
Arab tensions, it also "leaves the Arab world leaderless.:! 
No.one_seriously believes that King Faisal can assume the 
fa 
mantle and in time one supposes that the pressures on Presi-
dent Nasser to reassert himself will build up again. 
Whether he can do it in , a way which will cut across ideo- · 
logical differences remains to be seen, but there are those 
• C . h d t d. t th. . b · 1. 114? th in airo w o o no iscoun is possi 1 1ty. In o · er 
,, 
words, if Nasser-does begin to reass~rt himself, this may 
well r~present certain forces within the decision making 
process rather than any rnegalomanic tendencies on,the part 
-11, ... ~-· 
of Nasser. 
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The present .. trend. is to explain all policies of 
I 't'"• 
· intervention in terms of aggression which in turn reflects 
the personalities of certain states. In reality, the pro-
cess is much more complex than this would suggest. Inter-
vention takes place for limited objectives. Nasser did not 
intervene in Yemen in order to establish a base to takeover 
-
i the Arabian Peninsula.. . Even if this was a long term object-
ive, an attempt to use it as an explanation of the initial 
policy will merely confuse the issue. It _is only af·ter the 
intervention has taken place and the stakes begin to alter 
.th~t these more sweeping objectives begin to operate, al-
though very often they can be seen to be offered as a justi-
fication for the original policy. This, almost certainly, 
was the reason that Dean Rusk raised the issue of Red China 
in the Vietnam conflict. The oil fields of Kuwait in the 
Yemeni conflict seems to be an analogous justification for.~ 
a policy of intervention which began with more modest and 
limited objectives. 
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. CONCLUSION 
· This study. has rais~d a number of questions which 
--::-1.\·•-.;:r- ... , 
have not been examined in the text. There has been no 
attempt, for example, to define the concept of intervention; 
so although the policy pursued by Saudi Arabia, the U.N., 
the·u.s., and the U.A.R., could all be termed intervention, 
the types of action adopted were very different·. This 
suggests that there is a need, not so much for a definition, 
l .,, .• 
as for-a classification of intervention and an attempt to 
place it in the context of other po~icy options. The spec-
trum which the term covers is very wide; the action of the 
U .A.~}' is indistinguishable from a policy of war, while the 
, US action falls in the category of a peace arbiter. Wright 
in his Study of War suggests that intervention, like revo-
-
lution, lies: "somewhere between peace and war as these 
terms are popularly understood" • 1 This leads him .. to the 
conclusion that: 
"the r.ecognition of such a situation 
J'- · casts doubt upon the reality of a sharp 
distinction between war and peace and 
suggests the utility of searching for 
a variable of which war and peace are 
extreme conditionso Such a variable 
might be found in the external form or 
the internal substance of international 
relationso"2 
.·· ..... .;, . 
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Others have been aware of similar problems •. ·.. In 
an examination of external involvement in internal wars, 
'ii',.', ,_. 
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Karl Deutsch points out that the "elements of domestic 
strife and external intervention are i:r{t.ermingled in vary-
ing proportions." But he argues that there are important 
differences between internal war where there is a: "pre~ 
ponderance of domestic motivation, recruitinent and resources" 
and a 'war by proxy' which is 
. 
11 an international conflict between two 
foreign powers, fought out on the soil 
of a third country: disguised as a 
conflict over an internal issue of that 
country as a means of achieving prepon-
derantly foreign goals and foreign 
strategies."3 
~· I • 
Both Wright and Deutsch are concerned with identi-
fying the nature of different policy options pursued by 
states. There are two preliminary questions which need to 
be asked when identifying a policy of intervention: what 
type of action is being employed and what is the situation 
where the action takes place. Intervention can be classi-
fied in accordance with these two variables. There are 
four situations when a policy of intervention can be said 
· to operate. 
· 1) A war is in progress · ancf a state decides to enter the 
war even though the state is.in no danger of being attacked. 
The US ~ntry into World War I and II has, therefore, been 
characterized as an intervention. 
"ct-,· 
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2) A state decides to support a colony in a struggle with 
the mother country. This type of intervention has been 
· common inthe post-war world. 
3) A state becomes involved in.the civil war of another 
country. As in the two previous cases, it is possible for 
the intervention to be impartial. The US refusal to supply 
either Nigeria or Biafra with arms can be viewed as an im-
partial intervention. 
4) A state unilaterally involves itself in the domestic 
politics of another state. 
The second variable in the classification of .. 
intervention relates to the type of action a state can pur-
sue once the decision to intervene has been made. It would 
clearly make the classification too complex to include all 
the possible courses of action, but t~ey can be grouped 
under three headings. 
1) Non military int~rvention. This includes actions like 
propaganda, diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions • 
. 
-2) Passive military assistance. This involves military 
activities short of ·interdicting. troops. It obviously in-
• 
eludes sending military.aid but it also includes the mobil-
ization of troops and _the movement of troops into strategic ·. 
positions • The Soviets , for example, moved troops to the 
border of Czechoslovakia in March 1968 dur~ng the domestic 
1 : 
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upheavals in that country. 
3) Active military assistance.· This involves the inter-
diction of troops. 
A classification of intervention, therefore, could 
look like this: 
Ongoing 
War 
Colonial 
Conflict 
Internal 
War 
Unilateral 
Initiative 
Non 
Military 
• 
US attempts to 
settle Franco 
Mexican war 
1865 
US pressure 
on Dutch over 
Indonesia. 
~ 
US action in 
Santo Domingo 
(1915) organi-
zing elections 
S. U. removal 
of Finnish 
Government 
1959 
Passive 
Military 
Soviet arms 
to North 
Vietnam 
Soviet arms 
to Viet 
Minh 
US assist-
ance to 
Chinese 
nationalists 
US refusal 
to sell arms 
in Middle 
East June 67 
1 
Active 
Military 
us into 
World War I 
and II 
US into 
Spanish 
American War 
German and 
Italy into 
Spanish Civil 
War 
GB and France 
into Egypt 
1956 
.·,~·· 
It would not be difficult to apply this classifi-
cation to the Yemen situation which· has been described. The 
. interventions ?tll fall under the category concerning internal· 
war;· the three countries most involved: the UAR, Saudi. 
Arabia and the US fall into the three headings within this 
category. The US pursued a policy of non military inter- ·· · .. 
vention in the form of the Bunker mission; the Saudis pur-
sued a policy of passive military assistance by supplying 
the royalists with military aid, the troop movements and 
the military preparations also fall under this heading; the 
•. i , ~.. ' 1 
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UAR was .. obviously following apolicy of active military 
assistance. The classification, therefore, seems to be 
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useful in that it clearly delineates different types of 
intervention: but it only provides the basis for the most 
rudimentary type of comparison. 
The classification does not really help to solve 
the problem posed by both Wright and Deutsch. To· do this, 
it is ne9essary to ~xamine the motives behind the initial 
decision to intervene. This also provides another useful 
area of comparison which may help to provide a unified theory 
which will eliminate the diversity revealed:,/by the classif-
ication. There is very little point, for example, in com-
paring the effects of tl1e US intervention into World War I , 
. with the· British intervention into Suez; there is, however, 
I legitimate grounds for comparing the motives behind the two 
decisions. This technique has been employed before. In a 
study of British expansion in Africa, Robinson and Gallagher 
decided that there were so many variables involved, that 
·the only way to get a true picture of the reasons for ex-
. . 
;pansion was to examine the official archives to see what 
, . 
· pressures .influenced the decision makers. 
The elements in the problem might seem 
so numerous and disparate as to make .it 
insoluble. Some unified field of study 
has to be found where all possible in-
. centives to African empire may be assembled 
,\·-·. -;:11.-1_··"'1',' ',- ' 
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without becoming indistinguishable in 
their several effects. Historically, 
only the government in London regis-
tered and balanced all the contingencies 
making for British expansion in Africa. 
1 In following the occasions and motives, 
all roads led ineluctably to Do~ning 
Street. The files and red boxes which 
passed between ministers and officials 
at-the time contain the problem in its 
contemporary proportions. 4 
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This approach presents problems. There are no 
'···Egyptian or Saudi Arabian files available on the interven~ 
tion into Yemen. The motives which are suggested in this 
paper are gleaned from the facts surrounding ·the decision. 
These facts, for example, would not seem to support the 
contention that Nasser seized upon the intervention ~o 
(~--
Yemen as a means of resto~ing his prestige. On the contrary, 
the facts seem to indicate a reluctance on the p~rt of 
Nasser to use the situation for this end. It is possible, 
therefore, to es·tablish theories without complete informa-
tion •. Even with-the aid of all the documents there will be 
no clear' cut answers, although it is probable that a number 
of possible solutions will emerge. 
Robinson and Gallagher in their study concluded 
· ·'that ·the overrid.ing motive which ensured. that British 
decision makers would pursue a policy of intervention in. · 
Africa at the end of the nineteenth century was the strate-
gic importance of the Suez Canal. It is unlikely that 
. ,. '. 
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intervention can generally be attributed to such a specific 
cause; it is likely that interventions in a particular area 
and at a particular time can be examined collectively. Thus 
the rash of interventions which followed the defeat of 
Napoleon in 1815 seem to be related. Similarly, the con-
stant intervention by Europe and the U.S. in Latin America 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can probably 
.be explained by-a few overriding _principles. Both these 
examples illustrate that intervention is preeminently a 
. policy used by the strong agai.nst the weak. This suggests ·. 
that even though the incidence of war may decline in the 
contemporary system, it is unlikely that the policy of in-
tervention will be discarded. 
It was noted in the introduction that the· inde-· 
. -pendent, sovereign state is sometimes thought az:i anacroni~m 
in the contemporary international system. But there are 
many indications that the sovereign state will remain the 
. principal unit of o.rganization for the foreseeable future •. · 
However, the tremendous disparity between the different 
·units·does ensure an inequality within the system which 
will be exploited. Thus when Britain decided to withdraw 
from its position .East of. Suez it was argued that there 
would be a power vacuum left in the area. Likewise it has 
been suggested that if the_ US withdrew from Asia or Europe, 
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other states would take advantage of the power vacuum which 
·would be created. The nature of the power vacuum is never 
really explained and it is a very nebulous concept; never-
theless, it does point to the important truth that decision 
makers still consider the world to be divided up into areas· 
of .special interest which supports the idea that states are 
not fully sovereign. Many of the concepts, therefore, which 
were valid in the nineteenth century in a time when the· 
sovereign state was not universal, are still applicable 
today, despit~ the vastly changed circumstances. 
Although the sovereign state system·has·been ex-
tended to all parts of the globe, the idea that areas fall 
within the sphere of influence or hegemonial influence of 
other states remains viable. It is also true that this· 
situation will be very fluid: as states develop economic-
ally and militarily, the image they have of their own 
position and role in the world will change. If their over-
all position is improving they are likely to become re-
visionist states; if their overall position in the hiera~chy 
of powers is declining, they will favour the status quo. In 
either case, they are likely to use intervention as a means 
of developing or preserving the system to suit their own 
· needs. 
. ;r, . During th·e early part o·f the nineteenth century, 
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· ·the· European pow~rs. intervened· in Latin America in order to 
assert that the Southern hemisphere was part of their sphere 
of influence. As the US developed.as a major power, the 
European powers found it increasingly difficult to sustain· 
their position. The motive for their interventions now 
centred on an attempt to prevent the US establishing a pos-
ition of hegemonial influence in the Western hemisphere. 
From the·l840's the idea was to use European strength_ to 
. ·-1'~ l ........... ~ 
-., r , 
maintain a balance of power in the area. The Europeans 
. ' r{ 
seemed ·to see themselves as the 'balancer'--the part played 
by the British in the European system. By the end of the. 
century, the US had successfully asserted its position as 
the.hegemonial power in the system and the interventions 
which followed were to ensure that it-maintained its pos-
ition and eliminated any cause for European intervention. 5 
This analysis suggests that there could be a 
specific and a general cause_for intervention. A classifi-
cation of the motives behind a policy of intervention, 
.therefore, would look like this: 
General Cause 
Maintain sphere 
of influence 
Maintain Balanee -
of Po\'11er 
Maintain Hegern-
onial system 
Specific Cause 
a)Protect rights of nationals 
b)Retain favourable governments 
c)Prevent intrusion of other states 
a)Develop strong governments 
b)Maintain internal stability 
c)Ensure external security 
a)Protect the rights of other nationals 
b)Maintain favourable governments 
c) Settle disputes which invite fore-ign 
intervention 
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· This is a very crude model and it is ·difficult to 
.apply. Nevertheless, decision makers do seem to be conscious 
of these general causes. 
" I) ) 
In: the case of Yemen the UAR and 
Saudi Arabia were certain that the othe~r was attempting to 
include Yemen within its own hegemonial system. An objec-
tive assessment would suggest that both would have been 
satisfied if Yemen could have been brought within its own 
sphere of influence. The US, on the other hand, seems to 
be anxious to develop a balance .of power in the Middle East 
wit~ the countries sovereign and equal and unable to exert 
undue pressure on·other members of the system. Their ideal 
solution would have been .to end the civil war and leave 1 - '.:...:· 
Yemen under the influence of neither the UAR nor Saudi 
Arabia. 
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